

**KONINKLIJKE  
VERENIGING  
TER BEOEFENING  
VAN DE  
KRIJGSWETENSCHAP**

OPGERICHT 6 MEI 1865

**Ereleden**

Z K.H. de Prins der Nederlanden

Z.E. Luitenant-Generaal b.d.

M. R. H. Calmeyer

Generaal-Majoor b.d. J. J. de Wolf

Generaal-Majoor b.d.

E. R. d'Engelbronner

**Bestuur**

**Voorzitter**

J. P. Verheijen, genmaj inf

**Vice-voorzitter**

A. T. M. Oonincx, cdre KLu

**Leden**

G. C. Berkhof, bgen gn

A. J. G. M. Blomjous, maj cav

mr. B. J. van Eenennaam

W. Kasteleyn, kol KLu

J. C. M. Knol, bgen inf

A. G. C. Kok, kol marns

W. H. van Riet, ktz

**Redacteur**

W. Walthuis, bgen inf b.d.

Molenstraat 78,

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**Secretaris**

W. F. Anthonijsz, lkol cav

Denijsstraat 135,

2551 HJ Den Haag

**Penningmeester**

J. R. Karssing, maj cav

Meeuwenlaan 23

2352 CN Leiderdorp

girorekening 7 88 28

# MARS IN CATHEDRA

15 APR

1 9 8 3

56

## IN DIT NUMMER

Mededelingen van het bestuur: Vertraging in de verschijning van dit nummer — Jaarverslag van de secretaris — Financieel verslag — Studieprijsvraag — Bijeenkomst te Den Haag, maandag 15 november 1982

2013

Defence planning and the Falklands experience, voordracht door E. Gueritz, Rear Admiral Royal Navy, OB, OBE, DSC and Bar

2014

Discussie

2025

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# MEDEDELINGEN VAN HET BESTUUR

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## Vertraging in de verschijning van dit nummer

Doordat de inleiders op de bijeenkomsten van 14.10 en 15.11.1982 niet, zoals anders gebruikelijk, de tekst van hun voordrachten voor publikatie in dit verenigingsorgaan konden overhandigen, moest het gereedmaken daarvan geheel aan de hand van de bandopnamen

worden verzorgd. Fiattering van de aldus gereproduceerde tekst door de inleiders — een vanzelfsprekende noodzaak omdat dit blad een open bron is — kostte uiteraard nogmaals extra tijd. Dientengevolge was het niet mogelijk de voordracht van Pierre Lellouche tijdig te publiceren in het nummer dat op 15 januari diende te verschijnen. Daarom werd beslo-

ten de later gehouden voordracht van Rear Admiral Gueritz voor dat nummer gereed te maken, ook al omdat de actualiteit van diens onderwerp een eerdere publikatie alleszins rechtvaardigde. Dat daarbij enige extra vertraging niet kon worden vermeden, wordt door de redactie betreurd; het bestuur verzoekt de leden daarvoor enig begrip te willen hebben, en hoopt de volgende nummers volgens schema te kunnen doen verschijnen.

## Voordracht en algemene ledenvergadering

2 mei 1983

Op *maandag 2 mei a.s.* te 19.30 uur houdt de vereniging voor leden en introduc  ( s) een bijeenkomst in het Nederlands Congresgebouw te Den Haag, waar door de zorg van LAS/OPN een inleiding zal worden gehouden over

### Pantserbestrijding

Na de voordracht wordt, als gebruikelijk, gelegenheid tot discussie geboden.

*Introductie:* d.t.v. de secretaris, lkol W. F. Anthonijsz, Frederikkazerne, gebouw 110, Postbus 90701, 2509 LS Den Haag (tel. tijdens diensturen (070) 73 24 33).

**Agenda Algemene ledenvergadering** (in aansluiting op de discussie)

1. Opening door de voorzitter
2. Mededelingen van de voorzitter
3. Jaarverslag van de penningmeester
4. Jaarverslag van de secretaris
5. Jaarverslag van de hoofdredacteur
6. Verkiezing van het bestuur (m.u.v. de voorzitter stellen alle leden van het bestuur zich herkiesbaar; kandidaat voor het bestuur is kol art H. A. Couzy)
7. Rondvraag
8. Sluiting

## Jaarverslag van de secretaris

Op 3 mei 1982, tijdens de Algemene Ledenvergadering gehouden in het Nederlands Congresgebouw te 's-Gravenhage, werden de aftredende en herkiesbare bestuursleden gekozen, waarna de samenstelling van het bestuur der Koninklijke Vereniging als volgt was:

voorzitter:

J. P. Verheijen, bgen inf;

vice-voorzitter:

A. T. M. Oonincx, cdre Klu;

leden: G. C. Berkhof, bgen gn; A. J. G. M. Blomjous, maj cav; W. Kasteleyn, kol Klu; J. C. M. Knol, bgen inf; A. G. C. Kok, kol marns; W. H. van Riet, ktz; prof. dr. ir. J. J. C. Voorhoeve;

redacteur:

W. Walthuis, bgen inf b.d.;

secretaris:

W. F. Anthonijsz, lkol cav;

penningmeester:

drs. J. A. W. M. Rhoen, maj int;

leden- en abonnementenadministratie: J. J. M. Nijman.

