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# MARS IN CATHEDRA

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## Mededelingen van het bestuur

### Krijgswetenschapsprijs 1993

Op vrijdag 29 oktober 1993 heeft de voorzitter van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap, commodore B.A.C. Droste, de Krijgswetenschapsprijs 1993 uitgereikt aan de tweede-luitenant der genie H.G.M. Sillen. Luitenant Sillen mocht de prijs in ontvangst nemen voor zijn afstudeerscriptie „De vernieling van grote objecten”.

In zijn toespraak zei de voorzitter dat de originele en grondige aanpak, alsmede de weergave van een duidelijke eigen visie doorslaggevend zijn geweest bij de toekenning van de prijs. „Als officier van de genie bent u eerder bouwer dan vernielder. Juist als militairen echter moeten wij soms vernielen om te kunnen leven. U bent er met uw scriptie in gelsaagd deze paradox hanterbaar te maken”, aldus commodore Droste. Hij overhandigde tweede-luitenant Sillen vervolgens een oorkonde, een vulpen met inscriptie en een bedrag van vijfhonderd gulden.

De Krijgswetenschapsprijs werd in 1983 ingesteld om jonge officieren te stimuleren na te denken en te schrijven over krijgskundige onderwerpen. De prijs wordt twee keer per jaar uitgereikt: een voor de beste afstudeerscriptie KMA en een voor de beste afstudeerscriptie KIM.

### Contributieverhoging

Op de Algemene Ledenvergadering welke is gehouden op 6 december 1993 op het Instituut Defensie Leergangen, is met algemene stemmen besloten tot een verhoging van de contributie met f 10,-. Met ingang van 1994 bedraagt de contributie derhalve f 40,- per jaar (buitenland: f 50,-).

## Voordracht

# The role of the CSCE in European security

Op 4 oktober 1993 hield de Vereniging i.s.m. het Nederlands Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken in het Gemeentemuseum te Den Haag een bijeenkomst over bovenstaand onderwerp. Gastspreker was dr. Wilhelm Hoeynck, Secretary-General of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Hieronder volgt de tekst van zijn lezing en een samenvatting van de daarop gevolgde discussie.

Let me first of all thank you. I feel deeply honoured by the invitation of two such distinguished societies. The Netherlands play an important role in the CSCE. Many of you have certainly clear and farsighted ideas on the future of the CSCE. This is why I am particularly grateful for the discussion that will follow my presentation. The Hague is the seat of the High Commissioner on National Minorities and thus has a prominent place on the map of CSCE activities. Mr. Max Van der Stoep, the first High Commissioner on National Minorities, has made this new CSCE tool – as several delegates at the last meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials put it – 'a real success story'. This is to a large extent a personal success for the High Commissioner. I feel particularly honoured by his presence in this auditorium.

Our discussion takes place at a time crucial for the future of the European security. The same is true for institutions and organisations involved in it, including the CSCE. Consideration of this topic raises the basic questions which occupy today the minds of politicians, diplomats, military strategists and security experts:

- is a lasting and peaceful order in Europe an attainable goal?
- do the policies we are pursuing move us closer to this goal?
- are the existing institutions adequate instruments for establishing and maintaining such new order?

These questions express the growing perplexity and the obvious lack of orientation vis-à-vis the security development in Europe.

Scepticism in the ability of the Western institutions to project stability into the East; serious

doubts as to the effectiveness of diplomacy and political solutions in coping with our new problems; helplessness in the face of continuing wars and conflicts; these are characteristic perceptions of the situation as seen and expressed by public opinion. The gap between vision and reality is growing. But, as president Clinton said in his speech to the UN General Assembly, 'we must inspire our people to look beyond their immediate fears toward a broader horizon'.

In the past the CSCE agenda was clear: to ease block to block confrontation, to limit the Soviet threat, to build bridges between West and East and foster the freedom of captive nations. But let us not forget that at the time many were more than critical vis-à-vis the CSCE. Not very different from today they asked, what can a lofty structure like the CSCE do other than weaken NATO and strengthen the Soviet grip on its empire? However, the task as seen by Western and non-aligned countries, and by the less and less silent majority in Central and Eastern Europe, has been successfully achieved; even far beyond what we could realistically expect. The CSCE was instrumental in bringing about revolutionary change with peaceful means and without bloodshed. Certainly not the CSCE alone, but as a framework attracting and reinforcing decisive political inputs. Concentrating for once on the military aspects of security, it is worthwhile to ask why the old CSCE was successful.

