

THE  
FUTURE  
RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN  
GERMANY  
AND THE  
NETHERLANDS



# THE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS

*Report of the symposium held on the occasion of the 130th  
Anniversary of the Royal (Netherlands) Association for Military  
Science (Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de  
Krijgswetenschap)*

The Hague, May 18th 1995

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*Edited by T. de Kruijf*



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


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# Introduction

At May 6th 1995 the Royal (Netherlands) Association for Military Science<sup>1</sup> celebrated its 130th birthday. This memorable event was the motive to organize a symposium. After ample deliberations the board selected as topic: 'The future relations between Germany and the Netherlands'. The immediate cause for this selection was the planned establishment of 1st GE/NL Corps in August 1995.

It was decided not to aim exclusively on military matters but to place the cooperation between the two countries in a broader perspective. The duration of the symposium (one day) did not allow to pay attention to all relevant aspects. Finally as subjects to be dealt with were political, economical and military affairs. This meant that i.a. no attention should be paid to cultural, psychological and administrative matters. Although the latter aspects were deleted from the program, the reader of this booklet will discover that in the presentations and during the discussion period they got at least some attention.

It is not intended to highlight some points or to summarize the symposium here, but it became quite clear that many Dutchmen do not really know Germany. This in spite of the regular visits they pay to this country. Therefore the advise was given to improve the knowledge about our bigger neighbour, an advise worth to be repeated in this introduction.

The symposium was held on May 18th 1995 in the 'Nieuwe Kerk' in the Hague. The preparation and execution of the program was in the hands of Captain ret. (RNLN) A. Kok. The symposium was only possible thanks to financial support from the firms and organisations mentioned in Annex 3.

Just as five years ago the Association got also many positive remarks about this symposium. This may justify the idea to start the tradition of a larger conference every five years.

*T. de Kruijf*  
*editor*

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<sup>1</sup> Official Dutch name: Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap





# Welcomespeech

*by Major General B.A.C. Droste, Deputy Commander in Chief Royal Netherlands Air Force, President of the Royal (Netherlands) Association for Military Science (Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap)*

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

On behalf of the board of the Royal Netherlands Association for Military Science, it is my distinct pleasure to welcome you all to this symposium on the 'Future relations between Germany and the Netherlands' which has been organised on the occasion of the 130th Anniversary of our Association.

Having reached this respectable age of one hundred and thirty years, we are particularly pleased that the Association still has the kind of dynamic appeal that has managed to draw all of you to day to this place and celebrate this memorable milestone with us. I do realise that this dynamic appeal is for a major part caused by the times we live in now. Military Science is an ancient art, but it can also be a very tenacious one at times, as we could observe during the 40 years of the Cold War era.

However military concepts were given a new impetus during the years after 1989, which were anticipated with so much hope, but - as we know now - turned out to be full of turmoil. Contradictory though it may seem, this has caused our Association to flourish as is evidenced by our frequent and very well attended meetings dealing with a great variety of subjects. Military art and science are no longer the specific domain of the military as we can see for ourselves every day from the news reels on the conflict areas in the world, which - unfortunately - are numerous.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Fifty years after the Liberation, this month has been marked by commemorations, both in the Netherlands and in Germany, to reflect on our freedom which was fought for by so many. The fact that we have been living in freedom since, does not mean that this freedom can be taken for granted. This is also true of the material wealth that we enjoy these days. Open democracies, such as the German and Dutch ones, are increasingly being influenced by virtually unstoppable external influences. An adequate response, either in the area of politics or economics or in military terms if all else fails, calls for closer cooperation across national frontiers, in particular with our next-door neighbours, now more than ever before. Against this background we will be debating issues today concerning the future relation between Germany and the Netherlands. We consider this subject to be relevant because of the fact that in spite of major common interests, the people from Germany and the Netherlands often turn out to be less knowledgeable about each other's background than one would expect

as a result of our geographical proximity. This of course is a pity because both our societies form a multi-coloured palette and the respective shades would certainly merit a closer study on both sides. We hope that today's seminar will contribute to this process.

There is still room for improvement of the Dutch perception of Germany and on the other hand the German perception of the Netherlands. On both sides the perception of the other is incomplete and sometimes incorrect. How often do we hear preconceived ideas regarding both societies leading a life of their own and not only that, but we also find them repeated and responded to by the media undisputedly. And before we know it a new generation is infected with the same unchallenged prejudices. When we finally meet in person we find that these preconceived notions were and are unfounded.

Improving our perceptions of each other is not a simple matter and even more so because the self-image of nations, in which they mirror their counterparts, may require some adjusting at times. Moreover in many cases we are talking about deep-rooted ideas and not everybody is aware that these ideas go back to the time well before 1940.

The relation between two countries of such a different size and with such a different historic and cultural evolution is in short a matter which is delicate by its very nature. Fortunately the dissimilarities between Germany and the Netherlands do not stand in the way of close cooperation between the two at all. Defence cooperation in particular takes a prominent role here. For this definitely reflects how relations between nations in Western Europe have changed fundamentally after World War II. Apart from that there are Dutch soldiers serving in Germany and German soldiers serving on Dutch territory. In many aspects these soldiers can be proud of the fact that while performing their daily tasks they are laying the foundation for the kind of trust that is indispensable if we are to create real substance to a lasting relation between our nations which share so many common interests.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Before introducing the first speaker to you I would like to express my appreciation to the organisers of today's seminar and I would certainly like to include the support that has been provided generously by many parties outside the Association, such as the Ministry of Defence and all industries mentioned in the program. Without their highly appreciated assistance and contributions it would not have been possible to organize this conference.

I am also very honoured by the moral support we have received from our Honorary member, His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard, as can be witnessed from his remarks which are included in the program.

And last but not least there is another matter which has given rise to many a question: why should a conference about this specific subject be conducted in English? Why not opt for a solution in the style of the European Union, where everyone can speak their own language? The answer will not come as a surprise to you. Due to a long standing tradition of the Dutch we have opted for a low cost solution without interpreters. But perhaps even more importantly, we have chosen to do it this way because we felt, that if the discussions were to be conducted in two or maybe more languages at the same time, this might detract us from the debate on the real issues. So in this case the language of our English and American friends will serve as today's Esperanto.

We are pleased that the speakers whom we have asked to address this conference have accepted our invitation. It is my privilege to announce the first speaker to you, the Dutch

Minister of Defence Dr. Voorhoeve. As Director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', Dr. Voorhoeve has at the time made a significant contribution to the debate on Dutch-German relations. He was awarded the 'Grosses Verdienstkreuz Deutschland' for his accomplishments. In his present position relations between Germany and the Netherlands continue to feature prominently on his list of priorities. This is also evidenced by his forthcoming visit to his German counterpart Mr. Rühle next week when he will also discuss new proposals for bilateral defence cooperation.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is my pleasure to give the floor to our Minister of Defence Dr. Voorhoeve.



DR. IR. J. J. C. VOORHOEVE  
*Minister of Defence*

(foto: Fotopersburo Dijkstra B.V.)

power of the Corps in battle. Its shape is derived from the so-called 'Send' sword that for the past 400 years has been attached to the facade of the cityhall of Münster during the 'Send'. 'Sends' were church meetings held in Münster, often coinciding with large annual fairs. During these periods special rules applied in the city. The most important of them was that all quarrels were to be cast aside. The 'Send' still exists in Münster today. Three times a year - in March, June and October - its citizens have to put all their differences aside under the rules of the 'Send'. If the need so arises the military will join them in this tradition. Even between 'Sends' we can derive strength from the emblem, for we can be mindful of the Latin saying underneath: 'Communitate Valemus' Strength in community. I believe mr. chairman that the future of our two countries is encapsulated in this conviction.



*crest 1 (GE/NL) Corps*



# Presentation by Dr. B. Knapen

*Editor-in-Chief NRC Handelsblad*

The sixties of the nineteenth century brought a lot of optimism concerning scientific progress, so it was only natural to start looking at the conduct of war as a science as well. As an amateur who is only interested by the recent history of warfare I like to think that this century has learned us again and again that the conduct of war is not only a science but also and still is an art. At least writing about it is both - science and art - 'Kunde und Kunst'.

So I hope that your association will continue its stimulating work in the fields of science and art for at least another 130 years to go. Hopefully more in the fields of arts and science than in the fields of battle and warfare itself.

Today's topic deals with relations between countries and I guess being from the media, they did not ask me just to talk flag, motherhood and applepie, 'Friede, Freude und Eierkuche'. When one has to talk about the future - as we do today - one tends to slip into the past. What else can one do when you are looking for references and when your belief in astrology is only unfortunately underdeveloped. The famous French historian, the late Pierre Renouvin, came after decades of study on history of foreign relations to a loosely formulated theory in which economic and financial history plays a role but even more so the cultural sociology of national elites, of public opinion and the methods of decisionmaking. The features of a nation were taken into account in what Renouvin called 'les forces profondes' and the 'psychologie collective'.

Talking about the future of German-Dutch relationship one can only be glad to stick with Pierre Renouvin. One can look for 'forces profonde' and 'psychologie collective'. This is very useful for our framework of analysis because there is a lot of psychology in our relationship. So much even that I sometimes wonder why German-Dutch relations are taught by professors on foreign relations whereas it could easily be a field of specialisation within the faculties of psychology.

It is not easy to say something specific on a relationship between two countries, when at the same time these countries are in many respects uncertain entities. Uncertain in their sense of purpose but also uncertain in their room to manoeuvre as a nation-state.

Let me first talk about the sense of purpose. Or as the fashion of the day in both the private sector and the army would call it - the mission statement. If one looks to Germany one can of course distinguish some self evident features. With 80 million inhabitants Germany is by far the biggest country in Europe. Its gross domestic product is not that far away anymore of that of Britain and France combined. In terms of geography Germany holds a central position in Europe as well - something that will be even more visible when the government offices will



have been moved to the border with Poland, to Berlin. So it is all the more understandable that people start to look to Germany as a leader in Europe. Or as the former president of the United States said shortly after the Wall came down, Germany and the United States will be partners in leadership.