Zoals de Voorzitter reeds tijdens de vergadering aankondigde, deden zich in de loop van het verenigingsjaar enkele tussentijdse bestuurswisselingen voor. De penningmeester legde zijn functie neer en werd daarin opgevolgd door J. R. Karssing, maj cav; de bestuursleden prof. dr. ir. Voorhoeve en ktz Van Riet werden opgevolgd door respectievelijk mr. B. J. van Eenennaam en ktz W. IJspeert.

In het verenigingsjaar 1982 waren de activiteiten van het bestuur in de eerste plaats gericht op het voltooiën van de planning en voorbereiding van de viering van het 150-jarige bestaan van het door de Koninklijke Vereniging uitgegeven maandblad *Militaire Spectator*, het oudste tijdschrift van Nederland. Ter viering van dat bijzondere jubileum organiseerde het bestuur op 29 januari 1982 een Themadag onder de titel „Defensie en de media” in het Nederlands Congresgebouw te 's-Gravenhage.

Van de daar gehouden voordrachten alsmede van de aansluitende discussie werd in extenso verslag gedaan in een speciaal nummer van de *Militaire Spectator*, jaargang 151 nr 4, dat op 1 april verscheen.

In het kader van die jubileumviering organiseerde het bestuur eveneens — in zeer gewaardeerde samenwerking met het Bureau Tentoonstellingen van de Directie

Voorlichting van het ministerie van defensie — de tentoonstelling „150 jaar Militaire Spectator” die in de loop van het jaar ook elders in den lande werd geëxposeerd en overal veel belangstellenden trok.

Voor het vele werk dat in verband met voornoemde jubileumviering moest worden verricht, alsmede voor de regelmatige verschijning van de beide door de Koninklijke Vereniging uitgegeven periodieken *Mars in Cathedra* en *Militaire Spectator* is het bestuur grote dank verschuldigd aan de (hoofd)redacteur bgen b.d. Walthuis en de hem ter zijde staande redacteurs cde H. A. Baaij, maj R. B. J. Bongers, kol ir. G. M. van der Laan, kol W. C. Louwerse en kol drs J. W. M. Schulten.

Ten slotte dient vermeld dat voornoemde viering tevens werd benut voor de officiële uitreiking van de nieuw ingestelde „Militaire Spectator legpenning” aan de journalist J. M. Bik voor diens journalistieke prestaties op het gebied van de ingewikkelde vraagstukken de Nederlandse defensie betreffende, en aan de hoofdredacteur bgen b.d. W. Walthuis voor de wijze waarop deze gedurende meer dan tien jaren gestalte heeft gegeven aan de *Militaire Spectator* als medium. Verwacht wordt dat deze nieuwe traditie in de toekomst zal uitgroeien tot een door publicisten begeerde onderscheiding die mede zal strekken tot verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefe-

ning van de Krijgswetenschap, in het bijzonder waar het betreft de „onderlinge oefening in de krijgswetenschap en meer bepaald algemene verspreiding van heldere begrippen omtrent krijgszaken”.

Voorts verzorgde de Koninklijke Vereniging in de loop van het verenigingsjaar vier bijeenkomsten voor leden, genodigden en belangstellenden, waar interessante onderwerpen werden behandeld door deskundige sprekers. Op 8 maart 1982 spraken drs. J. C. Siccamo en prof. dr. ir. H. J. Dirksen in het gebouw van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Ingenieurs te 's-Gravenhage over „Defensiere-search en bewapening”, op 3 mei 1982 sprak prof. dr. ir. J. J. C. Voorhoeve in het Nederlands Congresgebouw in dezelfde plaats over „Pacifisme en neutralisme”, op 14 oktober 1982 hield Pierre Lellouche een voordracht over „De Franse Kernmacht” eveneens in het Nederlands Congresgebouw, waar ten slotte op 15 november 1982 Rear Admiral E. F. Gueritz, CB, OBE, DSC, Bar, „De Falkland-crisis” besprak. De belangstelling voor deze bijeenkomsten was in het algemeen redelijk te noemen; verscheidene niet-leden maakten gebruik van de mogelijkheid als introducé(e) de voordrachten te beluisteren; een aantal hunner meldde zich vervolgens ook aan als lid. Reacties op het gebodene waren talrijk, en