First of all, the CSCE concentrated on elaborating concrete measures. To build confidence and reduce confrontation, the concept of confidence and security-building measures was successfully put into practice. The CSCE developed the notions of transparency and predictability in the field of arms control. It was the CSCE Stockholm Document of 1986 which introduced for the first time obligations for on-site inspections without the right of refusal on the European continent. The elaborated measures, although often described as soft arms control, contributed significantly to eliminating suspicion and mistrust.

Second, the CSCE provided for continuity. It helped to maintain dialogue between the blocs even in the most tense periods. At times the CSCE was the only platform of arms control and security negotiations between East and West. After the start of the deployment of the INF missiles, the Soviets pulled out of all negotiations, except the Stockholm Conference. Sometimes the mere possibility of preserving dialogue was equal in importance to new arms control measures.

Third, through its comprehensive approach to security the CSCE helped to put arms control into an overall political framework. It consolidated the Western position that human rights and fundamental freedoms are as important for peace as control and reduction of military potentials. This was a glorious transformation of a firm belief in the fundamental importance of human rights into a strategic goal. It started modestly with the introduction of 'freer movement of people, ideas and information' into the East-West agenda, making the CSCE not a tool for consolidating the then geo-strategic status quo, but a vehicle for change.

The crowning of the arms control efforts pursued in the framework of the CSCE process was and is the CFE Treaty. (It is also a good example of the possibility to develop within a CSCE framework specific solutions for specific problems.) Together with the Vienna Document on confidence and security-building measures and the treaty on open skies, the CFE-Treaty constitutes the solid foundation for security co-operation. The essentials are the absence of a capacity for surprise attack or large-scale offensive action, predictability of strategic intentions and the absence of a threat of military domination by a single state.

The strength of this basis is confirmed by the vitality of these agreements in the present circumstances. The CFE Treaty, in the first place, but also the CSBM Document continue to be decisive factors for stability in a fundamentally different security environment; the old threat has been removed, Central and Eastern Europe are almost free from unwelcome foreign troops. Political and economic constraints limit effectively the ability to raise and train forces. But those agreements provide now for the irreversibility of the positive changes; and they provide for predictability of behaviour in Europe. They are politically and militarily in tune with the objective of a new democratic and stable security order in Europe.

Can the experience gained within the CSCE in the past and the assets which were the basis of its success be helpful in determining its role in the face of the present challenges?

To answer this question we have to look briefly at the new challenges. In my opinion, the most serious challenge of a strategic dimension is fragmentation of European security. This could entail the return to national approaches to security. Once started, such a process could lead to uncontrollable chain reactions. Europe could split into various areas with fundamentally different security interests and turn into a mosaic of incompatible security arrangements. The fall-

back into confrontational positions would be almost unavoidable.

A threat of a strictly military dimension stems from the high risk of abuse of military power, both internally and externally, by an authoritarian regime. The threat is no longer an all-out massive confrontation. In most, but not necessarily in all cases, it would lead to localised, typically small-scale resort to force internally or among neighbours. The problems of irregulars, non-state entities, non-limited categories of light weapons, deficit of rules for civil conflicts expose serious gaps in the existing security arrangements.

I am convinced that the CSCE can make important and perhaps unique contributions to meet these challenges. But let me add immediately: the CSCE can not do it alone. And with regard to most scenarios even not in the first place. As in the 70's realism is of essence. Asking too much of the CSCE will hurt, and is actually hurting, its real potential. Identifying more clearly what the CSCE can do, will also show what the CSCE can not and should not do.

Regional conflicts, particularly the wars in former Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus undermine the credibility of the concept of a single space with indivisible security. These conflicts weakened the belief in the efficiency of political solutions and the relevance of declaratory assurances.

I cannot forget the last sentence of a dramatic speech of the Bosnian foreign Minister at a CSCE meeting: 'To small states you leave no other choice than to arm themselves as quickly and as best as they can'. Who could wonder that countries threatened by the spread of instabilities have started to look for guarantees based primarily on military power. At least in the short term the CSCE is not the answer to such anxieties. It cannot provide military, alliance-type guarantees for the simple reason that it is not a military alliance. It is not an instrument for collective security. The essence of collective security, as I understand it, is to provide guarantees against external threats. All for one and without exceptions. But always against somebody else from the outside. The CSCE is composed of 53 states. There is no adversary, no 'somebody else'. Problems and threats emerging among its participating states are fully 'CSCE-internal'.

But what in this context appears as a weakness is also a strength. It is exactly the all-embracing formula of the CSCE that provides it with a mandate for developing co-operative security in the whole CSCE-area. That includes a legitimate and uncontested basis for conflict prevention and crisis management through peaceful co-operative means throughout the CSCE area.

