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# MARS IN CATHEDRA

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## Voordracht

## The situation in former Yugoslavia

Op 7 juni hield de Vereniging een bijeenkomst over bovenstaand onderwerp. Gastspreker was dr. Jonathan Eyal, Director Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSIE). Hieronder volgt de tekst van zijn lezing en een samenvatting van de daarop volgende discussie.

In the next few minutes I will try to outline to you the kind of problem that Yugoslavia was, on the assumption that you are more or less familiar with what is going on there. One of the most depressing things of Yugoslavia was that the conflict was actually predictable from the beginning. I could have written the scenario of what was going on in Yugoslavia on the back of my package of cigarettes. You did not need to be terribly sophisticated about it. It was very obvious from the beginning what was going on.

There were two problems. First that we had cried wolf for too many times. Ever since the death of Tito in 1980 everyone predicted that Yugoslavia would break up tomorrow, but it didn't break up till years. The second problem was that Yugoslavia didn't matter at all. One of the greater tragedies in Yugoslavia is not the children murdered, is not the women raped, is not the ethnic cleansing but it is in essence the fact that all of Europe tried to make an example out of Yugoslavia for completely different reasons and completely unrelated to what was going on in Yugoslavia. It is a disgraceful policy and an utter failure. Perhaps there came some good out of it: it has given us a cold shower about European security structure today. In that respect it may have done some amount of good.

The beginning of the war was with absolute accuracy by the CIA in december 1990. Not only was the beginning of the war predicted, but actually the date was predicted. The end of June 1991 was when the war was going to start. So if any politician tells you today that they didn't know what was going on, please don't believe

them. What they didn't want to know is the small difference in what we believe in, and what we were actually prepared to do on the ground.

It is fashionable to say that we can not blame the European Community for the failure in Yugoslavia because the European Community does not have the security instruments, and it is not right to blame Western leaders for failing to stop the war, because this is a civil war with a long historical background and nobody has any solution to it. The reality is actually much more simple. First: it is true that the European Community does not have any of the instruments for dealing with the Yugoslav problem. But it is actually the European Community that tried to deal with the conflict from the beginning. So if it is blamed now for the outrageous failure, it has only itself to blame. May I remind you: we started our policy in Yugoslavia that *under no circumstances will we ever recognise the independence of what was then called secessionist Yugoslavia* (quote Douglas Hurt). Six months later we recognised it. The reason for wanting to keep Yugoslavia together was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of nationalism. With the risk of repeating myself to people that have heard me before: nationalism is not a rational feeling. It is no good telling people that they must stay together because in economic terms it makes it good for them to stay together. To put that argument forward is no more profound or intelligent than to suggest that a couple whose marriage is broken down must stay together because it makes the payment of the mortgage on the house easier. What kind of an argument is that? This is precisely the argument that you gave Yugoslavia. We said the country had ten billion dollars worth of foreign debts, they must stay together because they will never be able to repay the debt separately. This is the argument we gave not only Yugoslavia but Czechoslovakia and the former Soviet Union as well. The reason why we suggested Yugoslavia to stay together is because if you allowed Yugoslavia to break apart then who knows Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union may break apart. Complete nonsense! The idea that, lets say mr. Lansbergs being president of Lithuania would have given up his fight for independence, simply because we were not prepared to recognise the independence of Croatia, is rubbish. Every nationalism believes itself to be unique. Every nationalism survives of the idea that they could somehow achieve victory against much larger forces.

But we did much worse than that. The main problem about this entire exercise is, that we actually do have blood on our own hands.

When we told the Yugoslav Republics in June 1991 that we did not recognise their independence we achieved the worst of both worlds: on the one hand we pushed Croatia and Slovenia into declaring their independence much more early, because they knew they had nothing to lose, on the other hand we pushed the Serbs into believing that they could use any amount of violence that they wanted, that we actually would not care as long as they would keep the country together. Now it is very easy to say that the Serbs wanted to fight in order to protect the ethnic Serbs in other republics. May I remind you that the beginning of the war was against Slovenia, the country that does not have any minorities at all. It had nothing to do with the protection of ethnic Serbs in the other states. It was an attempt to keep Yugoslavia together. It was an attempt that was encouraged, initially, by the Western governments. So we made the war an absolute reality and have probably made it much worse.