Slot op blz. 2013

## Resultatenrekening 1982

	Werkelijk	Begroting		Werkelijk	Begroting
Contributie	f 32.350,—	f 32.000,—	Contributie	f 365,—	f —,—
Subsidie	f 5.000,—	f 5.000,—	Ledenadministratie	f 3.658,48	f 4.500,—
Leerstoel	f 15.031,89	f 16.000,—	Secretariaat	f 717,05	f 1.500,—
Renten	f 4.008,83	f 3.000,—	Lezingen	f 7.441,45	f 9.000,—
Advertentie-opbrengst	f 2.705,92	f 3.000,—	Leerstoel	f 15.031,89	f 16.000,—
			Mars in Cathedra	f 15.631,11	f 16.000,—
			Militaire Spectator	f 913,39	f 1.000,—
			Diversen	f 3.835,21	f 9.000,—
			Saldo	f 11.503,06	f 2.000,—
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 59.096,64</b>	<b>f 55.700,—</b>	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 59.096,64</b>	<b>f 59.000,—</b>

## Balans per 1 januari 1983

Activa	1983	1982	Passiva	1983	1982
Giro	f 12.404,32	f 32.897,55	Contributie	f 24.260,—	f 22.400,—
Banken:			Ledenadministratie	f 300,—	f 600,11
— Rijkspostspaarbank	f 13.327,30	f 12.551,68	Secretariaat	f 28,—	f 118,25
— Crediet- en Effecten- bank	f 33.757,44	f 20.701,26	Lezingen	f 1.000,—	f 196,55
Contributie	f 450,—	f 600,—	Leerstoel	f 2.509,22	f 9.561,40
Advertentie-opbrengst	f 850,—	f 1.000,—	Mars in Cathedra	f —,—	f 3.795,22
Renten	f 2.649,89	f 2.068,62	Militaire Spectator	f —,—	f 2.000,—
Leerstoel	f 6.285,02	f —,—	Diversen	f 26,55	f 770,44
Lezingen	f 280,—	f —,—	Saldo	f 41.880,20	f 30.377,14
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 70.003,97</b>	<b>f 69.819,11</b>	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 70.003,97</b>	<b>f 69.819,11</b>

## Begroting 1983

Contributie	f 32.000,—	Ledenadministratie	f 4.000,—
Subsidie	f 5.000,—	Secretariaat	f 1.500,—
Renten	f 3.500,—	Lezingen	f 8.000,—
Leerstoel	f 15.000,—	Leerstoel	f 15.000,—
Advertentie-opbrengst	f 3.000,—	Mars in Cathedra	f 20.000,—
		Diversen	f 8.000,—
		Saldo	f 2.000,—
<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 58.500,—</b>	<b>Totaal</b>	<b>f 58.500,—</b>

### Toelichting

*Contributie.* Aantal leden per 1 januari 1983: 1058. In het bedrag is f 365 achterstallige contributie opgenomen.  
*Mars in Cathedra.* Rekening moet worden gehouden met stijging van de tarieven (druk- en papierkosten).  
*Lezingen.* Hieronder vallen de honoraria van de inlei-

ders, reis- en verblijfkosten, zaalhuur, enz. In 1983 zijn vijf bijeenkomsten gepland.  
*Diversen.* O.a. vergaderkosten, reiskostenvergoeding, wettelijke betalingen, onvoorziene uitgaven, kosten ledenwerving en beloning beste scriptie KMA.

over het geheel genomen dermate positief dat het bestuur mocht concluderen een verantwoorde voor-drachtencyclus te hebben georganiseerd. Voor het engageren van de sprekers verdienen vooral bgen Berkhof en prof Voorhoeve bijzondere dank.

Met grote erkentelijkheid dient eveneens te worden gememoreerd dat de in dit verenigingsjaar afgetreden penningmeester maj drs. Rhoen erin is mogen slagen de Koninklijke Vereniging uit de rode cijfers te halen en ervoor te zorgen dat de financiële toestand bij overdracht aan zijn opvolger als volkomen gezond kon worden gekwalificeerd, al laat dan ook de omvang van het door de heer Nijman uit-

stekend geadmistrateerde ledenbestand nog steeds te wensen over: reden overigens voor het bestuur zijn onverflauwde aandacht te blijven richten op de werving van nieuwe leden, omdat slechts op die wijze het voortbestaan van de Koninklijke Vereniging kan worden verzekerd.