Today, as in the beginning of the CSCE process, co-operation is the key issue. In the early 70's co-operation worked to de-escalate the threat of block to block confrontation. In the short term it led to progress, in mid-term it was a sweeping success. Now we have to provide for another quantum leap in co-operation to cope with the dangers stemming from fragmentation. As we have seen, the old CSCE created the basis for co-operative security. I think the new CSCE has inherited and newly created specific qualities for contributing to a comprehensive co-operative security structure that can re-establish the credibility of indivisible security for all CSCE participating states. What are the elements qualifying the CSCE for this demanding new task?

First is the comprehensive circle of participating states. Each and every state between Vancouver and Vladivostok has its place at the CSCE table. Today some are complaining that the CSCE had better avoided receiving the non-European successor States of the Soviet Union. But could we contribute to stabilising these new members of the international community by excluding them from CSCE? Developments in Georgia and the conflict in and around Nagorno Karabakh clearly demonstrate that help is needed. The Caucasus and also the central Asian states are not far away countries. As part of the former Soviet-Union and through their links with the Russian Federation they are of direct relevance to overall CSCE security.

Second, CSCE procedures are proven tools for developing co-operative security. The CSCE is the kingdom of persuasion. Decisions are taken by consensus. In contrast to a widespread assumption there are few examples where in the post-1990 era promising and important CSCE decisions were blocked because of the consensus rule. The consensus principle makes up for high identification by states with decisions taken. In voting bodies decisions may be perceived as imposed and therefore implementation can easily be refused. That's why NATO decides by consensus, this is why the clear trend in the Security Council is towards consensus. Adhering to the consensus in principle does not mean that the decision making process of the CSCE could not be considerably improved. But as far as basic decisions are concerned I continue to believe that it is a strength rather than a weakness.

The third element that qualifies the CSCE for making an essential contribution to co-operative security is its comprehensive concept of security. This concept relates the maintenance

of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and co-operation with peaceful inter-state relations. The human dimension is the heart of the CSCE. It provides the CSCE not only with moral authority. As understood today by CSCE participating states, the human dimension is in particular levelling down the traditionally almost insurmountable walls of national sovereignty. At the 'Moscow Human Dimension Meeting' in September 1991 – days after the unsuccessful coup in Moscow – the participating states declared 'categorically and irrevocably that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the state concerned'. This was a real breakthrough. It opened the way for CSCE involvement at an early stage in what has since turned out to be a particular threat to new stability: internal tension related with unsolved national minority issues. The high human dimensions standards, and the high degree of like mindedness of the CSCE participating states in this area also provides the CSCE with a substantial basis for addressing the root causes of tensions. Successful conflict prevention and efficient crises management is not in the first place a question of mechanisms or instruments. Common values are the best basis for finding lasting solutions.

The fourth CSCE quality in view of co-operative security is its growing potential for political consultation, including all aspects of security. Since the Stockholm CSCE Council Meeting, CSCE participating states meet every Thursday in the so-called CSO-Vienna Group. This group has become the standing body of the CSCE. Every subject important for one of the participating states can be raised. If necessary, decisions on immediate action can be taken.

The fifth CSCE element conducive to co-operative security is the newly acquired capability for concrete action. The dispatch of CSCE missions to several areas of former Yugoslavia, to Moldova, to Georgia, to Estonia and to Latvia and the vigorous engagement of the CSCE concerning the conflict in and around Nagorno Karabakh demonstrate that the CSCE has become operative. Of course, dispatching missions is not an end in itself. But the missions contributed by their mere presence to stabilisation. Solving these complex problems takes time. Patience is essential for success. An operative role has also been given to the High Commissioner on National Minorities. Furthermore, several instruments and mechanisms in the

human dimension and in the field of military aspects of security allow for operative action.

The six element for developing co-operative security is particularly important. It is CSCE's potential for mobilising active engagement of its participating states and mutually reinforcing support of international institutions and organisations. In spite of all the uncertainties about future roles of individual participating states and of the place of the individual organisations in a future European architecture, we certainly need the CSCE as a framework that invites involvement.

I wish to refer, for example, to the Norwegian foreign Minister, Johan Jørgen Holst, who underlined sometime ago that the CSCE enables the smaller and in particular the middle powers to play a role. There are many examples; one is the Netherlands. The CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was a Netherlands invention. Today, as mentioned already, almost everybody refers to it as a very efficient instrument of the CSCE for conflict prevention. But it was extremely difficult to reach consensus on this approach. Other national diplomacy's might have given up against stern initial opposition. But in the end tenacity paid off. Another example to mention in this context is the actual CSCE chairmanship of Sweden. The Swedish foreign Minister, baroness Margaretha of Ugglas, has given a high profile to her responsibilities as chairman-in-office of the CSCE Council. Supported by the full and very considerable potential of the Swedish foreign service with broad experience in multi-lateral affairs and peace keeping operations, Swedish leadership increases in CSCE activities in almost all areas.