But it was worse than that. I was involved in the Yugoslav conflict from the beginning and I remember that on the 25th of June 1991 the great Troika of the European Community arrived in Belgrade to teach the local people, the natives, how they should behave. We had the former president of the European Community, the present of the European Community and the future one. In the after-lunch the president of the Community took the president of Croatia and the president of Slovenia to a private discussion. He said: *"you cannot, even if you want to, be independent states."* When they asked why not, the answer was that they were too small to be independent in economic terms. Do you know who the president of the European Community was in that time? Luxembourg! And nobody in the audience saw the stupidity of this discussion. Luxembourg is an independent state, a member of the European Community, a member of NATO, who had a president of the European Community talking, supposingly, on behalf of 200 million people. And Luxembourg was telling Croatia, who is actually seven times the size, that it was too small to be independent. This was the reality, these things were actually said! Including your foreign minister, mr. Van den Broek, who very gravely declared on that night that this was the hour of Europe. It was not the hour of Europe, it was the momenti morti of Europe.

The essence of what happened that day, was that the European Community rushed into a conflict, not because it had any obligations, not because it had any idea of what needed to be done, but for one reason alone: that it hoped

that the bag of that conflict for the European Community would be to acquire new responsibilities. What actually happened was the competition between institutions, each one trying to pretend that it is the only institution that can solve the problem in Yugoslavia. And what happened? We had one cease-fire after another, the longest one lasting about 48 hours. We had the observers of the European Community, which the locals used to call the "icecream sellers", because they were all dressed in white. We had a big debate in Brussels where it was considered a great achievement that these people who represent the European Community had to wear a European Community Flag on their arm-bands. We had four peace-keepers in Yugoslavia: the United Nations, the CVSE, the West European Union and NATO. All peace-keepers and no peace to keep. Two naval patrols in the Adriatic, one from NATO and the other from the West European Union, and both of them had no rights to stop any ships until November last year. That is the reality of Yugoslavia!

I think the price that we will pay consists of two levels. It is much much more severe than the destruction of Sarajevo or all the murders and rapes that are going on. First there is the entire collective security arrangement in Europe. From the end of the Second World War we relied on the perpetuation of lies and we persisted in believing that these lies would continue as though nothing had changed. Lie no. 1: Europe as such is a good thing, that was the argument at least the last 25 years. Lie no. 2: Germany and France are equal, and they basically run the European Community. Lie no. 3: we don't really have to define what we mean by Europe. The Community calls itself European and monsieur Delors comes and talks about "l'Europe". It is not European, it is West-European. It represents one tip of the European continent and it wants to talk on behalf of the entire continent. I hear all the time that Europe must do something in order to stop this war. At the risk of disappointing a few people in this audience, the simple reality is that Europe can do nothing. The only institution that could act in Yugoslavia in military terms is the same old institution that we always had: NATO. The only way NATO could act there is at the same way as it has done for the last forty years: with American contribution. Without that we can talk until we are blue in the face. The reality is that the West European Union is a few bureaucrats, a few planners and a few boxes and filing cabinets on the move from London to Brussels. But they can do nothing; filing cabinets cannot threaten Serbian generals and that was what Serbian generals had to find out, that filing cabinets cannot fight.