Van de scheidende oud-bestuursleden werd op gepaste wijze afscheid genomen tijdens het gebruikelijke jaarlijkse bestuurs- en redactiediner op 25 oktober 1982. Als zeer gewaardeerde gast mocht daarbij ook worden begroet prof. mr. Th. W. van den Bosch, die de door de Koninklijke Vereniging bekostigde leerstoel Militair Recht aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam bezet.

W. F. ANTHONIUSZ, secr.

## *Bijeenkomst te Den Haag*

*maandag  
15 november 1982*

Onder grote belangstelling — gelukkig was erop gerekend dat een grotere zaal dan normaal het geval was, zou moeten worden benut — opent de *voorzitter* de bijeenkomst. (De essentie van zijn openingswoord, evenals de inbreng van de aanwezigen in de discussie, worden in het hierna volgende verslag weergegeven in het Nederlands, hoewel tijdens de gehele presentatie het Engels als voertaal werd gebezigd. Hetgeen de inleider in zijn voordracht te berde bracht, alsmede zijn beantwoording van de hem gestelde vragen, worden uiteraard in het Engels gereproduceerd.)

De *voorzitter* betoont zich verheugd over de ruime opkomst van leden en belangstellenden, en wijst erop dat de aanwezigheid van verscheidene cadetten van de KMA duidt op een verblijdende vitaliteit van de toch reeds zeer bejaarde Koninklijke Vereniging. Hij memoreert voorts het streven van het bestuur, zoveel mogelijk in te haken op de actualiteit, en zegt dat om die reden op korte termijn werd gezocht naar een deskundige die zou kunnen spreken over lessen uit het recente conflict over de Falklandeilanden, een militaire operatie die door de geïnteresseerde Nederlanders weliswaar met belangstelling werd gevolgd maar die in de fitnesses niet geheel bekend is geworden. Hij begroet daarom met vreugde de inleider van hedenavond, Rear Admiral Gueritz, wien hij gaarne het woord verleent voor de verbeide voordracht.

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### Studieprijsvraag

Ter informatie van de leden diene dat de Militair Rechtelijke Vereniging een studieprijsvraag heeft uitgegeven waaraan door een ieder

desgewenst kan worden deelgenomen. Voor bijzonderheden zij verwezen naar de desbetreffende mededeling hieronder.

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### Studieprijsvraag MRV

Het bestuur van de Militair Rechtelijke Vereniging heeft besloten tot het uitschrijven van een studieprijsvraag over het onderwerp

#### **Militaire bijstand ter handhaving van de openbare orde in de Nederlandse binnenlandse situatie.**

In de beschouwing dient aandacht te worden geschonken aan de wettelijke mogelijkheden, wenselijkheden, noodzakelijkheden — dan wel de keerzijden daarvan — alsmede aan de toepassing.

De deelneming aan de prijsvraag staat voor een ieder open. De studie, die de omvang van 6000 woorden niet mag overschrijden, dient vóór 1 mei a.s. te worden gezonden aan het Secretariaat van de MRV, p/a Paleis van Justitie, kamer 243, Julia-

na van Stolberglaan 2, 2595 CL Den Haag.

Aan de bekroonde studies kunnen de volgende prijzen worden toegekend: f 1000 (1e pr.), f 750 (2e pr.), f 500 (3e pr.), eervolle vermelding. De commissie ter beoordeling van de inzendingen bestaat uit: prof. mr. C. A. J. M. Kortmann (Nijmegen), voorzitter; mr. J. Demmink, directeur van politie ministerie van justitie; kolonel H. H. Dijcks, C-42 painfbrig; J. Valken, hoofdcommissaris gemeentepolitie Amsterdam.

Belangstellenden kunnen het reglement, met o.m. nadere gegevens omtrent de wijze van inzending, alsmede de eisen waaraan een studie moet voldoen, schriftelijk aanvragen bij bovenvermeld secretariaat van de MRV.

# Defence planning and the Falklands experience

**E. Gueritz**

**Rear Admiral Royal Navy, OB, OBE, DSC and Bar**

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

In 1592 Dirk Gueritz discovered South Shetland which is one of those islands in the South Atlantic related to the Falklands area upon which my talk is centered this evening. I am not sure what relationship I can claim with that famous Dutch navigator, but I know that my great great grandfather left the low countries in 1780 after a duel. He settled in Spain where he and his immediate descendants served in the army, in the Walloon Regiment of the Royal Guard. The family was subsequently forced to leave Spain to take refuge in England during the Carlist Revolution of 1824. This member of the family is delighted to have had the honour of being invited back to the Netherlands again.

My purpose is to discuss the security of Western Europe in relation to the experience which we have gained as the result of the Falklands crisis, because in all the discussions which I have heard in England it has been emphasized that one has to put the lessons into a very strict perspective because a number of the circumstances are very peculiar to that particular crisis and the campaign. It will be a very large subject to cover in a short space, but I hope that you will correct the defects in my presentation by hammering away over a wider area – as you wish – during the period of discussion which will follow.