But in what direction is Germany going to lead? To be quite frankly it is very hard to unfold here a new or even a more detailed panorama for you. In the realm of business and finance Germany has been a moderate proponent of free trade. For an industrial country with few raw materials and highly dependent from exports one might expect this to be a political course for the future as well. In the traditional field of foreign policy it is much harder to predict a policy future. On the one hand Germany has developed itself after the Second World War as a genuine western country - inbedded in Atlantic and Westeuropean institutions. But at the same time a united Germany has emerged with a genuine stake in Eastern Europe, with a vested interest in good neighbour-relations with the East and in stability near its borders. This means, for instance, in practise that Germany has to be very serious about enlargement of Western institutions towards the East, in membership of East European countries of NATO and the EU. At the same time everybody knows that this will be an endaeavour that requires hard and risky choices. Risky in terms of the relationship with Russia and other countries that will be left out of an expanded NATO for the foreseeable future. Much riskier even in domestic terms when it comes to enlargement of the EU. It will require high investments for all traditional members of the EU, it will put a financial burden on the domestic tax-payer and put a strain on the legitimacy and credibility of national governments during this painful process of economic and financial integration. One can easily imagine infuriated German and Dutch farmers demonstrating in Berlin or The Hague when they have to compete head-on with farmers in Poland. In the enlargement-discussion Germany also faces controversy with other European memberstates who don't feel the immediate threat of instability near their eastern borders but who like to emphasize more the unstability in the Mediterranean. And there is France that has a specific interest in integrating Germany more into the Community before enlargement takes place and before an enlarged Union can undermine the special position of France within the existing Community.

Let's talk now for a minute about security matters. Germany is involved in a gradual process of regaining its political sovereignty in security matters. The Paris Treaty came pretty close to what one would call a final Peace Treaty, although the word of course was left out. Then - later - German soldiers appeared in Somalia in a strictly humanitarian operation. Thereafter came the verdict of the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe enabling Germany to send troops out-of-area, although this verdict was embodied in a whole framwork of prerequisites. Anyhow in security matters Germany has more operational scope by now than it had five years ago. At least on paper.

But if one looks to the actual situation one has to take all sorts of questions into account as well. For one there is the psychological connotation that makes it hard for German soldiers to operate in a whole range of European areas. Even when the Second World War is laying behind us now for more than half a century, the burden of history is till felt or otherwise effectively used that way. German ground troops in the former Yugoslavia for instance are out of question. One can easily figure out all sort of regions with some political relevance where you won't find German troops in the near future, not even for peace-keeping missions. In this regard there is a lot of very understandable uncertainty in Germany on the question to what

purpose and to what extent Germany can and should act in the security field. As one German soldier recently answered me when I asked him, what was meant by out-of-area. He said out-of-area in Germany is newspeak it means far, far, very far away.

Now of course one can continue this list of the dilemmas for Germany but that is not the purpose of my remarks. The point I want to make is a question: Where is the German leadership where I referred to in the beginning of my remarks - where is the German leadership? Germany does not take the lead in any of these issues. And please don't understand me wrong as if their would be any sense of blame in my remarks. As far as the expansion of NATO is concerned, Germany is a helpful participant in the ongoing debate, but in setting its priorities the country seems hesitant. When it comes to questions as where to draw the line, how to manage the timing of the progress, it is not Germany that is leading. And for good reasons because as a country surrounded, even besieged by friends, it is complicated to make hard choices and in doing so becoming more a friend of the one than of the other. The same uncertainties occur in relation to enlargement of the EU. To be sure nowhere in Europe is Eastern Europe so seriously on the political agenda as in Germany. It is even a part of the treaties signed with the eastern neighbouring countries as a common goal to integrate them into Europe. In Germany there are all sorts of fascinating and stimulating ideas floating around. There is a lively debate. The Schäuble-Plan, for instance, seems to me still the only realistic and healthy approach to keep on the one hand the integrated Europe alive and enabling on the other hand new member states to enter into the EU - gradually, slowly but irrevocably. The Schäuble-Plan enhances a strong integrated centerpiece of Europe - the so called 'Kern-Europa' - in which the most integrated countries can continue and deepen integration. It avoids the paralysis that will occur certainly when twenty or more states become members of the Union. On the other hand this nucleus can open itself up to everyone that lives up to the requirements, this nucleus can function as an attractive magnet to others. As I said it is a realistic and healthy plan, but is Germany leading the rest of Europe towards this concept? The answer is NO. Chancellor Kohl is carefully using this plan to steer things up, being only very loosely committed to it at the same time. The need to compromise, the urge not to embarrass its most important and most sensitive partner France is a predominant paradigm in German politics. One can understand it, one can even sympathize with it - but of course it is not what we mean when we talk about leadership. Now, one may call this free floating of suggestions and this longing for compromise a natural process. Maybe, that is true - although I have been taught to call something a process only when you have to hide the fact you actually don't quite know what is going on. Then you call it a process.

The situation of German leadership sometimes reminds me of the days that West-Germany was rearming in the beginning of the fifties to encounter the communist threat. Of course this rearmament provoked some uneasiness in neighbouring countries in the beginning of the fifties. Thus, where it came down to for the Germans, was to build an army small enough not to frighten for instance Luxemburg and an army big enough to scare the Russians off. Now, by comparison, we expect the Germans to take the lead and at the same time they should do it in a way that no one notices, so that no one can take offense either. That is not easy - although we can conclude by now that West-Germany managed to do so in the fifties in rearming through NATO. So, there is reason for optimism that Germany can manage it this



*In the break the discussion went on between Drs. D. J. Barth, Secretary-General Ministry of Defence and Major General Dr. G. Freiherr von Steinäcker.*

(foto: H. Keeris, Directie Voorlichting)

being asked. From a rational, intellectual point of view these questions might be interesting and relevant but from a political point of view they seem obsolete. When France and Germany believe in the Eurocorps - all be it only for reasons of sheer psychology and sentiment - then we have to take that into consideration as an established fact of political wisdom. Eurocorps might not be a logical fit within the configuration of security organisations, but who ever said that foreign policy has to be logical? It only has to work.

Let me turn to German-Dutch relations. For the Dutchmen it would be sheer hybris to advise German politicians how to exercise leadership. As the German saying goes -'ein Schwanz wedelt nicht mit dem Hund' - the tail doesn't wag with the dog. From the Dutch point of view we have to analyse facts, attitudes and impressions and translate them into advantages. Dutchmen and Germans have a lot of traditional policy reflexes in common. Germany needs the European Community as an anchor against 'Alleingang', as a psychological safe haven for its uncertain geography and identity, as a framework for trade and commerce. Germany is inclined to federal structures, towards democracy in Europe, towards integration of the so called second and third pillar, of international and domestic security. In most of these topics the Dutch have the same positions - are like-minded. Where we differ we are developing, we are developing finally mutual understanding to discuss things without being suspicious about each other.

Having so much in common and taking German uncertainties towards leadership in Europe into consideration we have a lot to offer to each other. Improving the anchor of the EU - an anchor the Germans desperately need - can be a priority for the Netherlands. Stimulating the better elements of French-German cooperation, subtly influencing the more negative aspects of it and participating in the security field where ever it makes sense - here I see a stimulating role for the Netherlands in the future of German-Dutch relations. When you don't want to go alone, when you don't want 'Alleingang', there are only two alternatives. One staying home and inside, which means not going at all. The other is going together as neighbours and friends. The choice between these alternatives shouldn't be too difficult.

# Presentation by Dr. K.J. Citron

*Former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Netherlands*

The famous writer Mark Twain once said: 'Never forecast, particularly not into the future'. I am afraid he was right. It is always extremely difficult to predict the future; the recent developments in Eastern Europe are a good example. When I was running the planning staff of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1988 and 1990, nobody of us - planners - predicted the fall of the Wall within such a short time and nobody predicted the dissolution of the SU. Luckily some others did but they were mostly no Germans.

Nevertheless I am much more optimistic as to our look into the future of the Dutch-German relationship. The geopolitical context of our relations seem to be more solid and gives ground for a courageous vision of the future.

I will try to describe the various fields of international cooperation where the Netherlands and Germany have a common task. The numerous celebrations of this year, memorizing the end of the terrible war, are not only a motive to remember the bitter past, but also an occasion to take a look at the common future. Thanks to the political wisdom of many European politicians who did not want to repeat the mistakes of the past, a new beginning was made quite early after the war to overcome the traditional hostilities of the nation-states. The founding fathers of the European Community i.a. Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and in the Netherlands Hendrik Brugmans and Hans Nord started the European unification process by developing the concept of an integrated Europe. Looking back, 41 years ago the European Coal and Steel Community was started and Europe made a tremendous progress.

The Netherlands and Germany were right from the beginning encouraging this European approach, whereby surely economic considerations played an important role. I remember in this context the Dutch initiative against the allied concept to dismantle the German industry. Germany was seen by the Dutch as an irreplaceable neighbour, a partner 'uit noodzaak'. But at the same time - and this is all known and already mentioned - the Dutch kept a certain distance. We all know the reasons, one of them is widespread all over the world, the scepticism of a smaller country towards the bigger neighbour, but the main reason was - and in this context necessary to remember - the traumatic experience of the German occupation. The remembrance of this period and the remembrance of the courageous resistance has surely contributed to the cohesion of the Netherlands society. Literature, media and instruction have placed this subject time and again in the centre of attention. No wonder that the image of the neighbour Germany has remained rather negative and that the look over the border has remained critical.

Nevertheless many people in the Netherlands have discovered the last decades that the FRG has developed into a stable democracy. This may explain why so many Dutch have chosen

Germany as a vacation country (my country being after France the second favoured vacation place, if you include the business travellers, we even achieve the first place). These simple figures were for me a clear indication that the real state of affairs between our two countries is much better than the public feeling.

The Dutch saying 'liever een goede buur dan een verre vriend' reminds us that geographical closeness quite often has an important impact on the definition of interest. In this context I like to mention the dramatic inundations of the rivers Rhine and Meuse recently, which have reminded both our countries of their common obligation to do more to protect the environment and their citizens.

I think the Rhine river will remain for both our countries an important economic link. The same is true for the harbour of Rotterdam which is crucial for our cooperation. Another example of our common interest to prepare for the future is the 'Betuwe lijn' which is to improve the transport capacity of the railways at a time when the highways are more and more blocked. Both our countries are interested in strengthening the global competitiveness of the European economy, i.a. by promoting innovative and future oriented technology. We aim together at efficient infrastructures in the field of transport and communications. These examples indicate how close our interests are interlinked now and in the future: almost 8% of our products go to the Netherlands, almost a third of Dutch export go to Germany, our economic interrelationship is by far the closest in Europe. Few currencies are so stable and so interlinked as the Guilder and the DMark.