The politicians who say that they have a right to tell all Europeans how they should behave, should also be prepared to pay the price for it. The price is very simply that if we say that ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression must not succeed, we must be prepared to put our troops on the ground in order to prevent it from happening. Nobody has suggested that, and I will tell you why. In the beginning of the Cold War it was rather easy to suggest European and American solidarity. The threat from the East was so huge that in essence most European countries accepted that if they are challenged they will have to face everyone together. But the simple reality today is that a Serbian artillery shell cannot hit me in London. If my government wants to tell me that I should send my son or daughter to die in Yugoslavia then they better explain to me why. Why does Yugoslavia matter? Nobody explains. We have pressure from public opinion that forces politicians into claiming that they have to do something. But that "something" was nothing more than trying to get pictures of the television screens. I have always claimed that the Americans are much more efficient than the Europeans. We spend a year doing this nonsense. It takes president Clinton two months doing exactly the same nonsense and coming up with exactly the same results. But throughout this period there is a curious inversion of roles. Those vicars, bishops, intellectuals and music singers, and everyone who told us for the last forty years that force solves nothing in international relationships are now demanding immediate bombing of Bosnia. And all the generals who spent billions telling us with only major military force terminates aggression, I must say that they can do nothing against the few thousand drunken hooligans in Bosnia. Actually this inversion of the roles keeps going on. The reality is that nobody really knows what needs to be done. We started by saying that we would try to keep Yugoslavia together, whatever Yugoslavia means. After we discovered that we could not do it we changed it to trying to keep Bosnia together. Again we did not succeed. Let me kill of another sacred cow: this is the one of blaming it all on the Germans. This is actually not correct. The Germans wanted the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. By the time the Germans asked for that recognition they were absolutely correct, there was nothing else that could have been done by december 1991.

The problem is quite different. That the European Community was trying to pretend that the Germans were wrong to recognise Croatia and Slovenia, because after that now we would recognise every republic that wants independen-

ce. Recognising Croatia and Slovenia was right, recognising Bosnia was wrong! It was wrong from the moment it was clear that 34% of the population was Serbian that did not want anything to do with the republic. If we were serious about the Vance-Owen plan, it should have been put in place before the recognition of Bosnia, then we would have a change of success. Not a year after Bosnia no longer exists. Sacred cow number 2: the general liberal idea that somehow the people are good, it is only the leaders that are bad. Change the leaders and we will have peace. It is a very comforting noble Western protestant liberal idea. It may work very well in the North European countries. It has very little to do with Yugoslavia. The reality is that the majority of the people enjoy killing each other. We may find it very difficult to accept but I have seen it with my own eyes: they like it.

The third sacred cow: somehow every conflict has a solution. If one peace-negotiator does not succeed then get another one and if he does not succeed get another one. All you need is the right brain, someone who will come and shout *Eureka I've found the solution*. A lot of nationalist problems do not have a solution. They need to be managed with the lowest amount of violence. That is as much as we can do. If I told you today that I had the solution for Northern Ireland, you would think that I was insane. If I told you that I had written one article explaining exactly how the Frysians feel about the rest of the Netherlands and how all the disputes are never going to be again if my mind is adopted. Would you take me seriously? But every single day we have in the papers articles by people who come up with a solution.

You probably by now are getting rather bored with this sort of mist of negative thoughts. You must think that I am only coming up with all the things that went wrong, without coming with any kind of suggestions. That will not be difficult too. First: the main problem in Yugoslavia are the borders of Serbia not the invasions of Bosnia. Bosnia cannot be recreated. The damage, the violence, the bloodshed will actually be worse with the recreation of Bosnia. Two: there is no danger of the war spreading into Macedonia. As much as it may surprise some people: when it comes to opposing the Albanians the Macedonians and the Serbs are actually allies. They have an interest in keeping the Albanians down in the same way as the Croats and the Serbs have an interest in carving down Bosnia. The real question is Bosnia. And in Kosovo we are doing the third mistake in Yugoslavia in a row. The province must remain part of Serbia, but at the same time the Serbs must give Kosovo autonomy. The concept of autonomy is completely

meaningless in Eastern Europe. Autonomy means something only in the constitutional order in which the rule of law matters. Otherwise again I could write for you a perfect constitution tonight, but it would have absolutely no chances of success. The problem in much of Eastern Europe is precisely the collapse of constitutional order and the rule of law. To come and to suggest that the Albanians in Kosovo must have autonomy is ridiculous. It is another one of these paper exercises that Western governments usually make. The only thing that you can do with Kosovo is either to say that you don't mind that the tragedy of the Albanians would be very similar to the tragedy of the Bosnian Muslims or that you say that you do mind in which case: cut Kosovo out of Serbia and allow it to unite with Algeria. Now let me give you some general points about the lessons of it all.