Ladies and Gentlemen, for years before the Falklands crisis developed, I have been concerned by the tendency of politicians and defence planners to be seized by a fit of strategic obsession. This obsession has been exemplified in past history by overattention to the Western Front in World War I, by concentration on the

British Grand Fleet in the North Sea during the same war – to the detriment of our losses in merchant shipping in the Atlantic – and more recently, perhaps, by concentration upon the employment of the heavy bombers as a strategic solution in more recent wars. Today, in defence terms there is still a considerable obsession with the central front of Allied Command Europe, the Central Front in Europe. In political terms there has been a tendency towards insularity by members of the European community to the detriment of their understanding of threats which may develop beyond the European area. We have the problem, Ladies and Gentlemen, of balancing the requirements to prepare for wars we hope we shall not fight, and being prepared to engage in conflicts we cannot avoid.

A subsidiary defect in political and military planning for the future is the tendency to extend the circumstances of today into the future without considering the possibility of some radical or dramatic change in the basic factors upon which all our assessments have been founded. A convenient short title, for the remedy for this complaint is set in the 'concept of structural collapse.' Who would have supposed, for example, in 1914 that in four years' time there would be no German Empire, no Russian Empire, and no Austro-Hungarian Empire? Could the 'industrial barons' of the last century have imagined that their commercial empires would have their policies dictated by their workforce or, perhaps more recently in our country again, could Trades Union barons have imagined that their powers might be quite dramatically curtailed in five or six short years by press and economic cir-

cumstances? Or again, would the film producers and cinema magnates of the thirties have dreamt in their worst nightmares that there would come a time when the temples in which their fans were expected to worship would be converted into gambling halls for the game which we in Britain call 'Bingo'? Arrogance and complacency can be the cause of short-sightedness which is unwilling to accept the possibility of change. And right up to this moment aircraft manufacturers, tour managers and airline operators may be the latest victims. The best way of avoiding painful, sometimes fatal, results of following the easy path of extension of the present is to project one's thoughts for a period of years ahead and then look back to identify the possible areas of change and see what may have changed during the period with which one is concerned.

For example, Mr Chairman, when writing on the subject of the projection of power in the context of contingencies and possible responses, I suggested in an article some five years ago that 'we should not become mesmerised by the African situation and the developments in the Indian Ocean to the exclusion of a glance to the South Atlantic where Soviet opportunism could reach as far as the Falklands. Withdrawal from imperial commitments — I said — may have been sound budgetary policy: now steps must be taken to act in concert with our friends to safeguard our economic policy. This will include in the British case adequate forces to contribute to the general projection of deterrent power in the Southern Oceans, including sea-lift for mobile forces, air power for use at sea and in support of those mobile forces, air lift and tankers for refuelling long-range aircraft, the whole supported logistically on a realistic scale.' And I went on to suggest that 'improvisation there may be in the interest of speed for time is short, but let it be planned and not haphazard.' In more general terms, I have recommended over a period of years that Latin America should be subject of very careful study as the likely focus of international attention in the 1980's as a possible source of international conflict. Internal social and po-

Rear Admiral Gueritz is a consultant of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies. Retired from Navy in 1973 after 35 years service. In World War II with Lord Mountbatten's 5th Destroyer Flotilla in HMS Jersey until she was sunk in May 1941. Then joined Combined Operations, serving as Beachmaster in operations for the capture of Madagascar and in the invasion of Normandy, in which he was severely wounded. DSC in 1942 and a Bar to it in 1944. Post-war appointments in South Africa, the Mediterranean and the Far East. Always particularly concerned with inter-Service training and operations, as well as strategic studies. Promoted Rear Admiral in 1968. Served as Admiral President of Royal Naval College, Greenwich. First president of Royal Naval Staff College. Final appointment: Commandant Joint Warfare Establishment at Old Sarum. OBE (Military) for service Near East as commander, OB during service as Flag Officer. — Some years Specialist adviser to the House of Commons Select Committee for Defence; member of University of London Board of War Studies. Editor of the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute from 1976 until 1979 when Director and Editor-in-Chief of the Institute, until 1981. Co-author of 'World War III', co-editor of 'Ten years of terrorism', 'Will the wells run dry', and of RUSI/Brassey's Defence Year Book 1978/79 and 1980/81. Articles in journals and periodicals in the UK and overseas, and broadcasts on BBC's Home and Overseas radio services; appeared in British, European and US TV-programmes. Member of: Council of the British Maritime League, the British Atlantic Committee, the Marine Society, the Operation Drake Fellowship, the Victoria League for Commonwealth Friendship. President of the Society for Nautical Research and Chief Honorary Steward of Westminster Abbey.