These positive facts do not necessary exclude problems, as for example, the nervous discussions in the media of the Fokker/DASA-relationship which showed that many people do not yet realize that there is no realistic alternative to such close border cooperation. The need to attract foreign capital was particularly clear in the 'Neue Bundesländer', where we tried our best to invite investors from abroad to contribute to the necessary transformation. We are glad that quite a big number of Dutch businessmen are actively participating in this modernization process in the eastern part of Germany.

But we have to look beyond our borders: the Central and Eastern European countries expect our support for their difficult efforts to adapt their economies in order to be able to join the EU. We are sitting in the middle; we see the problems of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the other countries like Romania and that's one of the reasons we are trying to get more understanding for the need to give these countries a chance to join the Community. In the future we may even have to increase our efforts considerably in order to prevent destabilizing developments. I am glad that for example the 'Adviesraad voor Vrede en Veiligheid' has recommended common efforts in this specific field.

Both our countries are keen to develop the EU further, to make it more competitive, also in view of the economic challenges from Asia. A large measure of agreement exists on the necessary steps leading to the Economic and Monetary Union. The excellent cooperation of the central banks of our countries will surely be continued in the future. There is also widespread agreement that the institutional development of the EU will require i.a. more democratic legitimacy. Both our countries see the need to intensify the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, i.a. by giving Europol here in The Hague more competence. The principle of subsidiarity finds positive support in our countries, the desire for regional competence is particularly strong in Germany with its old federal tradition. I just came back from a vacation in Bavaria. There you feel it very strongly, the people there are first Bavarians, then the Bavarians may be a bit German and a little bit European. This is not limited to

Bavaria or other provinces in Germany you feel it also in the Netherlands. The need to have your own identity and not to disappear in a kind of European melting pot.

I am glad that the critical attitude of the Netherlands towards French-German initiatives has changed into a more positive evaluation of the forerunner role of this team. It is a great problem how do you bind Germany in. How do you oblige Germany to remain in the process. I think we have chosen this. It was a political choice that France and Germany tried to do their best to stay together and if you had problems to find a compromise. I know this was not always welcomed here in the Netherlands, but when we had sometimes problems between France and Germany you suddenly could discover in also Dutch newspapers several commentaries saying it would be a tragedy if the team of France and Germany would fall apart. So I am very happy that we recently could observe a more positive contribution and I think in the long run the Netherlands is an important partner in the Community. We need a kind of group that is pushing ahead and trying to get things going.

Another field of interest is the development of a 'common foreign and security policy' of the EU; the experience of the last years, i.a. in former Yugoslavia has shown that we need more cohesion, if we want to become more convincing and effective in the future. One positive example, where both our countries participated, was the French initiative for a 'European Stability Pact', which aims at stabilizing those countries in Central and Eastern Europe which are seen as candidates to join the EU. We tried in preparing that pact to help the three Baltic countries and the six Central and Eastern European countries. We tried to convince them that they have to solve their border and minority problems at two 'Round Tables'. Having served last fall to prepare these 'Round Tables', where we even managed to get Russia to join the table with the Baltic countries, I must say this was a very important experience where the EU as a whole did something which is very important for the future. In this context I would recall the very important contribution of mr. Max van der Stoep who in his role in the CSCE did a lot to help the EU to make a success of this initiative.

Another example of our countries common look at the future was the first bilateral Conference of ambassadors from both our countries on issues concerning the role of Islamic countries. A conference which took place in Mannheim last year. This meeting too showed how close we are on foreign policy issues.

Both our countries will be very interested in the results of the IGC in 1996 which aims at adapting the EU institutions to the challenge of the future and the bigger number of member states. Our countries are also keen to strengthen the role of the European Parliament. The fact that our countries decided to set up a bilateral working group indicates how close we are in this field.

Further progress in the EU will surely not be hampered by our two countries, but probably by others who are thinking that we are moving ahead too quickly. We may be faced - as in the past - by hesitation and reservation: the EU may have to live with different speeds in various areas. In the long run however the European train will not be stopped and I hope that the Netherlands and Germany will continue to sit in the front engine. Both our countries know the risk, if ever Europe would fall back into purely national interest policy. Germany will be hesitant to lead because if it would try, there would be a lot of criticism. So people expect Germany to lead but if we do it too strongly, people would speak about 'Alleingang' and would speak about Germany trying to play a dominant role. It would be wise if we would continue to be cautious with the position we happen to have.

Another very important field where our interests are very close is the main topic of today, the



*Also outside the conferenceroom Dr. K. J. Citron (left) had to answer questions.*

(foto H. Kerns, Directie Voorlichting)

security policy. In view of the many new risks and instabilities we are bound to stick together. I hardly need to mention the fact that since more than 30 years Dutch soldiers serve in Germany and German soldiers get their training in Budel. The practical experiences of most military with their host countries are very positive.

The recent creation of the Dutch/German Corps in Münster is another striking example of our common look into the future. The suggestion to place the Corps during the first years under the command of a Dutch general, came - as far as I know - from the German side. It shows that we are not always as 'domineering' as youngsters may believe. The political class in the Netherlands and in Germany realizes that the challenges of the future are so gigantic that they can only be met by strengthening the EU and the transatlantic partnership. In this context I would like to mention the recent proposals by minister Kinkel to supplement the present links with the USA by developing a common free trade area with the USA and Canada.

Both our governments are convinced that the involvement of the USA in Europe is absolutely necessary and that courageous steps are necessary to increase the links with North America. In addition our governments are supporting the efforts to develop the WEU as well as the pillar of Europe within NATO and also as the future defence instrument of the EU.

The close cooperation between The Hague and Bonn on security issues was for me - during my years in The Hague - particularly pleasant. I am glad that this cooperation is to be intensified in the future. I mention in this context the endeavours in the field of military training, logistics and armamentsplanning, for example the future reconnaissance vehicle. The



perfect or if we think that it should be improved. Once you ask this nasty question, the response seems clear: there is room for improvement, particularly the young generation in our countries knows too little about their neighbour today.

There are quite a number of initiatives and programmes going on, but the number of participants is rather limited. What could be done?. Being an optimist I would like to see a major initiative for more youth encounters and for efforts to present a more balanced image of the neighbour in schools, on both sides of the border. There are initiatives but it has not yet produced a major result. I would dream of seeing the media, especially radio and television joining in an effort to discover 'good news' about the neighbour, as it happened recently during the big flood. It was indeed tremendous impressive how German newspapers admired the Dutch way to handle this major flood. I have also seen Dutch newspaper articles which subscribed the help given in Germany as positive.

Minister van Mierlo in his 'Hofstadlezing' stressed that young people should realize that Germany is not at first place a country with an evil past but a country of today which is aiming at the future. We are grateful for this future oriented policy.

We all know naturally how difficult it is to change long established prejudices, but we also know that personal encounters lead to surprising experiences. Having travelled as a student all over Europe shortly after the war, gave me such unforgettable experiences. The task is now with the next generations to follow the Chinese proverb: to see once with your own eyes is a hundred times more valuable than to hear from others.

# Presentation by Prof. Dr. C.W.A.M van Paridon

*of the Free University at Amsterdam*

## THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF GERMANY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE NETHERLANDS

The economic relationship between Germany and the Netherlands is one of vital importance for the Netherlands. The importance of this relationship will be highlighted in the first part of this article. In the second part I will discuss issues concerning the competitive position of Germany in the years to come. I will end up with some remarks concerning the future relationship between the two countries.


### **Dutch-German economic relationships**

A few years ago the Dutch newspaper NRC-Handelsblad presented a small graph showing the economic growth rate in Germany and the Netherlands in the last twenty years. The similarity was striking. When the German economy showed high growth rates, so did the Dutch economy. And when in Germany an economic recession occurred, the Netherlands followed suit. Here you find the same graph, extended with more recent data (see next page).

I decided to do some supplementary analysis. First it became clear that in the after-war period the similarity in economic development between the two countries has greatly increased. Second, for each of the two countries the similarity in economic development between each other was greater than with any of their major trading partners. And third, when I compared this relationship with other outstanding ones, like Canada-United States, Ireland-United Kingdom and Belgium-France, it became clear that only between Canada and the United States there was more similarity than between the Netherlands and Germany. So I had to conclude that this relationship was really special.

Through which channels is this similarity realized, do these economies influence each other? The trade relations between the two countries are showing some indication for this special relationship. From the Dutch perspective both with imports and exports, Germany is by far our most important trading partner. About 24% of the Dutch imports are coming out of Germany, while about 29% of the Dutch exports has Germany as its destination. Belgium is second, with a share of about 14%. From the German point of view, the Dutch position is less dominant. Here France is the main trading partner, with about 12%. Then Italy and the Netherlands are about equal, with about 9%. Thereafter, countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and Belgium are not that far behind. The last ten years the Dutch share in German imports have shown a steady decline. This could imply that our products, with regard to price and quality are not as attractive as those of many of our competitors.

## Yearly Growth Rates Gross Domestic Product



Source: OECD

But also the contents of trade are important in this respect. The Dutch export to Germany differ considerably from other EU-countries. While export from these countries are mainly industrial products, the exports from the Netherlands are much stronger oriented at energy, agricultural products, natural resources and chemicals. Concerning manufactured products the trade is mostly at the medium technology level.

When we look at foreign direct investment, the relationship between Germany and the Netherlands is less special. In both countries the United States and the United Kingdom are much more important, both for ingoing and outgoing direct investment. Germany is a minor investor in the Netherlands, mainly in the service sector. Fokker is major exception here. The direct investments of the Netherlands in Germany are slightly more important and more directed at the manufacturing sector. In this way they confirm the traditional view that Germany is more a production-oriented economy and the Netherlands is more accustomed to trade and transport.

A third relationship across borders is through monetary relations. Here of course real strong ties exist. Sometimes one hears even the remark that 'De Nederlandse Bank' has become even an affiliate of the 'Deutsche Bundesbank'. The last decade 'De Nederlandse Bank' has been very successful in het monetary policy to fix the exchange rate of the Dutch guilder with the D-Mark. Inside the current European Monetary System these two currencies are having a special relationship, being the only ones within the original margins. The consequence is that the interest rates in the two countries are more or less the same, in level and in development over time.