Lesson number 1. Europe cannot be a little island in the West of the continent surrounded by wild beasts and pretend that it goes on with a little agenda of harmonising the ATD or organising the ratification of article 415A of the treaty of Maastricht. When we are serious about Europe, we really must mean Europe. Lesson number 2. In spite of all the hot air there is only one security institution in Europe today and that is NATO. If we are serious we want to defend ourselves, then please stop talking about the peace dividend. Paradoxically the end of the Cold War has made local wars more, not less, likely. They are more likely to take place because the stakes, the dangers of use of nuclear weapons, for instance, is much smaller. The chances of success for whoever launches a military offensive are much higher. If we are serious about defending our continent on our own, we actually must tell our electorate that we must spend more, not less, on defence. Otherwise we will remain in an arrangement with the United States, which sometimes may serve us and sometimes may not. Lesson number 3. Don't make any great claims to keep principles when you have absolutely no intentions of paying for them. If we are serious that we want to prevent ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression we must be ready to pay the price. To finish with the most gloomy lesson. I have a strange feeling that Yugoslavia was just the beginning. How will we react in case of violence in the former Soviet Union? How far will Europe extend; what will the limits of Europe be? I never believed in these great intellectual plans about the so called architecture of Europe. I never believed that politicians would actually sit down with a ruler and make decisions. The problem is not to put it on paper, the problem is when it is tested. We failed this time.

## Discussie

**Vraag:** You gave me the impression that you want to treat the situation in Yugoslavia in the same way a nuclear reactor is dealt with: you keep the process going but also keep some distance and shut it down only very gradually. But if we do it that way, what will happen in 20 or 30 years? Will some kind of learning process occur or should we not even hope for that. And should we fear the same problems in Russia?

**Antwoord:** I am not sure that I accept your analogy with a nuclear reactor, mainly because I am not sure that we actually have many options. It would be very easy for me to take the mantle of morality and to claim that the only way to accept the division of Bosnia is to accept the results of ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression. In that way I would be a moral citizen respecting the international law. But I would be doing nothing with this war. The great tragedy is that the Bosnian muslims continue to fight, expecting the Western world will intervene. I am absolutely convinced that we must have a Bosnian muslim state. We must have it for the basic reason that we may not make the Palestinian mistake again. If these people will not have a state now, they will never get it afterwards. There will be more than 2 million people that nobody wants around.

Ethnic cleansing succeeds every single time. It is irreversible: where are the Jew of Eastern Europe today, where are the Indians in North America today. Clinton says America will never tolerate ethnic cleansing! But if you want to prevent ethnic cleansing you must do it before and not after ethnic cleansing starts. That calls for a policy of constant engagement from the beginning. So I hope I am not using Yugoslavia as a laboratory. I am just trying to draw the lessons from this disaster and I think that that is the only thing we can do. It is a tragedy and not only in moral terms. Not because I don't have morality, but because it is not my business. I am only looking at the lessons Yugoslavia has for the security and these lessons are very great. The Americans believe that the Europeans are going back through history, to their old traditions of killing each other because of race, of concentration camps, of gas chambers and everything else. This is the view of average Americans: *this business has nothing to do with America*. In Europe people on the street think: *why do we have all these military establishments?* There is a general feeling that politicians are rubbish, that they are unable to answer the needs of today. What the new generation will bring I do not know. The new generation in the twenties

brought on the one hand very noble people and on the other hand people like Hitler. So I can not make a prediction of what kind of society we will get. I can only say that if we freeze the war in Yugoslavia, that is about the best we can do for the next 20 years. This is a moral task simply because nobody bothered to explain the people in the street why a Serbian artillery shell that can not reach you in The Hague, still matters. As long as you don't explain that, there will be no public support.

**Vraag:** My question is about the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. In the eighties people were talking about a mutual admiration between president Reagan and prime minister Thatcher. Now that we have seen that the problems in former Yugoslavia have raised very important questions that can influence to the Alliance, what do you think will be the effect on NATO? What do you think will be the effect on the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States? And what will be the effect on the position of the United Kingdom in Europe?