As to the US interest in the CSCE there is no doubt that NATO is for both sides of the Atlantic the proven and irreplaceable link between Europe and North America. But the US is looking out for increased possibilities for multilateral action to improve security in the whole CSCE area without having to do it alone and without being the key player everywhere. The CSCE framework seems to be attractive for such US engagement. In the most difficult CSCE operations the US plays a leading role, not least in the CSCE efforts to find the basis for a negotiated solution for the conflict in and around Nagorno Karabakh.

I think the CSCE is also an attractive international framework for the Russian Federation. At the last meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials there was a very thorough discussion concerning the conflicts in the Caucasus area. It was clear from the intervention of countries inside and outside this region that in their views the Russian Federation has unique possibilities

for contributing to the solutions of these crises. All interventions at this meeting, including the Russian representative, underlined the importance of using these possibilities within or closely linked with the efforts of the CSCE or the UN. It is also worth mentioning that on a different, equally important issue, namely the stationing of unwelcome foreign armed forces, like on the territory of the Baltic states, Russia choose a CSCE framework, the 1992 Helsinki Summit Declaration, to agree with a specified withdrawal principle. This spirit which now seems to be prevailing in Moscow can be a decisive Russian contribution to developing co-operative security. There are many other participating states, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, which are attracted by the CSCE framework. This does not mean that the Swedish presidency does not have enormous problems in mobilising the participating states for the support of CSCE missions. Qualified personnel for the missions is essential for their success. This can become the real test for the vitality and credibility of the CSCE. Our central and eastern European partners are more than disappointed about Western performance, particularly concerning the planned monitor mission to Nagorno Karabakh. The IOPG (Initial Operational Planning Group) has – on the basis of careful and detailed planning – established the need for 500 plus personnel. As of last week there were altogether 181 personnel pledged – 30 from Western countries. This is perhaps food for thought in ongoing discussions about projection of stability.

What can be said about the CSCE as a partner for mutually reinforcing co-operation with international organisations? This obviously is a difficult subject because it is directly related with the development of a new European architecture. Few feel challenged to engage in this discussion against the background of so many and fundamental uncertainties. Why not try a pragmatic approach based on some principles providing for direction without defining the end result.

First of all, let's acknowledge that a variety of organisations is not a drawback but an asset of the future European architecture. Institutional monopoly would in my view inevitably lead to hegemonial structures. Lack of flexibility, unending strife for internal balance of power, uncontrolled mammoth-growth and behaviour would make such a giant certainly not the right guarantor for a lasting peaceful order.

Second, is it so difficult to determine the role and the division of labour between the several components of a developing architecture on the basis of their comparative advantages? The UN

is the global organisation with an extremely broad area of activities and with the prerogative to mandate enforcement. But the UN is burdened with too many problems. The CSCE is a regional arrangement under the UN Charter. Chapter VIII of the Charter establishes some kind of subsidiarity principle in favour of regional arrangements. The CSCE is well placed to become a framework component for a co-operative security structure in its area. NATO is an instrument of collective security with unique operational capabilities. There are other important structures and institutions, like WEU, NACC, CIS, Council of Europe and – of a very different category – the European Community. Each has its own area of action and responsibility. Some direction has to be given in view of the growing resemblance both in membership and subjects dealt with between the CSCE and the NACC. The rule of comparative advantages might help. The CSCE with its comprehensive framework should probably continue to focus on operative conflict prevention. NACC should probably concentrate on the development of a common strategic culture, as NATO Secretary General Wörner has put it, and focus on practical co-operation in the field of peacekeeping.

Third, every institution should keep its specific and autonomous character. A discussion about hierarchies and general chains of command would inevitably end up in futile argument.

Fourth, institutional imperialism should not be tolerated by the overlapping membership of states. What the institutions should however do is to ensure that there is no gap between their mandates. They must also ensure the continuum of action, particularly in crisis management.

Fifth, and most important, all of them and on a non-discriminatory basis should be ready for mutually reinforcing support and enjoy the political and material support of their member states. Without such back up they will not be in a position to work effectively.