The conclusion must be that through these monetary ties and through the trade relations both countries are influenced back and forth. Of course the national economic development is strongly depending on domestic factors: entrepreneurial behaviour, favourable labour market developments, growth of technical knowledge, the working of relevant markets, favourable supply conditions in general and appropriate government policies. But being a very open economy and having strong economic ties with its much bigger neighbour, it is clear that the future economic development of the Netherlands strongly depends on what will happen with the German economy.

### **German economic development in recent years: reunification**

Back in 1989, at the eve of the breakdown of the GDR, the (West) German economy was judged extremely competitive: high growth rates, declining unemployment, no inflation, a positive budget for the government and an ever increasing surplus for the balance of payment. When the Berlin Wall fell and the unification of the FRG and the GDR came closer, it seemed that this process took place at the right time with a West-German economy fully equipped for this task. Although economist warned for overoptimistic ideas, Chancellor Kohl said what many thought or wished: the unification between the FRG and the GDR would be realized without higher taxes; in a few years time the inhabitants on the new Länder would live in an economy as rich and strong as that of the old Länder.

How different it turned out. With the economic and monetary union, at July 1st 1990, the GDR economy experienced a complete breakdown. In a few years time about 45% of total employment disappeared, in manufacturing even 80%. Most firms were in great difficulties: the consumers in East-Germany preferred products from the West, demand from Eastern Europe melted away and markets in the West remained as difficult to enter for them as in the past. Furthermore, the initial wage agreements certainly did not increase their competitiveness. The German government tried to improve the attractiveness of the region through a massive investment program, in communication and infrastructure for instance. At the same time the West had to pay for social security payments and for Länder- and community- expenditures in the East. The result was a net-transfer of about 150 billion D-Mark yearly.

It now seems that these efforts are beginning to work. The economic prospects of the new Länder are beginning to change. The development downwards has stopped and now the way back should be started. That will be difficult enough even though the economic growth rates are high and unemployment has started to decline. Certain sectors like the building industry, services and some manufacturing sectors, producing for the local markets, show considerable progress. The exposed sectors however, which have to sell their products at home and abroad in competition with firms from elsewhere, are still in a difficult situation. Currently the financial transfers from West-Germany remain crucial, not only for social security expenditures but also for the necessary investment to raise the attractiveness of the region. Once the exposed sectors are able to sell their products at foreign markets, the new Länder will be able for the first time to generate economic growth at its own. It still will take a long time before the economic gap between West and East will be bridged.

Although initially the West German economy had profited considerably from the increase in demand from the East, as did other West European countries and in this way had postponed the inevitable recession, the economic costs of the unification process took its toll. The high



*Attention from Lieutenant General H.A. Couzy (left), Lieutenant General (ret.) J.P. Verheijen (right) and Major General (ret.) A. de Bruine (centre).*

(Foto: T. Remmers, AVDKL)

transfer costs implied that taxes had to go up. Still the budget deficit increased considerably. The upsurge created tensions on the labour market, with relative high wage increases as a result. The 'Bundesbank' feared inflationary consequences and decided to raise interest rates. All these developments caused a rather heavy recession in the West German economy, with negative growth rates and with increasing unemployment.

### **The German competitive position**

Whereas in 1989 only positive judgments could be heard about the German economy, three/four years later a serious discussion arose about German competitiveness. Everything seemed to have changed. Germany itself was going through a painful and long term unification process. Outside Germany there was the rise of new competitors, in South-East Asia and in Eastern Europe, and a fastening pace of technological development. Would German firms still be able to cope with these new challenges?

According to the German government the high wages, long holidays and short working-weeks, high taxes and premiums, the many laws and regulations on labour and product markets and the subsidies for sectors with problems had made the German economy less competitive, than was necessary to meet these new challenges. Lower wages or lower wage increases, less rigidities at the labour market, deregulation and cuts in subsidies, together with extra



*Prof. Drs. A.M.M. Kolodziejczak reviewing his speech before addressing the audience.*

(Foto) T. Remmers, AVDKL

Yet the size of the German Economy is only a quarter of that of the United States and half of that of Japan. On a global scale the German Economy is not 'too big to handle', it is too small to act by itself.

So we can conclude that fifty years after World War II we might need a more fruitful approach towards Germany and the German Economy than the 'too big to handle' and 'small is beautiful' attitude which has been dominant for such a long time.

At the end of the twentieth century the global economic order finds itself in a crisis. For even today the global economic order is basically a postwar economic order, which means that this order was meant to function during a limited time after the Second World War. But, as John Maynard Keynes put forward three quarters of a century ago in the opening lines of "The economic consequences of the Peace"<sup>1</sup>:

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<sup>1</sup> During World War I John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) held a post at the Treasury and was selected as an economic adviser to the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. He resigned that position in June of that year and wrote and published *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, in which he argued against the excessive reparations required of Germany. His major and most revolutionary work, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, was published in 1936. Keynes played a central role in British war finance during World War II and, in 1944, was the chief British representative at the Bretton Woods Conference that established the International Monetary Fund as well as it as laid the foundation of the postwar economic order.

German economic growth took place in a world where the Americans backed the world economic framework and supplied security.

These three investments in European economic integration are not only investments in a process that produced regional peace and prosperity. They are also necessary contributions to world stability and global economic development.

In three instances the Federal Republic of Germany is asked to act as a locomotive, as an engine of integration, firstly on the road to Economic and Monetary Union. Secondly on the road to a social dimension of the European Internal Market. Thirdly on the road to the admission of the Central European countries into the European Union.

Discussing the first investment namely the one in a European Economic and Monetary Union, we can already hear Mr. Tietmeyer's voice, saying that these are nice things to discuss by the end of the century or later, 'in due time', 'when the time is ripe'.

Germany's neighbours, however, should react to this objection by saying that we have to avoid the German 'too big to hide' - and 'too big to handle' problems now.

The time is ripe for us to remember that Mr. Tietmeyer is in Frankfurt, the former Allied Headquarters, ruling a central bank whose predecessor was founded by the Allied Powers and was originally built according to the American Federal Reserve Model, complete with the Deutschmark and foreign reserves aid within the European Recovery Program better known as Marshall Aid.

Furthermore, the German Economy is obviously too small to carry the burden of the Deutschmark being a global reserve currency. At the same time there is no possible return to the situation where the Deutschmark has no international dimension. This is a very good example of the 'too big to hide' problem.

In the Maastricht Treaty it was decided that those member states which would qualify on the basis of the so called Maastricht convergence criteria would move to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates and a single currency. This will take place in 1997-1998 only when a majority of countries qualifies in the end of 1996 examination, or in 1999 when no majority is needed.

The fact is that we need a majority for political feasibility and that makes the 1999 solution fairly unattractive. By 1999 the financial markets may already have lost faith in EMU and the single currency. By then the business cycle may have gone sharply in the wrong direction whereas the dollar volatility may have harmed the European economies severely.

The Bundesbank has very rightly put forward that the Maastricht convergence criteria, drafted by the Dutch Presidency, must be strictly respected in the 1996 and 1998 examinations. With regard to the end of 1996 examination projections show that apart from the debt criterium Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Austria may qualify, which means a majority of eight out of fourteen.

If Denmark were to opt out, the majority would be seven out of thirteen.

There may be a problem with the Government debts of Belgium and the Netherlands, which are well beyond the threshold of 60% of the Gross Domestic Product and with those of Ireland and Denmark which are closer to 60% of GDP.

In an interview with the 'Neue Zürcher Zeitung' Mr. Tietmeyer also very rightly put forward that the convergence criteria he wants to adhere to so strictly were meant for the situation that

countries were already participating in the European Economic and Monetary Union<sup>5</sup>. This means that 60% of GDP of Public Debt is dynamically in accordance with a 3% Public Deficit and 2% Inflation and 3% Economic Growth following the Domar formula. Therefore the Dutch Public Debt of 80% of GDP may also be a problem for the financial markets, even when it is declining and thus meets the Maastricht Debt criterion to a large extent.

I would therefore suggest that in addition to the Maastricht convergence criteria a debt clearing mechanism ('EMU Clearing') is introduced for those countries who by 1996 fulfil all the other convergence criteria but whose debt is beyond 60% of GDP. This clearing means that these countries pay a certain part of their GDP, for most countries less than 1% of GDP per year, to a European Debt Clearing body which in exchange takes over the debt beyond 60% of GDP.

Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,

I think very few of us believe that Mr. Kohl would have been able to bring about the German 'Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion' and the 'Wiedervereinigung' by 1992 instead of 1990.

Two years can make a big difference. Two years can make the difference.

Which of us think that Europe and its citizens would be better off with two Germanies instead of one? Probably very few of us would prefer two Germanies.

The second contribution European neighbours should ask from Germany is to bring about by means of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference a real social dimension of the European Internal Market.

If there is to be in Europe for the Netherlands, for France, for Great Britain, yes also for the United Kingdom, for the countries of Central Europe the possibility of Rhineland capitalism, the possibility of a social market economy as a synthesis between equity and efficiency as an alternative for the American-Pacific cowboy capitalism, the social market economy model should be included soon to its full extent in the New Treaty of the European Union.

Inclusion of the Full Social Market Economy framework in the European integration process may help countries like the Netherlands to find a new balance between employment and social expenditure. Lower social expenditure and therefore higher business employment may increase social security as well as welfare, and contribute to the survival of the Welfare State as the very heritage of postwar civilization<sup>6</sup>.

Due to their postwar cradle situation the Germans were in a position to introduce this new concept of 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft' according to the ideas of Walter Eucken, Alfred Müller-Armack and Christian social teaching. Germany could make a new start thanks to allied protection.

Now is the time to export this concept to the European Union and to the whole European continent in order to keep our economic system in line with our European civilization and with the idea of humanity to which German writers like Friedrich von Schiller and Wolfgang von Goethe contributed so much.

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<sup>5</sup> Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15./16. April 1995.

<sup>6</sup> Andre M.M. Kolodziejak, Does Social Protection increase Social Security?: Implications of the Krugmancurve. Revised version of the invited Report for the Conference 'Monetary Union and Social Protection' of Observatoire Social Européen, Brussels, 6-7 October 1994, forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy



# Discussion Morning Session

## *Question of Dr. van Eekelen,*

I would like to come back to the question of leadership and try to connect the economic and political side of that question. It seems to me that from the Netherlands point of view it is wrong to say that we ever want a German leadership in an overall sense. We want leadership for certain particular things especially in the field of European integration. Secondly with the monetary union coming about, Germany puts aside the question of the common currency, put it aside from the political debate because certain objective criteria will conflict. So then indeed Germany will not be too big to handle because it has given up much of national policy in that field.