litical problems will be complicated by the rival poles of Communism, in Moscow and Peking, striving for power, Communism clashing with capitalism as personified by the United States, European industrial power competing with that of North America, and the general international economic and political tension generated over sources of energy, of rare minerals and of food. The conflicts likely to be generated over sources of energy have led me to list *four areas* as illustrations of those which deserve the close attention of free world countries, not least those in Western Europe and North America. Of these four the first, *Antarctica*, has already been overtaken by events. Antarctica itself is an area of

potential international dispute, the patterns of which may take shape as competition for resources sharpens. Two specific regions of dispute exist already: between Chile and Argentina over the southern tip of South America, and between Great Britain and Argentina over the Falklands, which we are about to discuss. But we have also the problem of Chile and Argentina in conflict and the broader issue of resources under the sea. And I believe, if time permits we might explore further this possible source of conflict for the future: the general problem of energy sources, certain minerals, and the production and distribution of food.

Well, if there is a problem in the Antarctic, there certainly is a problem also in the North, in the *Arctic*. When Norway was a thinly populated, relatively poor country, she may have seemed a poor prize for Soviet aggression except as a listening post for NATO. As an oil rich country Norway looks far more attractive. Resources, some of which have not yet been tapped, may offer attractions. Those in the Svalbard (Spitzbergen) Archipelago may come to mind as Norway and the Soviet Union are already in dispute in that area. Spitzbergen is also a gatepost to the Barents Sea, that highly sensitive area of Soviet defence. I am sorry that there is not time to elaborate upon this or upon the other two of my selected areas, which have also the initial letter 'A': the *Aegean* and the *ASEAN* area. The main point I wish to make at this stage is the fact that we would all be wise to concern ourselves with where these conflicts may take place, what steps we can take to be ready to assist in their resolution before they develop into active crises or to assist in their suppression if they do. Forethought and forward planning, based upon projection as I have suggested, seem to provide the key.

In fact, the Falklands crisis did not develop over a matter of resources under the sea or fishing rights in the waters. It developed over an issue of sovereignty without either party having shown any notable interest in the strategic or economic potentialities of the area. However, there is a

clear cut lesson which has emerged to reinforce so much of what has been written about deterrence in the context of the East/West confrontation. Deterrence, Ladies and Gentlemen, is a word which can be applied in many circumstances other than those of confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The basis of successful deterrence lies in the clear perception by the aggressor that his prospective victim has both the capability and the will to resist. If it appears that either of these components are missing, then the aggressor may believe that an opportunity exists for an adventure at small risk. At this very time the Committee of Enquiry is sitting in London to investigate the circumstances in which the Falklands crisis came about. I do not wish to anticipate the findings of this august body, but it seems to be common ground that the rulers of Argentina believed that the British had lost their will to defend the Falklands Islands and therefore that the capability which might be available would not be put to use. The trigger which carried this perception from thought to action has been alleged to be the withdrawal of the Ice-patrol ship HMS *Endurance*, as part of the general economies being applied to the Royal Navy. As an aside, may I remark that the age of HMS *Endurance* has led to some rude remarks associating her with the scrap-iron merchants from Argentina who were among the first to make a physical intrusion on to British territory in South Georgia. There are two deductions to be made: the first is the sad evidence of false economy leading to heavy expenditure and loss of lives; and the second is a clear illustration of the need to give unambiguous signals of intention so that an aggressor can be left in no doubt of the consequences of any rash excursion. One of the agents which can provide signals in the NATO-context is the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force with its capacity for showing the several flags of NATO in a threatened area. The same, of course, applies to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. It is to be hoped that the authorities of the Alliance will take care that these and other mobile forces are



readily available for use as ministers may require.

This brings me to the next point. It is the task of the armed forces in democracies to provide the ministers of their respective governments with a variety of options for action in pursuit of national and Allied interests. When cuts are made in force levels and equipment programmes, ministers must be made aware of the capability which they are surrendering and the consequent loss of options in the employment of military forces as a means of maintaining freedom of political action. It is no use accepting comfortable assumptions to blur the consequences of cuts in capability or deployment. They seldom live up to expectations in the harsh realities of the modern world. I have particularly in mind that awful cliché: 'the oil will always flow' which used to be advanced as an excuse for Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Cuts in the British capability for mobile force deployments outside the NATO area were excused by introducing bland assumptions that operations would not take place except 'by invitation only' or unless 'red carpet treatment could be guaranteed'. It is straining these two assumptions to fit a situation which called for the deployment of land forces over 8000 miles into the approaching antarctic winter with the task of confronting and, if necessary, ejecting a well equipped garrison likely to exceed their own numbers, in the face of a serious threat from land based air power and a by no means negligible air surface and sub-surface threat at sea. I would like to say at this point that the resolution of my countrymen and our Government was considerably strengthened by the clear evidence of admirable support from the government of members of the Commonwealth, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Economic Community, and not least from our old friends in the Netherlands.