The CSCE has a good record in co-operation with international organisations. We have an exchange of letters with the UN that establishes a co-operative framework. The UN is continuously being informed about all CSCE missions. The Security Council has issued a number of resolutions directly addressing and involving CSCE missions and activities. In spite of some problems in day to day business in certain areas it is clearly felt that the UN Secretariat is guided by the view of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that regional organisa-

tions have to carry a larger part of the burden. As to European organisations it is not well known that the EC monitors in former Yugoslavia are working under a CSCE mandate, providing them with the agreement of all states that have interests in this unfortunate part of Europe. It is equally little known that the WEU-operation on the Danube is covered by a CSCE decision, which was one of the prerequisites of the riparian states for accepting this mission. The sanctions assistance missions in the countries neighbouring Serbia and Montenegro, which have contributed a great deal to strengthening the implementation of the relevant decision of the Security Council, are based on very intensive co-operation between the CSCE and the European Community and its member states. Practical links have been established between the NACC and CSCE discussions on peacekeeping. There is certainly still a broad field for further development of co-operation between European and transatlantic organisations, including CSCE mandates for peacekeeping and not only for NATO. But it is wise to proceed with care. We must beware of one track, one issue solutions that neglect the respective environment and tend to lose sight of the key factor: improving overall security and stability for all the new democracies.

Arms control remains a centre piece for any co-operative security structure. The justified focus on the human dimension and the concrete and immediate challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management have diverted public attention from the continued CSCE efforts in this area. Traditional arms control was based mainly on a restrictive philosophy. The aim was to limit, to constrain or to prohibit military actions which had an impact on the security of others. The new approach which the CSCE is attempting to follow is to build a close network of mutual links and ties. Increased interdependence and 'internationalisation' of security behaviour would reduce the possibility that a state 'goes on its own' and would make it unattractive to look for unilateral solutions. More control in arms would follow from more co-operation.

The operational centrepiece of the CSCE undertakings concerning military aspects of security is the Forum for Security Co-operation. It provides for the continuity of efforts which resulted in the CSCE Treaty and the CSBM Document. It is there where new co-operative approaches to strengthening security in the political-military area are being explored. The mandate is clearly going beyond classical arms control as it relates to 'arms control', disarmament and confidence- and security co-operation and conflict prevention'.

Let me briefly outline how in practical terms a response to the new challenges is being prepared.

First, new arms control measures must be relevant in solving today's problems. They have to be more closely connected with the political settlement of conflict and be integrated into overall crisis management activity. Having this in mind, the negotiators in Vienna are preparing a set of stabilising measures for localised crises situations. Such militarily significant measures, sometimes copied from existing instruments, could be applied in specific conflict situations and adjusted in substance and form to the particular circumstances of that conflict.

Second, new arms control should help to further 'internationalise' national defence efforts. That is the idea behind the proposals on the increased exchange of information and dialogue on defence planning. States would share with others at an early stage their long term intentions as to the purchase of equipment, size of troops, level of spending, etc. This means building trust through more openness and co-operation.

Third, the CSCE would undertake to promote further direct contacts and exchanges in the military field which will again strengthen co-operation. There is no doubt that a qualitatively higher level of military co-operation and contacts would be a tangible contribution to strengthening confidence and mutual understanding.

Fourth, transfer of conventional arms can be particularly de-stabilising. This sensitive area should be opened to external insight. At least some restraint on transfers to regions of instability on the basis of common rules should be observed. Such rules are now being negotiated in Vienna.

There is a fair chance that agreements in these four areas could be finalised by the CSCE Council of Ministers in Rome (end of November beginning of December this year).

The Forum for Security Co-operation is also negotiating two major projects which might substantially contribute to the development of an all European security system. Decisions on these projects could be ready for the Budapest Summit Meeting in the fall of 1994.

Negotiating the so-called harmonisation has turned out to be rather difficult. The endeavour to establish a common meaningful denominator of arms control obligations for all the CSCE states has raised very complex questions. If the

yardstick is the CSCE Treaty, new arrangements must not undermine the treaty itself. Another problem is related to the fact that the two security approaches of the past, that of alliance-type integration and that of neutrality based national independence, created differences of defence structures and perception. But there is still room for negotiation and exploration of compromise solutions.

The most ambitious and far reaching project is the Code of Conduct guiding relations of states in the field of security. This document should constitute the quintessence of the efforts pursued at the Forum which is to prevent the abuse of force both internally and externally. It will strengthen the foundation of common rules, standards and norms on which any system of co-operative security must be based. In the view of some participating states, the validity of the concept of indivisible European security would be strengthened if one could agree on action to be taken in cases of non-compliance.

I have tried to outline what the CSCE is doing and what it can do and could do. Hopefully I did not create the impression of not having observed my own appeal to realism. But realism, in my view, does not mean to judge the CSCE potential by the cynical, well known question: how many divisions has the CSCE? The CSCE has contributed to fundamental change in Europe without divisions. Now, in spite of the experiences in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, there is no reason to give up our efforts to manage this change with peaceful means in the first place.