**Antwoord:** You are asking rather big questions. We were aware that the special relationship was based on all kinds of serious issues which includes the historical connection. Power in the US is moving away from the east coast to the west coast at least in economic terms. So clearly this withholds some implications, and neither Mrs. Thatcher nor Mr. Reagan are still attracted to each other. I hope you are not going to make the usual mistake that people that are not either English or American make about the so called special relationship. The English were treated not very nicely in Washington last month, because of the Bosnian issue. But the language is much underestimated. I can go and talk to any American official, like they talk to an Englishman, and I don't only understand his language but I also understand the nuances in his voice. I instinctively understand what he is talking about. American television network can cover any political event in Britain and it will be instantly recognised by most Americans. The legal and the electoral system are identical in terms of how you elect and in terms of some shared battles. Paradoxically someone like Clinton is actually educated in England. But I don't think it matters as much as before. The Americans believe that the British connection would be one that would keep their influence in Europe. Because of the British indecision about Europe, though, I don't think that the Americans believe the British connection is that important. We (the British) didn't return much for the love the Americans gave to the Germans; the Ameri-

cans supported the German unification the first, and the Germans did not repay a great lot either. In a way the Americans are looking for a new anchor and it will certainly not be found in England.

To the effect of Bosnia on the relationship I can not think of any worse time that this could have happened to us. Because the whole issue of major involvement in Europe is now being discussed from both sides, but especially from the United States. I don't accept the argument that because of this issue was on Europe's doorstep, it was Europe's responsibility alone to solve it. I don't believe the Americans have solved Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico and a few other small things in their own backyard. If the Americans are serious, the ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression are international incidents. The truth of the matter is that America is going through the same kind of moral disease of the inability to come to terms with the new world at the end of the Cold War. I have a strong believe that when our children will write the history of this period, the most important thing that they will say our mistake was, was the fact that we failed to understand the significance of the end of communism. We believed that the end of communism was something that would only change Eastern Europe. They had to have market economy, democracy etc.; they had to become people like us. We didn't need to change at all. So we went ahead with a plan established in the mid eighties for the ever closer union. This was complete nonsense if you look at it now in terms of the conditions that were taking place by 12 countries in the one corner of Europe. After 1989 it was still claimed to have a reason: Europe. You could do nothing about the outcome. The great tragedy of the last few years is that we assumed that the end of the Cold War only melts East European institutions. Wrong! It melts every institution: NATO, European Community, United Nations, CVSE, WEU. Every institution is back in the melting pot. That is the crucial mistake. America is in exactly the same position. It keeps hoping that it is the only remaining superpower in the world. But when it comes to exercising the leadership...?

*Vraag:* The problem with politicians and public opinion is, that it is very difficult to show Europe that the consequences of Yugoslavia are broader. You are talking about uncertain scenarios which people don't believe in and the only thing you are left with is the moral hangover. Could you be more specific about the possible consequences? The people in the street think it is a moral issue.

The second problem is the concept of Europe. This concept is very vague and weak. It is not

only a question of where the discussion ends, but also what it will be like. Maybe the only thing you are left with and people believe in is a sort of nation-state, with a predominantly ethnic character. What are the consequences?

*Antwoord:* I basically agree with what is said, and I will try do make some pointers.

First: clearly, blood is thicker than water! Despite of all the claims of trying to establish a higher international identity most people instinctively identify themselves with people whom they share a certain amount of joint historical experience with. I don't believe that nationalism is only a matter of black and white, that you either have the nation state or a great United States of Europe. The European Community was a bureaucratic exercise. It was an attempt to impose a European identity through economic means from below, which was absolutely correct. But we do not ask people to much about their opinion about Europe, because if you do, you might get an answer. So you only regulate the size of the eggs, without bothering to tell the chickens, and how many cheeses you can have in Europe and to give numbers and sizes (your sizes) on everything. You can see the reality in every European country. When France had a referendum, it passed by 0.7%. The Danes had to be asked twice, and I suppose they would have been asked about ten times until they came up with the right answer. The British were never asked because everyone knows the answer. The Germans were never asked because everyone knows their answer. The problem at the moment is that the idea of Europe is becoming increasingly meaningless to anyone but the politicians, and that a whole generation of officials still clings to this. Remember what mr. Kohl said after the reunification. He talked about a German unification within Europe. What does this mean? For a politician from the generation of Adenauer, the Klein-Rheinländer politician, it was absolutely noble. If we could only explain to the Germans why it is that the German language is not the first official language in Europe; why it is that Germany who has an economy about the size of Britain and France combined, is not a member of the Security Council of the United Nations, why it is that Germany does not have its equal share of the European Parliament; why it is that Germany does not have any European institution on German soil? If you are from the generation of Adenauer it is very easy to explain why, you do not need an answer. But it does not work like that now. What you said is absolutely right. Look at all the European governments: all the sex scandals in Great Britain, the hara-kiri prime-minister of France, 12 ministers in Italy in jail, the financial scandals