Now the next point I have in mind to mention is, that we have been assured by the Chief of the Defence Staff – Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin – that the campaign was distinguished by absolutely clear political directions, without

the sort of 'back seat driving' of which even that famous statesman sir Winston Churchill was guilty, or worse still, the vacillation which bedeviled the Suez operation. If you see my hair grey, it is because I was a logistics officer for the Task Force in the Suez operation! Now, it has been said that the British are not always successful in amphibious operations. When we invaded and captured Madagascar in 1942 – coming up in May just forty years before the Falklands landing – we were told that this was the first successful amphibious operation the British had carried out since Quebec in 1759. And we have also had a slightly unfortunate record in the medical field in the sense that the Crimean War was not distinguished for its care of wounded until a lady called Florence Nightingale came forward. So you can imagine my feelings, standing in Malta just about to fly off to the East to join the Force in the Eastern Mediterranean but knowing full well that the logistic support was steaming West and that our hospital ship which was designated for the Suez operation was off the Cape of Good Hope!

Well, logistics was the key in that operation to a great extent. We managed to get over our difficulties. And logistics was undoubtedly the key to the operation which we have just conducted in the South Atlantic. As an old logistician I am lost in admiration for the work that was done to make that possible. But the clearness of the political directions was a most important part.

Which leads me again to mention command and control. The Commander in Chief Fleet was designated as the Task Force Commander for the operation in the South Atlantic, and he was receiving his orders from the Chief of the Defence Staff who – for the first time in our recent history – was given the responsibility of advising the Government on his own. We had previously had a collective system, with three Chiefs of Staff and a Chief of Defence Staff, providing collective advice with collective responsibility: quite fortuitously this had been changed a short time before the crisis developed.

So that was point one of interest. Point two is: it

happened to be a sailor who was Chief of Defence Staff, and of course the operation happened to be maritime . . . I am not sure how many deductions one can make on one side or the other, and I am not making any saucy remarks about it . . . the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Operations was also a sailor, and the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff for Personnel and Logistics was also a sailor. This, I assure you, was purely a chance of appointing and no more, but in these circumstances perhaps it was important. You can see that if the Government were to draw too many conclusions from this, perhaps happy, state of affairs in a particularly maritime operation, it might be that more difficulties will arise in situations of another character.

Now the next point is that there was no divisional headquarters charged with the responsibility for mobile force operations. If you read the British Defence White Paper — which is of course, being English, coloured blue — you will find that it has contained mention of three different headquarters designated for this task in a period of less than two years; so you will appreciate there has been no continuity.

The officer selected to command the land forces was the Commander of the Royal Marine Commandos, the Major-General Commando Forces. I guess his HQ was too small for the task he was given, and in the best British way they had to put something together at the last minute. I do not believe that this is a satisfactory state of affairs, and a number of us have been complaining about the problem for some time.

The next point is that there was a brigade HQ for the Commandos, ready, trained, accustomed to commanding its forces, accustomed to mobile forces' operations, regularly in very arduous conditions. Now here is a key factor, particularly for army attention, I think, that if you wish to have special forces of one kind or another it is no good giving people training and perhaps giving them a parachute badge and saying 'I have several hundred men and now I have a parachute battalion: get three more battalions and I have a brigade, a parachute regiment.' You have not!

All you have is some people who have been trained in parachuting. It takes quite a time to create that cadre of understanding of the problems of the special operations before you can embark on them with confidence. And this is one of the reasons why it was possible to embark this force of Royal Marines, supported by the parachute battalions that went with them, in an extraordinarily short time and — as far as one can judge — with surprisingly little confusion.

Again, British amphibious history is scarred with stories of guns being loaded in one ship and the ammunition in another. One gets sunk, and it doesn't matter which because they are of no use unless they are together. Well, on this occasion the main lesson that was learned was over the unfortunate Atlantic Conveyor which taught us a lesson we all know perfectly well: 'Don't put all your tents in one ship.' When she was sunk, down went practically all the tents that had been intended for the support of our forces later. But my point is that of the cadre of understanding, non-commissioned officers, officers, staff officers and commanders alike. It has been a complaint of parachutists that they have not been commanded by a parachute brigade HQ at the decisive moment; so we will see what comes out of that.