New tasks certainly have to be undertaken by a new CSCE. Structural change is underway and can be managed. But the success of the new CSCE is by no means linked with the establishment of a bureaucracy. What the CSCE does need is the attention, the involvement and the support of participating states. Not for conserving a successful example of multilateralism in a museum of diplomatic history; but for making a meaningful contribution to new stability.

I thank you for your attention.

## Discussie

*Vraag.* Right now 53 states have joined the CSCE. Is there any limit to the number of states that joins CSCE. Despite the European element in the acronym CSCE, there are non European nations, for example Japan, that are participating; and what about China?

*Antwoord.* As far as fully participating states are concerned, there is a basic agreement that CSCE should stay within the CSCE area established by the preparatory conference in Helsinki in 1973. Japan is not a member but an observer with rather far reaching possibilities to participate including participation in missions. Actually, we just had a discussion on improving the connection with what we usually call the non participating mediterranean countries. There is a long standing interest from Egypt and Morocco, and those countries will be invited to take part in the next council meeting. However, there is no consensus as to the relationships with other countries.

*Vraag.* What should NATO say to CSCE on its summit in January 1994; what do you expect from NATO?

*Antwoord.* Active support from NATO has always been very important throughout the history of CSCE. Now, we have direct links with NATO. In my view it would be very important to continue to stress the role that the CSCE plays in developing a European security structure including the continued interest of NATO and NACC in practical co-operation. Because, in the end we are not dealing with NATO and we are not dealing with CSCE but we are trying to create a new stability.

*Vraag.* You stressed the importance of consensus. How do you view the possibilities of a CSCE security council to vote by majority?

*Antwoord.* Actually you pose two questions at the same time: one on the establishment of a security council, and one on the voting mechanism. I think – at least what the principle is concerned – one should stick to the consensus rule. I think it is really very important and, by the way, it is also a very good school for responsible international behaviour. The CSCE consensus principle is thus an important element that could contribute to keeping the international community together. If the majority rule would apply, all participating states would still be bound by the decision. However, the political value of such a decision would be considerably lower than any decision taken by consensus. By the way, I could also tell you that there is no chance to come to such a majority vote because you would need consensus to agree on the voting mechanism and you are not going to get that. Of course, decision making is now more complicated but I think we can do it.

As to the security council, the situation is the same. For most of the participants a security council implies permanent members and non

permanent members. This again is not a perspective for the overwhelming majority of the CSCE participants. Even if you choose permanent members on a rotating base, some countries would perceive a UN like situation, in which they are not involved in most of the decision making; this is just what they do not want. Again, I think we should develop other means to facilitate decision making, for instance specific decisions in view of an operation. As far as operations are concerned, the decision to send a mission should be made by consensus; but when it comes to the operative questions there are several possibilities to do that. But let me say again, I do not see any future at all in the establishment of a security council in the CSCE.

*Vraag.* In the last European council the French government made a proposition to start a discussion on what the French then called the European pact. Now, of course, we do not know what will come out of the next European council and everything is under discussion. But, when I look at what the French meant by this proposal, and when I look at your discussion of the interlocking institutions, I just wonder whether this pact would be a contribution to institutional pluralism or a disadvantage.

*Antwoord.* Regarding the pact of stability, as far as the institutional component is concerned, – if I am not mistaken – the state of the art in the discussions among the Twelve is that the stability pact would have no institutional component. Now as far as the substance of the pact is concerned, i.e. giving high priority to the very serious problem of the relationship between territorial integrity, self-determination, and minority rights, I would feel that it is very important that in this area we now have a far reaching initiative from the French and from the Twelve. We have never discussed this question amongst CSCE participating states. We have not yet been officially informed by the Twelve, because I think that the discussion on this issue has not yet reached the state of where the Twelve could go out and present a consolidated position to the CSCE. But as I understand the situation both from the discussion amongst the Twelve and from the discussion amongst the participating states, it would be most welcome that a bridge be established between the stability pact on the one hand and the CSCE on the other.

As far as pluralism of institutions is concerned, I would think we are not actually in need of additional institutions in the European framework. I think every political question or every question concerning the future structure of Europe in the end boils down to a question of balancing power. If you have several structures it is much



easier to balance power in a way that is acceptable for everybody because you have several frameworks in which different partners play a role. I think that is something I can imagine much more concretely and positively as framework for a really lasting peaceful Europe then if you would imagine one big organisation being competent for everything organised more or less in a centrally organised way which in my view would not be a structure that would have a chance of contributing to a really lasting peaceful order. In this sense, I think this multi institutional system is quite a good beginning to come to mutually supporting co-operation.