in Germany, Ross Perot in the United States who can get 19% of the votes in the elections. Ross Perot is not a product of democracy, he is an accident of democracy. These kind of people can all be there because there is a general feeling that the politicians are talking about things that have nothing to do with the lives of the normal people in the street. This is an essential frustration.

I am sorry to say this, but a new Berlin Wall has to be created, in the way it already has been created in immigration terms. All we have achieved perhaps is that we moved the Berlin Wall from where it was to the borders of the former Soviet Union. The reality is that we must make a decision about how far Europe goes. It is not possible to continue claiming that we cannot answer how far Europe goes, and that the East Europeans must remain in expectation while every West European government scratches its head. This is what we have been doing for the past 3 years. There has been no other structure that was meaningful and that was legitimate. The truth is that the Dutch citizen identifies himself much more closely with a Dutch minister than with a bureaucrat from Greece with a name he can not even pronounce who happens to be responsible for agriculture in Brussels. If we had a democratic European community, matters could have been different. But this is the chicken and the egg story. We started with a non-democratic community because it was a bureaucratic exercise. So you have a parlement that is elected but decides nothing, and a counsel of ministers that is not elected but decides everything. And then you expect that this will have legitimacy with electorates in democracies in Western Europe? How?

I don't believe this is going to end up in chemical wars. It is a joke to suggest we are going back to the twenties. But we have great similarities with the twenties. Nobody knows what the role of America is. All Eastern Europe is destroyed and Western Europe is in recession precisely when we should help. Nobody knows what Russia is all about. In that respect there are great similarities with the twenties. There is one big difference: Germany is not destroyed today. But we must forget about the dreams. It is very wrong to sell people bullshit, which is basically what we are doing today.

*Vraag:* When you say we should build a wall at the shores of the Boeg river, what do you mean by a wall?

What countries might become members of the European Community? Would there still be a need to develop further in a cooperative relationship with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)?

*Antwoord:* Europe as we know it today, in terms of the cooperation that was built up in the last forty years, can only be applied to the countries on this side of the former Soviet border. That doesn't mean that we do not have cooperation, but you know as the English would say: it takes two to tango. The problem at the moment is, that the Russians claim an exclusive zone in the former Soviet Union and indeed they still claim a veto of the affairs of the East European countries. That is not acceptable. If, for example, Hungary wants to join the European Community it's a Hungarian problem, it should not be a problem that will be decided in Moskow.

I have a feeling that, at least in the beginning, we will have a lot of tension with Moskow. We are already building up to it. Look at the way we treated the Ukrain. Everyone talked about Moskow, Russian security, Russian aid, Russian interest, Russian influence etc., and then we are surprised that the Ukrain refuses to give up its nuclear weapons. What is the lesson they learn from Yugoslavia? That you get a retired foreign secretary that comes to you after you have been carved up? I suspect that we will have a relationship with Moskow very similar to the relationship that Europe had with the Ottoman people in the early 20th century, which is basically: we paid them as much as we could get away with in order to keep them away. I suspect that this is as much as we can do in the shortest period of time. We must not fool ourselves, you are not going to get Russia transformed overnight.

*Vraag:* You were very critical about the actions, or rather non-actions, of the interlocking institutions. What will be their future? Will it be that the NATO will act on its own without a UN mandate?