The question is then for the Dutch, how can we maintain our old view that there should be a certain balance in Europe, France, Germany and Britain perhaps, if they become more active again. Under what conditions can we expect Germany to continue playing this role in European integration. Because indeed Germany and especially Chancellor Kohl is virtually the only real European left. And if you are going to give up your monetary sovereignty - except the common currency - now Germany has said we want in return a political union. But that political union becomes rather vague and what exactly is then the quidproquo which a German government, a German public opinion will except?

## *Answer by Dr. Citron,*

We are bound to continue to integrate as strongly as possible into the EU and to be an engine together with others. Very often with France, but we are happy if we can take also initiatives together with the Netherlands, sometimes also with Italy. So we think for the promotion of the political union we have to work together, you cannot leave leadership in one hand. There is



*Prof. Dr. M.C. Brands  
Chairman of the symposium leads the  
discussion.*

(foto: T. Remmers, AVDKL)

naturally a domestic policy problem giving up the D-Mark. There are people who sometimes joke and say the only real identity the Germans have is the D-Mark. This is naturally exaggerated, but it is indeed not easy to give it up and when it is given up - and this is the promising idea of Maastricht - then the new European currency should be as stable as the Guilder and the D-Mark. This is a precondition and not only mr Tietmeyer but also the government will insist that the currency remains as strict as there has been agreed upon. Following my experience and the discussion here, I am convinced that the Netherlands Bank, the Netherlands too is interested not giving up the Guilder for nothing, but giving it up into an absolutely stable and incorruptable European currency. Not only Kohl but also the new French president stay on the line of continuing Europe because we have no real alternative.

*Additional remarks by Prof. Dr. Brands,*

I like to remind you of the lessons Chancellor Kohl gave at the beginning of this year in the Hague. Especially concerning the political union was one of the most pertinent questions asked. Why such a vague institution as a condition for something that may be feasible, a monetary union? Why you make it even more difficult? The answer was very impressive to the whole Dutch audience. Chancellor Kohl gave two major reasons: One: I cannot sell at home this message on the monetary union in case I cannot offer them a perspective of irreversible developments within the European unification, otherwise there will not be a quid pro quo.

Second: Mrs. Thatcher was absolutely wrong with her view that you could have a type of monetary cooperation and integration even without a political framework. Then the wind will take it over. It will be gone in a minute in moments of great difficulty.

That lesson was given to a few Dutch monetary specialists.

*Answer by Prof. Dr. van Parijs,*

Just a little remark about the link between the political union and the monetary union. It strikes foreign observers again and again that the President of the 'Bundesbank', when he speaks about the European monetary union, always makes the link with the political union. When you listen to the speeches of presidents of other central banks in Europe you hardly hear anything about it. You always hear that it is not only an economic union but there should also be a stable political union. This makes the economic and monetary union useful, otherwise you should not do it.

*Question of Mr. Knottenbelt,*

The word 'future' in the title of this conference is completely redundant. Of course we are interested in the future relationship but we must discuss the past and the present as much as the future. This title and this whole conference is definitely geared towards controlling, because it speaks of the entities Germany and the Netherlands as a sort of sacrosanct entities. Mr. Freddy Heineken published a booklet about five years ago with the title 'The united states of Europe', in which he pointed out that the best administrative areas are between five and ten million people. I am very much interested if the panel would take up this point. It is geared towards maintaining the status quo of sovereign entities. Is that the best interest of Europe?

*Question of Lieutenant General (ret.) Loos,*

After lunch two generals will take the stand and before we heard about political and economical aspects, but mr Knapen also mentioned the psychological aspect, although he did not deal with it. Maybe mr Ambassador can say something about that aspect. In the relations between two people those psychological aspects play a big role and it may be that the characteristics of the Germans and the Dutch as well are a factor of influence. I think it does matter, we have a certain idea about of what the Germans are, although it may not be correct. However the ideas are there and vice versa. I would like your comment on that.

*Question of Mr. Vis,*

Is it necessary to have a Europe of two speeds or can we afford to have a Europe of only one speed?

*Answer by Prof. Dr. van Paridon,*

I first want to address the question about the regions that was raised. I can imagine that in the future the concept of the federal state as in Germany exists, will become much more attractive for the other member states of the EU. Because it seems that the initial level is a little to high for many, of the important decisions to be made. Too far away from the public, from the voters and therefore another level, like that of the 'Länder' in Germany, seems to be more attractive. And if you look to a unitary state as the Netherlands, you can observe tendencies that the regions can become more important in the future then they were so far.

Concerning the two-speed Europe, I guess that if you want to succeed with the monetary union in the near future, there is no other choice then that only a selection of countries will enter that union and that other countries for a certain period of time will not take part in that union. That would imply a two-speed Europe. What the consequences of that will be of course depends on what is left behind. Is it imaginable that there is a monetary union without Italy, where the Treaty of Rome was signed? And what will be the position of the United Kingdom? It can be imagined that these two countries are involved, that for the remaining ones it will be very difficult to enter that economical and monetary union in the near future and that they would become second class. If countries like the United Kindom and Italy and other bigger ones will stay outside then the solutions will be much more found in a cooperative way.

*Answer by Prof. Drs. Kolodziejak,*

The problem with the word two-speed Europe is, that we don't know what we really mean. To some extent you could say that in Europe we have always known two speeds or even more speeds. That is what we call 'geometrie variable'. So one country did something and another country committed itself, but on a later time. I would say to those people who advocate it, that the union would fall apart in the good ones and the bad ones for ever, let's say for a longer period. I would think that it will be a very negative development. But two speeds as long as one party commits itself to try to get into the monetary union as soon as it can, do it, that's a good thing. So two-speed is a rather difficult word.

*Remarks by Prof. Dr. Brands,*

Especially in our country we don't feel the strong urgency of this question, we see it still as an academic debate. The major question is, by expanding the EU, what kind of steering center will there be or will the whole thing loosen and the steering capacity within Europe gets less

What do you think of this new generation in Germany?

*Answer by Prof. Drs. Kolodziejak,*

I think one of the problems is that the German problem or the way the German problem found its temporarily solution after the War, was not discussed with next generations. So it would be far better to tackle this problem before it was overdue to tackle it. When I look at my students they don't really understand, they just think they don't particular like the Germans.

It is a fact of life, we have a saying in Holland 'onbekend maakt onbemind', that means if you don't know a person, you don't like him.

That's why I ask for strong initiatives by the Germans, because in this situation we have, the Germans have to prove that their interest is in Europe and because of the history they are more challenged than the French, they are more challenged than the British. It is their duty, their fate, to take a larger role in the future of Europe than the others.

*Answer by Prof. Dr. van Paridon,*

We all know that knowledge in understanding, if you don't know anything or not enough of other people - it can be your neighbours, it can be other citizens of your town, it can also be people of other countries - than certain images can be created and live very long.

Unfortunately we have not learned that lesson for a long time. I am much more optimistic about the future. When we look at the changes in educational programs. The knowledge about Germany, the political situation there, the economy will improve so much, that also the existing image in this country will change in a positive direction. In this field a lot more should be done than has been done in the past.

*Answer by Prof. Dr. Brands,*

The Dutch government has a very heavy responsibility. When if you noticed that Dutch youngsters do not know so much about Germany, then you should set up special programs to get a better information about it. That's only the Dutch side but we are rather slow in that. We organize conference after conference but that's not the structural thing. It should be a part of our education and I noticed Germany was a major subject of exams in history. It was really astonishing to hear the teachers - not the students - about the difficulties they were facing concerning modern Germany.

A second point concerning German youngsters is we have still a long way to go within the European framework to teach them that there is no solution for Germany as a new type of (broader) Switzerland. That's a highly idealistic idea and it would not serve us when they stick to that item. They do it with the best intention but they are wrong. Germany can never be a



*Major General Dr. G. Freiherr von Steinäcker in discussion with the panel.*

(foto) T. Remmers, AVDKL

Switzerland, certainly not within the EU. That's a new type of German illusionism. We have to teach them that it is wrong.

*Answer by Dr. Citron,*

It is not so easy to teach them. We tried to teach them to take the lessons of the past to be cautious and always joining others. I am convinced it is still wise to be cautious and not to jump ahead. If we start jumping the first criticism would come from this beautiful country.

# Presentation by Lieutenant General P. Huysman

*Chief ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff*

Mr. Chairman, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

Your programming has been such that you have reserved the post-lunch period for two military speakers. This places an extra responsibility on our shoulders: we have to keep you awake and sustain your interest, I hope we succeed.

Furthermore, I personally regard it a great privilege to be given this opportunity to address you on the German-Netherlands bi-national relations with special focus on military cultures. I shall do so with an excellent German colleague, whom I have known 15 years and with whom I have had a good healthy working relationship that has also been, and still is, a warm and friendly one. I was, and still am, literally always required to look up at him, however, I can assure you that I do so figuratively as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this symposium takes place in a turbulent political-military period in Europe, a period in which NATO and her member-states are undergoing reorganizations yet being simultaneously confronted with the need to execute real world operations.

General Droste, your Association has for many, many years taken upon itself to exercise, practice and even indulge in military science in the very broadest sense of the word (perspective). It should therefore pose no great problem to find interesting subjects and themes for you to pursue since the collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989.

Both the Eastern and Western military powers in Europe looked on in surprise and even shock when within the space of weeks communism collapsed through its own serious weaknesses and without any bloodshed. NATO reacted to these developments rather slower and with more caution than her member-states, who with great enthusiasm and speed cashed in on the peace-dividend that was suddenly available through the collapse of the existing threat. Surprise was yet again manifest when old feuds revived in several European countries with the falling away of communism. Bloodshedding was not shied away from under circumstances in which even war crimes were not and are still not being shunned. Within NATO a new kind of "flexible response" originated, and the overall strategy was amended to provide, among other developments, for crisis management. More than it ever was previously accustomed to another world organization took the lead in bigger military operations; and there is a more manifest form of cooperation developing between the UN and her members on the one hand and the NATO, the WEU and other organizations on the other hand.