*Vraag.* Do you think there is a challenge to the security in Europe, do you think there is a danger of fragmentation of Western European security? What could be the role of the CSCE in crisis management in the Russian Federation; and what kind of action can the conference take in case of conflict in the Russian Federation, given the lack of military power?

*Antwoord.* Let me underline again that I spoke of conflict prevention in the former Soviet Union, as opposed to the Russian Federation. On your question how the CSCE could be helpful there, I can just cite examples. We have 2 missions deployed; one to Georgia and one to Moldova. These missions are trying two things. First, to be helpful in the continuing efforts of the local peacekeeping forces which are in both places. So, our missions establish contacts with the tripartite peacekeeping forces to give them a kind of international framework that is welcomed by all three participants, and that in our view has contributed to maintaining the cease-fires established. The second task is to prepare the ground for a political solution of the conflicts. Again, both in Moldova and Georgia we have a cease-fire but there is no progress yet towards a definite political solution. These missions have about 7 to 15 members, those are not large scale missions, but for preparing the ground for a political solution we think they are just the right size; for this task you do not need military back-up. Now, the situation is different in Nagorny Karabakh. Still, basically the CSCE is trying to do the same there. First, to be helpful in establishing a cease-fire; then, monitoring a cease fire. Based on actual planning, you would need, as I said, some 500+ unarmed monitors for that. So the aim is to solve this problem peacefully; this action would go really hand in hand with preparing the ground for a negotiated solution of the problems in and around Nagorny Karabakh. I think our overall concept of crisis management has to be such that you have the possibility for a continuum of action, starting

with early warning and ending if need be with enforcement action. I think it is important that in every operation it is quite clear that if peaceful means are not successful then there is a possibility that through the decision of the security council enforcement action could be taken and this is one of the reasons why the CSCE in all its operations is co-operating very closely with the United Nations. So that eventually you could establish this continuum from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. But, as we see almost everywhere where enforcement action is undertaken, it is extremely difficult and the outcome is extremely dubious. So what we think is underlined by this: that we have to put much more effort in the early stages of conflict so that we can try with peaceful means to avoid escalation to an armed confrontation. That is the lesson that we have to draw from many of our experiences during the last one to two years in several areas where the UN has been active.

*Vraag.* Would you like to comment on the statement that the security situation in eastern Europe already is a fragmented security environment?

*Antwoord.* I would not wish to take issue with that, but by developing a co-operative security system we have to try and avoid that fragmentation is spreading. We should try to reverse this development so that we can re-establish the credibility of what we keep saying in CSCE documents: that the security of Europe is indivisible. We have to do all we can to re-establish the credibility of this political aim. And, as I tried to explain, I do not think that the CSCE can do it alone. We have to come to a system where several structures and organisations, including the UN, co-operate.

*Vraag.* The possibilities for solution of inter-ethnic problems are small. My prognosis is that all the old sources of inter-ethnic problems will remain in existence. Together with the principle of consensus this makes it impossible to improve the situation. Do you agree, or are you more optimistic about solutions than I am?

*Antwoord.* There certainly is an element of a dilemma when you look at territorial integrity, self determination, and minority rights. But at the same time, I would think that there is a way out. If minority rights are granted, if autonomy is granted, I think we could be in a position to solve a lot of problems without coming to what certainly is the worst case, that is secession. Therefore, I think on the one hand there is a dilemma, but on the other hand there is also a chance. Developing the rights of minorities,

including eventually autonomy status, could offer a perspective of solving such problems. I would not say it is a solution for all the problems – we know that even in long standing democracies we still do have such problems – but I think there certainly is a chance if we give more attention to minority rights, and if minority rights are given before such problems escalate into armed conflict and armed intervention. This is certainly one of the demanding tasks of the High Commissioner on national minorities, who is involved now in many places from the Baltic to the Balkans. I cannot but agree with you that this is perhaps the key issue of future development in Europe: do we manage to find solutions on these many ethnic problems? Judging by personal experience, I think there are solutions to that, and perhaps for a moment I can refer to my experience. I negotiated the German-Polish agreement. I can assure you that from the moment there was a clear regulation of the border question, we were able to make a lot of progress on the question of minorities. If we could make it clear that the right to self determination does not in itself imply a right to secession, we will have taken a big step forward. Please keep in mind, this is my personal view. I am certainly not speaking on behalf of the 53 participating states, but within CSCE there is a trend developing into this direction. In Helsinki last year we were already close to saying something in this direction but there was not enough time to elaborate on that. But there is a feeling that we have to bring more clarity into this question and quite frankly, I think the solution of these problems does not lie with unlimited fragmentation everywhere, but with maintaining the borders and granting minority rights including autonomy. I think that could lead to the solution for many problems.