You said Kosovo was our first priority and not Macedonia. How do you think this will develop looking at the present position of Srebrenica? You raised the problem of what we would do with a conflict on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Having in mind one of the statements of the Ukrain saying that they claim an exclusive mandate on peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union I think that we must not prepare for peacekeeping operations on the territory of the former Soviet Union, but Western Europe has to prepare itself for containment of conflicts.

*Antwoord:* First of all: you very politely said interlocking institutions; these were not interlocking institutions but interlocking institutions, and that indeed was the problem.

Their problem was the classical problem of all institutions: they have to justify their existence.

Once institutions are established, they never die. What we need in Europe are not interlocking institutions, the language is wrong. I used that language myself and I was equally wrong. The truth is that we don't need any new institutions in Europe. What we have is absolutely fine. What we need is an agreement between the governments about the specialisation between the institutions. For example: the European Community is clearly the best institution for dealing with economic management between governments in a higher level and when it gets its act together even on investments in the East and trade policy. The Council of Europe is the best institution for dealing with minority issues, because it has the tested legal instruments. So don't invent any new ones. NATO is the only institution that can deal with security issues. Sometimes it will have a UN mandate to do what they are used to do, sometimes it will have to operate without a UN mandate. It is as simple as that. I don't believe that you can throw away united unified military command, all the infrastructural organization, in order to build up a new democracy in Brussels under the West European flag.

I don't have a solution for Kosovo. As I said in the beginning: there is no solution for every conflict. There is no way, that 2 million Albanians can be assimilated in Serbia. If you want some peace, there is no way that you can prevent some changes of frontiers in Yugoslavia. In the case of Kosovo we will have to consider the greater Albania. I don't think that anyone, including the Italians, is terribly worried about a greater Albania. You are right in saying that this cannot be achieved without another war in Serbia. I have a great suspicion that we are going to visit Serbia again in the future, because the problem is the frontiers of Serbia and not so much Croatia or Bosnia. We have now in the Balkans the German problem like it was in the twenties. You have a country that is absolutely destroyed economically, with a nasty nationalist-socialist dictatorship, with a huge army, with territorial claims on all the neighbours. If you want to challenge them, you have to know what you want to do, and one of the things you have to do is to accept some territorial changes. Finally on your containment. I absolutely agree. I think the whole idea of the discussion about peacekeeping or peacemaking is complete nonsense. The conflicts that we are going to get in Europe are not the kind of conflicts that are very clear so when the war is stopped you can introduce forces for peacekeeping. You will never get a clear cease-fire, because there are internal conflicts that are of a different nature. One of the stupidities of the European Commu-

nity is to try to negotiate cease-fires in Yugoslavia. It is the wrong approach. You first must decide what you want to achieve. You'll never have a moment when you can say: this is peacekeeping, this is peacemaking. There is a way around it and that is containment. Every Western government now is thinking in those terms, but no one likes to talk about it officially. There are many ways of claiming this containment. We have Ukrain. We should encourage Ukrain. It is an enormous asset for the stability of Europe, both as a counterbalance to Russia and as a support for the East European countries. But we do nothing.

*Vraag:* You give the impression that Macedonia is not as burning an issue as Kosovo. I think that you might compare Macedonia-Kosovo to a Siamese twin because of the Albanian question. If Kosovo joins Albania I think Macedonia will be destabilized. As you explained, Serbians and Macedonians are to a certain degree allies as far as the Albanians are concerned. What is your comment on that?

*Antwoord:* One third of the Bosnian nation did not agree with the creation of the very existence of its state. That is a huge problem. It surprises people that there is no such thing as the Bosnian nation. The muslims are either Croatian or Serbian, but there is no such thing as a Bosnian muslim nation. Since the war there is a thing as the Bosnian muslim nation, because the Bosnian muslims created themselves a nation in the same way as every other nation: by paying with their blood for it. So kids in Sarajevo can learn forty years from now about how they fought to create the Bosnian nation. People will quickly forget that there was no such thing as a Bosnian nation. We made a big mistake in assuming that there was such a thing as a Bosnian nation. The problem in Bosnia was very similar to the problem of Yugoslavia: what is the nation. There is a big problem in Macedonia. If you want to stabilize the region you must take into account the views of the neighbouring states.