The western nations were not and are not inclined to disband NATO, an organization which had contributed to years of peace and political stability in Europe. On the contrary, it is

strongly felt that the Alliance should be extended; and this has already resulted in the policy for "Partnership for Peace". You are all aware that several eastern European states, former Warsaw Pact members, wait impatiently to be granted membership. I have briefly described the new environment in which the NATO finds itself. Initially NATO adapted itself to this new environment with the necessary reserve. From my present perspective as Chief of the ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff of our Alliance I can, however, ascertain what has been realized, and what will and should be realized based on the grounds provided by long-term studies.

You must be rightly wondering what my extensive introduction has to do with today's main issue and focus, which is the German-Netherlands military cooperation. Well, I can assure you just about everything; for if I were to clearly and stringently emphasize the differences between the German and Dutch culture in my presentation to you, then I can guarantee you that this would not compare in the slightest to that what awaits us, that is, the real bridges we must overcome between our Western and some Eastern European military cultures.

Our objectives in Central Europe for more multinationality are twofold. The drastic Armed Forces' reorganizations, reductions and, I might add, the severe financial constraints, force nations to cooperate more in this field. But it is also NATO's new strategy and tasks, which on the crisis spectrum vary from humanitarian aid and peace-keeping to combat operations in a regional conflict, that result in more cooperation between nations.

In other words tasks and new roles focused on crisis management. The international intent and preparedness to act is well demonstrated with the deployment of existing and accordingly trained multinational formations, even relatively small sized formations, while the political responsibility is automatically shared by at least the force providing nations. Multinationality is nothing new within NATO. For years we have had staffs such as NORTHAG and 2ATAF. In the GDP concept bordering Corps units worked and cooperated intensely with each other, and we were fortunate to have an excellent partnership between the now disbanded 3rd German Armoured Division and the soon to be disbanded 1st Netherlands Army Corps.

Yet there are differences between the new and old work structures and circumstances.

Previous cooperation in operations meant specifically next to each other and with each other for missions limited in time and space, now it entails complete physical integration. An



*Lieutenant General P. Huysman*

(foto: T. Remmers, AVI/DKI)

additional and interesting development is that even the multinational level of Command has dropped to corps and even divisional level. This subsequently implies smaller staffs than what we were accustomed to at Army Group level, and above all with a smaller number of nations contributing.

Our naval and air forces were always more acquainted with such cooperation at lower levels, however, they cannot be used as role models for the Army because of the different character of their operations in very much ad hoc formations under varying chains of command.

Good examples within NATO were and are the ACE Mobile Force (Land) and the UK/NL landing force, a Marine unit.

It was the AMF(L) in particular which I used as a model formation when I was requested to be the Commander of a new multinational airmobile division. The units of this new division were to be provided by four nations from their existing resources, but the Headquarters (HQ) with all its personnel, procedural, operational and infrastructural complexities had to be built from scratch. As the leader of a multinational activation team I did, however, consider that an enormous advantage, because everything was new for the initial group of military personnel and for all those that followed thereafter in the four pre-planned personnel increments. Our responsibilities, tasks, location and the organization were new, and we were certainly not bogged down by any historical ballast whatsoever.

It explicitly meant that we had to try our very best to build a multinational culture from scratch. I considered that my personal mission and goal, and I can assure you that I devoted much time to that end.

I can now also assure you that this push for multinational culture is by no means an obvious one; it is also not of a temporary or passing nature that becomes easier once the trend is set. No! Cooperation between different military cultures within an operational staff, and also between this staff and the assigned units continually demands the Commander's personal, unflagging attention and devotion. Furthermore, I dare to make the proposition that the challenge in an unit is that much greater when there are a smaller number of nations involved. Observations and experiences have taught us that no particular military culture has the opportunity to dominate in multinational organizations with eight or more nations when there is an equal amount of manpower contribution toward the organization. Above all, there often is a high level of tolerance with specific cultural characteristics and even with daily language usage.

In my four nation division the four cultures were certainly more manifest and therefore recognisable in daily duties. Allow me to clarify this with two words, that is, two words per nation. The Germans "grundlich and punktlich"; the Belgians "loyal and hospitable"; the British "professional and traditional"; the Dutch "flexible and computerlike".

I drew the attention of every new officer to these cultural differences, I also requested him to cooperate in the build up toward a multinational culture, whatever that may be. It explicitly meant that he was never to be derogative toward another national working style or way of life; above all he was expected to consider the relative character of his own culture. Obviously these were all attempts because culture is never really something you can easily manipulate. Cultural inheritance is after all inherent to upbringing, education, military training etc. During brainstorming sessions within my staff on the issue of multinational leadership I have often raised the proposition that in this respect "successful leadership strongly depends on a series of small practical details". A commander must have an eye for differences, even the



minor ones, and be able to discuss these, only then can they be speedily solved. After all, even minor unintentional cultural confrontations lead to minor irritations. But daily minor irritations can accumulate and result into an overall aversion or irritation between cultures, or, and that certainly is unfavourable, between three cultures and one other.

I shall illustrate this with two practical examples: one on the work style and ethic, the other on national diet. For complete clarity, I am still discussing four military cultures. A Dutch general has the tendency to maintain short and open lines toward his staff by a walk-around managerial style; he also usually applies an open-door policy when a personnel member wishes to speak to him privately and accordingly schedules an appointment. Well, this style made my German Chief of Staff terribly edgy and nervous, he continually approached either me or the personnel member to inquire what was going on despite realising and trusting that I was not about to jeopardise his authority without prior consultation or inquiry. We had to therefore make clear agreements on this issue.

Furthermore, certain nations feel that a concept submitted to a two star general should always be a 100% correct without having prior consultation with him for his directives or guidelines during the decision making process. There was general surprise when I insisted on attending certain brainstorming sessions to be able to provide initial guidelines for the stipulated policy. However, this surprise rapidly transformed into appreciation because for a project officer dealing with an important issue it is essential to hear His Master's Voice.

Then, an example of an entirely different kind, I refer to it as the "nasi goreng incident" during HQ MND(C)'s first field training exercise. I deployed the entire HQ on to the training area in Limburg, The Netherlands, and arranged for my HQ-company to be supplied by the Dutch NCO school in Weert. Owing to the obvious Indonesian cultural influences in Dutch culture my German cooks received the ingredients for the preparation of an Indonesian "nasi goreng" meal in their field kitchens. They did their very best, yet the end result was a kind of Bayerische Knödel into which the usual vinegared vegetables were processed.

At this the British were most demonstrative; they had, after all, already been confronted with a jar of peanut-butter instead of scrambled eggs and sausages for breakfast.

It is a commander's prerogative to wave this away and say: "Men, carry on please, this is Host Nation Support. During deployment in a certain southern nation you will have to consume the cooked brains of a goat".

But, you all realise that it simply does not work that way! This discussion led to more issues which have little or nothing to do with culture but which are certainly well worth briefly raising here.

Besides the logistical difference I just illustrated there are significant differences in compensatory regulations for field training exercises, different financial compensation for extra, non-regular duties, and differing disciplinary measures for similar offences. I personally feel that personnel serving in such units should be governed by some form of multinational regime: it is simply unacceptable to have to compensate some of your personnel immediately after the exercise with five days of compensatory leave, while other personnel quite ordinarily must turn up for duty the day after their return. The ramifying and negative effects of these differing national rulings are quite clearly underestimated by the MODs. Owing to the legal implications they are not prepared to amend their national systems.

After my multinational divulging I would like to address now the issue of the German-Netherlands bi-national Corps formation.

The German and Dutch military have been already working together for many years, and that experience most certainly provides a sound foundation for the forthcoming more intimate cooperation between the two nations in an Army Corps staff.

In this context I would like to address briefly three issues: training and education in a broad perspective, the psychological factor, and lastly the bi-national leadership.

The fine red line here is that we are confronted with two nations and with four cultures, two national ones and two organizational cultures.

In the field of training we are confronted particularly by organizational culture. Binational formations should not attempt to influence the military skills of their soldiers in order to produce the uniform and standard soldier for their needs. That is unacceptable, more so because certain units are assigned to more than just one multinational unit, the so called double-hatted units, and also because this conflicts with national training principles. No, the multinational commanders must have thorough knowledge of the specific national skills and apply these optimally under certain, and ideally suited, circumstances, also relating to this to the different types of equipment that units have available.

Binational training should focus rather more quickly on the staff elements and the HQs that are at least two levels lower than Corps level. In the field of standardization and interoperability, which is part of the former, I feel that a German-Netherlands Corps would progress more rapidly than other multinational formations, but even here caution instead of speed should govern the way ahead.

To me training seems an useful asset for personnel of both parties who will be working within such an binational staff. I have already mentioned the to short lines oriented Dutch organizational culture versus the more hierarchical focussed train of thought that is inherent to our colleagues, the flexible behavioral trend versus the more formal, etc. But, ladies and gentlemen, allow me to stress that no nation should ever conclude that their organizational culture is more superior than any others. Every culture has its advantages and disadvantages. In this respect I should warn my Dutch colleagues: our internationally renowned flexibility should never be allowed to degrade into popular and un-military behaviour.

Although our national institutions devote sufficient attention to develop the required military etiquette and behaviour, these are generally not as stringently put into practice. This is at times incomprehensible to our foreign colleagues, and often leads to irritation.

The one but last issue I shall address is the psychological aspect of binationality. This aspect can reveal itself in different forms which are at times caused by external political circumstances. Politically the German Armed Forces were only permitted to be involved in limited UN commitments. It was required to await the Bundesverfassungsgericht verdict pending an issue taken up by the SPD concerning out of area operations. It was never at all comfortable for German personnel in my divisional headquarters to be continually on the receiving end of tales and briefings by their foreign counterparts on their worldwide UN experiences.

The German deployment in Somalia and Cambodia under the UN flag did them a world of good; but the ultimate psychological breakthrough came with last year's Bundesverfassungsgericht verdict stating that the Constitution did not conflict or disallow UN out of area operations by the German Armed Forces. Thereafter there was yet again ground to regard each other as equals.