*Vraag.* But does self-determination not imply the possibility of disrespect?

*Antwoord.* I think self-determination, and I have the impression this is also the developing view amongst lawyers, self-determination could lead in the end to secession, if and when the rights of minorities continue to be violated. But we must make it clear that self-determination in itself does not imply the right to secession and that it offers in the first place a framework for improving the rights of minorities, autonomy, and so on.

*Vraag.* The CSCE used to be characterized by the linkage of the various baskets. Nowadays, you see more and more expert meetings, separate mandates, more diversification. Do you think it would be a good idea to link all the aspects of the CSCE again?

*Antwoord.* I have tried to underline at several points in my speech how important a comprehensive concept of security is. Of course, it is not important only in an analytical sense, but it is also important in an operational sense. It is quite clear that human rights including minority questions are of crucial importance to security. Here you see the direct link between security and human rights; CSCE has been highlighting this context all the time. The fact that you have several institutions in several places is just a consequence of the way in which the CSCE developed in an evolutionary way. The decisions were taken at different times and so there were different options. We are now trying to streamline the structure somewhat. The nomination of a Secretary General is one of the measures.

But now to the point you have rightly mentioned as being so important, economic cooperation. If you take the CSCE, there are two parties who can make really substantial contributions to economic cooperation: the United States and the European Community. Linking these together with CSCE will not be easy, but it can be done and it must be done because they are all members, so to say overlapping members, of the same institutions. For example, let us take a look at the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is extremely important to link the capabilities of the European Community in the economic field with the efforts of UNPROFOR, while at the same time involving CSCE actions such as confidence building measures in the military field. I cannot but agree with your view, but making it operational is not easy. Still, we have to use economical measures. Let me remind you of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, which is the application of combined efforts. The sanctions were decided upon by the UN Security Council, but they are implemented through a mandate from the CSCE with the assistance of the European Community; the operation on the Danube is a WEU operation under a CSCE umbrella. So, you have certain elements of a comprehensive concept also in our efforts for a conflict prevention and crisis management.

*Vraag.* But what has happened to economic basket in CSCE? Is it still on the agenda?

*Antwoord.* The economic dimension has not at all disappeared from the CSCE but you are addressing different aspects. The one is the political perspective of market economy and principles for economic development. This is still a task of the CSCE, and the conference you are referring to was the economic forum in Bonn in 1991. The CSCE is pursuing that through a relatively huge economic seminar that we have in Prague once a year.

Now, when it comes to economic co-operation in an operational way, you have to see where you can get economic support in concrete terms. Because it is quite nice to stipulate and to demand an economic operation, but you have to have somebody who is really doing it. Of course, every participating state is invited, but still you have to see where the largest potential is. What I am trying to say is to keep this in mind, to make this part of an overall effort of conflict prevention and crisis management. At the same time, do it by dividing the work between those who can provide such help. I should have mentioned the EBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development with which the CSCE also is co-operating. But I can assure you it not easy to generate such aid in a concrete way.

*Vraag.* What is the position of the CSCE in the Russian question? How could this influence peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions in the former Soviet Union?

*Antwoord.* This is extremely difficult to say. I can only assure you that CSCE participating states would wish, to the extent possible, to be helpful in a co-operative way to see to it that the principles we have established within the CSCE concerning human rights, democracy and the rule of law, can be realised. We all see the problems, we all see that in quite a number of

CSCE participating states important steps still have to be taken. But on this issue I think it is very important that we do not create a situation where we speak *about* one another in the CSCE, but where we speak *with* each other in a really co-operative way. We just have a meeting going on in Warsaw on the implementation within the human dimension and this is what we are actually trying to do. I think it is important to keep in mind that regarding human rights we never really reach a final stage: we are always on our way. We know what is happening in our countries; we know that we too are still in need of improving on human rights. So, there is no answer one can give once and for all. It is important for Russia and it is important for all CSCE participating states that they express their readiness in a co-operative way to be helpful in developing and firmly establishing the principles of the human dimension.

On peacekeeping and peacemaking we should keep in mind that even countries that some would see as far away, like Central Asia and the Caucasus, these days are closely related with our own security situation. Therefore I think we should not make a distinction between what is somewhat closer and what is somewhat further away. I think we should be ready to get involved also in trying to settle crises in places that some would regard as too far away, simply because they are related to our own security.