One of the paradoxes of Yugoslavia is that from the moment the European Community intervened in Yugoslavia all the neighbours were excluded. The Hungarians who have more than 400 thousand ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia were told: it has nothing to do with you, because you had imperial claims etc. The Rumanians: it has nothing to do with you because you are too good friends with the Serbs. The Bulgarians: no, because you have historical claims on Macedonia. Greece, which is the only Balkan country that is actually a member of both the European Community and NATO was told that



it shouldn't intervene. We believed that the Greeks, instead of being able to help us, would be a bother to us. What ever you put in place in Macedonia today is worthless because the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Albanians, the real neighbours, have absolutely no interest in the solution that is imposed from Brussels or from New York. If you are serious about stabilizing the region, you have to talk with the neighbours. And the truth is that there is no such state as the Macedonian nation. You can say that the presence of Americans or the 700 Scandinavian UN forces their could prevent the connection between Macedonia and Kosovo. But if you are going to sit on the Macedonian side of the border and look how the others are cut up by the Serbian troops, what did you achieve? Did you stabilize Macedonia? I don't think so.

*Vraag:* Maybe we should spend more on defence to prepare for a "big" fight like during the Cold War.

What will happen if we accept Poland and Hungary as NATO members?

*Antwoord:* We have to put effort into broadening instead of deepening, there is no other option.

The European Community has done a lot, but honeymoon is over now. The reality is that Eastern and Western Europe have to go hand in hand.

*Vraag:* If Bosnia had not been recognized, do you think we also would have had problems?

*Antwoord:* This war was not avoidable.



# Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap

Opgericht 6 mei 1865

De Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap stelt zich ten doel, het bevorderen van de krijgswetenschap in de ruimste zin.

Voor het verwezenlijken van die doelstelling worden bijeenkomsten georganiseerd waar, over belangwekkende onderwerpen, inleidingen worden verzorgd door deskundigen uit binnen- en buitenland. De tekst van de voordrachten wordt met uitgebreide samenvattingen van de discussies gepubliceerd in het verenigingsorgaan "Mars in Cathedra".

Daarnaast geeft de vereniging het maandblad "Militaire Spectator" uit.

Voorts bekostigt de vereniging, daartoe mede in staat gesteld door subsidiëring door Defensie, de bijzondere leerstoel in het militair recht aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam.

Ook kent de vereniging jaarlijks een prijs toe voor de beste scriptie van een cadet aan de KMA en een adelborst aan het KIM, die door de voorzitter van de vereniging wordt uitgereikt.

Vervolgens beloont de vereniging publicisten die zich hebben onderscheiden met artikelen e.d., op het gebied van de verenigingsdoelstelling, met het toekennen van de Militaire Spectator legpenning.

Al deze activiteiten worden mogelijk gemaakt door de leden van de vereniging. Om het voortzetten van dat alles te kunnen verwezenlijken is het gewenst dat het ledental op peil wordt gehouden en zo mogelijk wordt vergroot.

Het is daarom dat het bestuur van de vereniging U om steun verzoekt, zijnde Uw aanmelding als lid van de vereniging voor de redelijke contributie van f 30,- per jaar.

Leden woonachtig in het buitenland betalen f 40,- per jaar.

U ontvangt daarvoor Mars in Cathedra én de Militaire Spectator.

Aanmelding kan geschieden met behulp van de onderstaande aanmeldingskaart.

Bent U reeds lid van de vereniging, werf dan een nieuw lid.

Aan de Ledenadministratie van de  
Kon. Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap  
Karel Doormanlaan 274, 2283 BB RIJSWIJK

## Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap

### AANMELDING NIEUW LID

Ondergetekende meldt zich hiermee aan als lid.

Naam en voorletters: .....

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Straat: .....

Postcode: .....

Plaatsnaam: .....

Actief dienend officier KL/KLu: Ja / Nee\*

\*) Doorhalen wat niet van toepassing is.

(plaats) .....

(datum)..... 19 .....

(handtekening)