Another psychological factor which cannot be disregarded is how this binational formation,

the GE-NL Corps. would be accepted and supported by both peoples, and the subsequent effects of this on the Corps personnel. In this respect I am more concerned as to how the Dutch will react, rather than the Germans. Initial press reactions to this new formation were definitely not positive, later, however, a Netherlands Royal Military Academy research study concluded that the larger part of the population did support this German-Dutch military cooperation. Recent investigation by the Dutch International Affairs Institute, Clingendael, somewhat contradicted the Military Academy's conclusion and supported the thought that it is still necessary to improve overall acceptance and support. It is not unthinkable that we in the Netherlands have missed some form of deliberation such as the Elysée Council of the early sixties, with which De Gaulle and Adenauer were able to initiate the processing of post-war traumas, differences etc. between France and Germany. It seems as if we are not able to rid ourselves of the charged atmosphere between the two populations which manifests itself from the beaches at Scheveningen to the football stadiums in the very far corners of Germany. I have, however, never ever noticed any of that intense tension or charged air in my dealings with my German colleagues, and I believe that they, along with the numerous Dutch firms that co-exist with and maintain healthy working relations with their counterparts, are good role models for how we should continue to integrate our two peoples.

Ladies and gentlemen, I shall now conclude my presentation with the most dominating aspect in the drive toward more multinationality, or even regarding today's main issue of "binationality", and that is LEADERSHIP.

As the first commander of a four nation division it would have been easy for me to place a Dutch flag on my desk and dictate that the Dutch style of work with Dutch procedures would pervade within my staff, obviously with the hope that my successors would simply follow suite. I did not do that, in fact, with the one exception of short lines of communication between general and corporal, I very consciously selected to trod a multinational path. I feel that multinational formation commanders should be carefully selected and that they should be prepared for these positions with the appropriate career-path.

I have read extensively about multinational leadership and have learned that national cultures are almost impossible to change, I have also learned that organizational cultures are difficult to change. The better option is to take the best from every available culture and to apply and use it, just as Richard Hill, a British author, describes in his book entitled "Euromanagers and Martians".

He states, that it is very difficult to determine which nationalities are best suited for certain tasks. He makes an attempt and I quote:

*"Europe would be heaven on earth if the Germans were responsible for all the railway traffic, if the British were in charge of the police forces, if the Dutch managed the agendas and if the Belgians were the cooks and the Italians of course, would have to be the lovers". "It would be hell on earth, however, if the Italians were in charge of the railway-traffic, if the Belgians were responsible for the agendas, if the Dutch controlled the police force and if the Germans were the lovers and the British the cooks".*

In short, this is a big problem for the multinational manager. Richard Hill examined a notional make up of what the ideal multinational manager in Europe should look like, and in addition,

be able to trade with American, Japanese and Chinese businessmen. In his book, Richard Hill, does not solve the question of who is most suited for the position of multinational manager. He concludes his book in desperation stating, and I quote again: "*Multinational managers should just behave like everybody else, they are all ridiculous anyway*".

I would not, however, say that of the first Dutch Commander of the GE/NL Corps. It is on his shoulders that an immense responsibility rests. He will have to set the binational trend, which can later be extended on. I wish him and his staff every success in his endeavour, and I am confident that he will succeed.

I thank you for your attention.



# Presentation by General H. Hansen

*Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe*

## THE DUTCH-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP: A SUCCESS STORY

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

My interest lies in the military relations between the Netherlands and Germany and I would not presume to comment on the much broader and may be more important issues of political and other relations between our countries. However I feel that I am reasonably well prepared to comment on military relations between our two countries, our two armed forces respectively.

I was asked to give my talk in English. That may surprise some of you, but I will remind you of the words of the Emperor Charles V, who ruled both our countries: *'I speak Spanish to God, Italian to women, French to men and German to my horse!'* English is neutral in that respect, particularly if one bears in mind that in the days of Emperor Charles the word 'Duits' applied to both our languages.

Most of my career with military units has spent in the I (GE) Corps. You will recall that, under the old layer cake deployment of NORTHAG, I (GE) Corps had an area of responsibility between the I British Corps (to the south of the Hanover-Berlin "Autobahn") and I (NL) Corps to the north. As a battalion commander, as a brigade commander and subsequently as a divisional commander I had numerous dealings with my Dutch colleagues. Indeed my brigade came under command of 4th (NL) Division and ultimately under I (NL) Corps and at times I had a Dutch battalion under my command. In those days we did not distinguish between operational command and operational control. I did not know about these things. It simply worked. So I had the closest relations with the Dutch brigade at Seedorf and of course even more closer to the battalions in Bergen-Hohne and Langemannshof. Subsequently as divisional commander in Hanover I had frequent and various dealings with my Dutch colleagues in NORTHAG. I think therefore I can safely say that I know you as military colleagues and I know what I have to talk about.

Let me make it very clear from the outset that our cooperation has not been confined to our land forces. Our air forces also form part of this military team as they work together in NATO Integrated Air Defence and because of the close cooperation between individual flying units. We also should not forget the elements of our naval forces which for decades has worked together on closest possible terms bilaterally as well as in multinational NATO task forces. Consequently my remarks relate to the whole spectrum of military cooperation, although they will focus on our landforces.



*General H. Hansen and Lieutenant General H.A. Couzy: friends in discussion.*

*(foto: T Remmers, WDKL)*

the much deeper integration that has existed within airforces for some long time. We all know the significance that the corps level has for landforces: it is the highest national level of command which at the same time ensures a seat at the table within the integrated level of NATO-structure.

Please imagine the position if only the USA, the UK and Germany, who maintain national corps, were represented at this table, but no other European partners. Such a situation would neither be in your, nor in our interest, because it would stir up jealousy and lead to disinterest and in due course fragmentation and desintegration. Furthermore the general staff officers of the smaller partner countries would be deprived from the opportunity to develop professional skills at the very important and vital operational level.

Please do not misunderstand me: this is not token of favour of the bigger toward the smaller partners. It is purely a matter of looking after our common shared interests: successful military cooperation in Europe depends on a balance of involvement at all command levels, irrespective of the scope of the individual military contribution. To make it clear that I for one, mean what I say, from the very start of the planning to set up our common GE/NL Corps, I as Chief of Staff German Army and my colleague General Couzy, were in fullest agreement that the posts of the Corps headquarters should not be filled in proportion to the number of men, tanks, apc's, artillerypieces, battalions or brigades, but would strictly adhere to the principle of equal shares, that is to say fifty-fifty. In a sensitive area like that of military relations, a system



*M.J. Knottenbelt, res maj, inf, b.d. RMWO 4; there was a lively discussion about 'muddy boots'.*

(foto T. Remmers, AVDKL)

The combat training centers are a right step in the right direction. You can only get muddy boots in wars happening at the days we are in. That is nowadays peacekeeping sometimes with a tendency towards peace enforcing. And I agree it is totally different to fight that kind of wars than the traditionally type of wars.

*Question by Mr. Knottenbelt,*

It is very interesting to hear from general Huysman that it is easier to fight a real battle than peacekeeping. Presumably he has experience with both. I have only with one, with Dutch commando troops in recent war (WW II) and I have never been a peacekeeper. Fighting the battle is simply straight forward. It leaves you with complex ideas in your head. One of them is the concept of the 'bellum justum', just war. Does it has any interest in looking into it?

*Question by Mr. Munnikhof,*

We have been talking extensively about the hesitation of Germany to take the lead in many domains and I was actually waiting for my favorite word in German, which is 'Zwergbedürfnis' the urge to be a midget and this hesitation might be a valuable issue for politics. But one thing is sure, in business and in industry it is a counterproductive connotation, it is a connotation of disaster. My question is actually this one: You all received a very nice brochure of one of our sponsors, it says a journey through the world of Daimler-Benz. Is not the world of Daimler-Benz actually the real world we are living in? In which



If it is a peace-enforcing operation in a Kuwaiti kind of situation, a clearly designed breach of international law, then irrespective of the country, place and position, we should participate without any reservation. In all other cases I would prefer in agreement of the state concerned.

*Answer by Lieutenant General Huysman,*

Concerning the question on war doctrine, to fight a real war is not easy and I appreciate very much what you have done in WW II. The complex aspect of peacekeeping operations is, that we are trained to fight but we are not allowed to fight. That is the complex issue in Bosnia because we have no mandate to fight there. To develop a new sort of war doctrine is difficult but we are very busy with it. The other day it was only attack, defend or delay, but now it is on a smaller scale, it is complex planning and it is combined, more nations are involved and it is joint (it is army, navy and airforce together). But we are developing at the highest levels in NATO new concepts together with the MNC's.

*Answer by General Hansen,*

Let me deal with the issue concerning the concept of 'bellum justum', just war and whether and how Netherlands and German multiscientists would approach this issue and where they stand now. Obviously the question incorporates a number of issues. Religious issues, issues of international war, issues about the perception of our society. In respect to a legal situation or religious question there may be difference in perception and realities. It is certainly and definitely not systematically approached and not a joint effort by both sides. I would like to see a seminar composed of our two military and scientific communities to approach that issue. The only thing I can tell you is, that in Germany the question 'bellum justum' is a very deeply discussed controversial issue in the entire question of commitment of German forces. There are still very different views in this respect. One of the most difficult things in our deployment to Somalia was this issue. It was constantly discussed in our society.

Another aspect is that of international law, which is distinctively different. The one has a strong morally aspect, the other one has for this reason mainly a legal aspect.

Referring to a NATO Wintex-exercise during which your NATO-ambassador in a debate, whether a certain measure should be taken or not, asked: Why are you Germans approaching these things so legally, this is far beyond any political reasoning? I said equally bluntly, there is one difference between you and us. You were sitting in Nuremberg and we were standing. Honestly it is not as simply as that, but you need to know in the question of 'bellum justum' that international law since the Nuremberg trials has become a part of our constitution. In case of doubt it supersedes national constitutional law. So the legal issue of the application of military force by virtue of the effects plays a very important role and that needs to be kept in mind when you are debating these kind of issues.

Additionally there is the worldwide aspect on how these legal and moral questions are transported and discussed. Transported by our mass media into our society and that is why I refer to the perception of our societies. This is an extremely controversial issue which is carried and translated to military communities as well. After the Somalia, Cambodia and Irak deployment quite a number of military professional soldiers felt that this kind of activities was not in concert with the oath they were taken; the oath which clearly said: Germany's freedom and to serve loyally our government. They turned in their oath and decided to quit the service. Just to indicate the role this issue plays in our armed forces. I am not totally aware which role it plays in your armed forces, but I would say. It is an issue worth to be paid attention to.



*The panel in the afternoon discussion period: General H. Hansen (left), Prof. Dr. M.C. Brands (centre), Lieutenant General P. Huysman (right).*

(foto: T. Remmers, AVDKL)

command and even the airforces for years and years already. We (army) could not use them as a good example because the character of their operations is quite different.

*Answer by General Hansen,*

I have always considered the navies around the world as the largest and most closest knit 'dark blue uniform labor union' and to that extend I would say I see no reason why not the navies - they do it since long - could even be integrated. Sure they can. In the same way you form a multinational or a binational corps, you could be able to found, to organize a binational destroyer flotilla, a submarine flotilla and even establish multi- or binational command structures. It is even much more complicated in the army context for various reasons.

The enlargement of NATO is about the same question as the enlargement of the EU. The question at issue is, what is in the best interest of the nations within and outside these organizations. Do we need to go for a widening at the expense of deepening, with all consequences. Or should we refrain from widening with all the consequences and simply stick together and say let us have a small family, deepen our relationship and of course don't forget the outside but more or less neglect it.

This is the issue that must be adressed. I give you my personal view, same for NATO and the EU: It is against the spirit of the alliance as well as the EU to simply forbid them or neglect or forestall entry of other nations. They can not be excluded.

Once they can not be excluded it is a question of terms and therefore an extension is going to come, it is the most natural development. Even at the expense of a certain degree of substance

and quality an enlargement is in the best interest of all our nations. who are now in the alliance. Once it is being done, prudently, stepwise and we should not look for easy and short term results. In my view it is going to come.

I will tell you one thing which concerns me as a military man and I am going to raise it next summer in Dresden when I make a speech for the Atlantic society. I am not so sure whether all those ones strongly advocating enlargement of NATO have considered the consequences for the members of NATO and our societies. And I simply need to state article 5 'contractual obligations' in my view the entire issue of enlargement cannot just be dealt with between governments. It needs to become a public case in our societies. Our societies have the right to know in what kind of commitment our government are staged, are going to enter into and what are the alternatives.

That needs a public debate similar perhaps to the one we had on the double track discussion. It may be a fierce battle but I would prefer a fierce battle with a good outcome rather than a bad outcome without a battle. That needs to be raised in my view and that is not yet done.

# Final remarks by Prof. Dr. M.C. Brands,

*Chairman of the Conference*

Concerning the Dutch-German relations.

As I am a teacher I will now come to the homework especially for the Dutch side, because I expect it is a larger part of the audience.

What do the Dutch still have to learn? Quite a few things.

- We are dealing with a different type of Germany. How different, what different? We have to find it out. It is a far more complex Germany than our prejudices suggest.

- We should start to learn again the German language. It is a minimum, that is not a type of slavery towards Germany. It is a normal type of behavior towards one of our bigger neighbours; as we also should learn to speak French again.

- We have to do everything to prevent in the future those enormous outbursts of irrational anti-German behaviour.

We have heard that on the rational level there is a very good cooperation. That can be improved here and there, but in fact it is an excellent type of cooperation. But we are confronted now and then within the Dutch society with these outbursts and they are mainly related to a total lack of knowledge of what is going on in Germany and how the German society itself reacts on things which are not very nice there.

That's quite a load for the Dutch and I still think they do not fully recognize the importance of this load. It is a load for our government as well. In our schools things should be taught again on these subjects and they hardly are - as I know from experience.

I come now to the German side. That is a very settled business to express it. We have been discussing quite often to day the point of a new type of German illusionism. General Hansen referred to youngsters that operate on the basis of never again. They won't really learn the lessons of WW II and of course German militarism nobody wants. There is a type of tragic element involved in learning. The lessons of WW II will not prepare us in the best way for the enormous problems we are facing in Europe to day. One of the most impressive elements during the visit of Chancellor Kohl in January this year was, that he tried to make it clear to youngsters. You have been trained that military solutions are no good at all, you cannot turn around all of a sudden the program and say look we should train more military Germans to participate wherever in the world.

But never the less we have to learn. our German friends have to learn, in a European framework to give up on German illusionism.

I will not miss an opportunity to teach wherever I can what continent we are living on, what continent we are living in. We are still not toilet-trained concerning security issues in Europe.

We have hardly any political security structure. We have institutions of course like NATO, excellent and of course we are trying to come to a common foreign and security policy, as our compatriot mr. H. van de Brock tries to establish on a daily basis. But he has told me also how extremely difficult it is to get Europeans together on a common program. The institutions are allright but the political steering mechanism, where the institutions should be used for and under what circumstances and so on, are extremely important.

It can be said again, we are missing our American friends on a daily basis more and more. We realize on a short notice what enormously important function they have fulfilled in Europe. Of course against the enemy, against the people in the East, but also allies amongst themselves, protecting allies against allies. One of the major functions on coordination and leadership. And on this continent we are extremely short on leadership and coordination. So don't misunderstand that some of us have been pleading for a new type of coordination and some more leadership and also from the German side. It is in this context, the IGC of 1996 I am sure cannot provide that, we have to find new structures.

# Closure of the symposium by Major General B.A.C. Droste,

*President of the Association*

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, mr. Chairman and speakers of today in particular.

Thanks to your valuable contribution I feel free to state that we have been successful in achieving the goal set for this day: to conduct a meaningful discussion on the future relations between the Netherlands and Germany.

In the Netherlands we are sometimes inclined to think that this relation is equally essential for the future of both nations involved - but, to our credit, it can also be said that we do realize that Germany has many more neighbours. They think of themselves being important also and all of these nations have their own peculiarities.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands feels self-confident enough to rank itself among the larger nations in Europe, although it also regards itself as the smaller of the larger ones. This perception of ourselves creates tensions, but as we have learned today, these tensions should be looked upon as positive forces.

Both countries can be characterized as strongly European-minded. That in itself provides a basis for cooperation and progress. It is very gratifying to find that many aspects of this cooperation result from initiatives that have sprung from the roots of both our societies. The bond of friendship and cooperation that has existed for many years now between the armed forces of our two countries is an excellent example of how neighbouring countries can work together effectively to our mutual advantage and even more so to the advantage of Europe as a whole. Ladies and gentlemen,

The Royal Association for Military Science is very pleased with the fact that its 130th Anniversary has served to make a contribution towards further improvement of the relation between our two countries.



*Major General B.A.C. Droste closes the symposium.*

(foto: T. Remmers, AVDKL)

Thank you once again mr. Chairman and all of today's speakers; besides I thank the audience for attending the lectures and debates. Your participation has made the discussions more lively and given a further perspective to the conclusions that we have drawn to day. I thank you.

At the end of his closing remarks the president issues to the Chairman of the symposium and the lecturers a small bronze statue with two fishermen standing hand in hand working together symbolizing the German-Dutch cooperation.



(foto T Remmers, AVDKL)

# Annex 1. PROGRAM

*The future relations between Germany and the Netherlands  
Nieuwe Kerk, Spui, The Hague*

## **PROGRAMME**

*18 May 1995*

- 09.30 - 10.00 hrs. Reception
- 10.00 - 10.30 hrs. Word of welcome by the Chairman of the Royal Netherlands Association of Military Science, Major General B.A.C. Droste RNLAf.  
Address by the Minister of Defence, Professor Dr. Ir. J.J.C. Voorhoeve.  
Symposium chairman: Professor Dr. M.C. Brands.
- 10.30 - 10.50 hrs. Presentation by Dr. B. Knapen, editor in chief of *NRC Handelsblad*.
- 10.50 - 11.10 hrs. Presentation by dr. K.J. Citron, former ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Netherlands.
- 11.10 - 11.40 hrs. Coffee.
- 11.40 - 12.00 hrs. Presentation by Professor Dr. C.W.A.M. van Paridon, Staff member, Advisory Council on Government Policy (WRR); Professor (by special appointment) of German economics and German-Dutch economic relations.
- 12.00 - 12.20 hrs. Presentation by Professor Drs. A.M.M. Kolodziejak, Catholic University of Nijmegen, Faculty of Policy Sciences.
- 12.20 - 13.00 hrs. Discussion with the guest speakers.
- 13.00 - 13.15 hrs. Performance brass ensemble of the Band of the Royal Marines.
- 13.15 - 14.15 hrs. Luncheon.
- 14.15 - 14.35 hrs. Presentation by Lieutenant General P. Huysman, Chief ACE Reaction Forces Planning Staff.
- 14.35 - 14.55 hrs. Presentation by General der Bundeswehr H. Hansen, CINCENT.
- 14.55 - 15.25 hrs. Tea.
- 15.25 - 16.15 hrs. Discussion with the guest speakers.
- 16.15 - 16.30 hrs. Closing words by the symposium chairman and Major General B.A.C. Droste RNLAf.
- 16.30 - 17.00 hrs. Aperitifs.



## Annex 2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ACE     | - Allied Command Europe                               |
| CFSP    | - Common Foreign and Security Policy                  |
| CJTF    | - Combined Joint Task Force                           |
| EU      | - European Union                                      |
| FRG     | - Federal Republic of Germany                         |
| GDP     | - gross domestic product                              |
| GDP     | - General Defence Plan                                |
| GDR     | - (former) German Democratic Republic                 |
| GE      | - Germany   |
| HQ      | - headquarters  |
| IGC     | - Inter Governmental Conference                       |
| MNC     | - Major NATO Commander                                |
| MOD     | - Ministry of Defence                                 |
| NATO    | - North Atlantic Treaty Organization                  |
| NCO     | - non-commissioned officer                            |
| NL      | - The Netherlands                                     |
| NORTHAG | - Northern Army Group (dissolved)                     |
| OSCE    | - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| SU      | - (former) Soviet Union                               |
| TWOATAF | - 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force (dissolved)           |
| UK      | - United Kingdom                                      |
| UN      | - United Nations                                      |
| USA     | - United States of America                            |
| WEU     | - Western European Union                              |

# Annex 3. LIST OF SPONSORS



- Mercedes-Benz Nederland BV

**SIEMENS** - Siemens Nederland NV

**S.F.M.O.** - Stichting Fondsenwerving Militaire Oorlogs-  
en diensslachtoffers en aanverwante doeleinden



- TNO - Defensieonderzoek



**SIGNAAL**



- Hollandse Signaalapparaten BV



- N.V. Koninklijke Nederlandse  
Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker

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