I cannot leave the command and control problem without mentioning the enormous problems that were created for communicators by the distance. Straightforward problem: a distance of 8000 miles, trying to provide effective communications, even in these wonderful times of satellites and all the rest of it!

Now the other part of readiness is not only this cadre of knowledge and understanding, but also the fact that the troops are accustomed to rapid movements. Our commando forces are part of the Mobile Force arrangements for North Norway and so they are not unaccustomed to high-speed changes of plan, and therefore they were ready quickly. It is interesting that of the Gurkhas and the two battalions of our Household troops who were made available in the second stage, one of the Household battalions had just

recently been on what are called 'public duties' (that is in London). Therefore they found more difficulties in competing with conditions in the Falklands than would have been the case for commandos or parachutists who tend to be trained on barren rocks anyway. I think there is another point to make about that. However fit the officers and men of the special units may have been when they set sail, one of the nagging problems throughout the passage out and the diplomatic maneuvering that went on was the question of how long could a landing be delayed before the troops lost their military virtues in the sense of tending to become softer and less keyed up. This definitely is a problem. We noticed this particularly when we were going to Madagascar in 1942: we were more than six weeks at sea and obviously there was a problem with troops' fitness. In fact we had one battalion embarked in each of four ships, we had two battalions (plus) in two ships, and we had four battalions embarked in one ship. We afterwards found out that the casualties we suffered ashore, from heat-stroke and all the other forms of exhaustion, were in direct proportion to the number of people who were embarked, because there had been marching rounds and physical training and so forth.

Now the other part of readiness is something which has concerned me in the longer term: and this would affect officers in higher appointments in all services. We, in England, have a problem I believe, which is the unofficial 'Ten Year Rule.' I do not know how your Treasury is in the Netherlands, but in Britain they have a key part in the lives of all military officers. Between the two World Wars they devised a splendid scheme: they got the Government to make the assumption that *there would be no major war* in which we would be involved, *for ten years*. And then they extended it every year. So you appreciate that we do have some difficulties in the planning departments in order to equip our forces for anything!

Well, it is not quite like that now, but there has been a tendency until quite lately for us to assu-

me, it seems, that we have about ten years before anything needs to be ready! And therefore it does not matter if you spend another six months adding another frill, or postponing this or postponing that, until the thing costs a lot more and starts to attract most unfavourable publicity from the politicians; and ultimately perhaps you lose the equipment altogether or something else has to be cut to fit it into the programme. So the unofficial Ten Year Rule is a bad idea, and it could indeed have run us into considerable difficulties in our recent experiences.

Now if I may, Ladies and Gentlemen, I like you to be made privy to another little secret of mine, and that is that the Falklands crisis has given *the doctrine of administrative impossibility and professional resistance* a most appalling pasting. The doctrine of administrative impossibility is this: when we had had a spy operating in the British Admiralty some years ago, it was suggested that we should have our briefcases inspected on a random basis as we went out, rather like going through the customs. We were then told that this was 'administratively impossible'. Now, if any of you happens to come to London, try and get in in any of our buildings, in any government department, and try to be let in with a briefcase: it may be 'administratively impossible' to search those going out, but it is perfectly possible to search everybody when you are going in!

'Professional resistance' on the other hand is slightly different. It means that 'the poor chaps in the Reserve will never be up to the standard of regulars'. I do not know about your Army, Navy and Airforce, but we have to pay considerable attention to our Reserves; they are the people who help us to get to strength, and in two World Wars it is of course these amateurs who won them . . . the professionals having probably all been killed off or locked up before they had been able to do more than fight the first stage of the campaign!

I am not making too much of a joke about this, because it is a very serious matter that our Reserves are of high quality. This is particularly

important in the United Kingdom, as our forces are all volunteers and we have no conscripts: therefore we have Reserve forces, and we depend upon them very considerably. In the particular context of the current problem we had two special areas of pressure. One was the tremendous sortie-rate that was produced by the Harrier aircraft and also by the helicopters. The Sea Harriers flew 2000 operational sorties, and the 820 Squadron of Sea King helicopters flew 1560 hours in May, which is the equivalent of two aircraft airborne 24 hours a day throughout the month! Any airforce officer will appreciate the enormous performance that this is from a pilot's point of view, but a lot of other people will also appreciate what a tremendous achievement that has been on the part of the maintenance crews and support echelons, those who have got to provide spare parts, fuel, ordnance and the like. So that is one area of considerable pressure. The sortie-rate, of course, was one thing, the length of the sorties was another. The heavy bombers that flew out, they had I don't know how many in-flight refuelling to do in order to do a round trip to the Falklands and back. Some of the Harriers, remember, flew to Ascension Island and then flew on down to the Falklands, refuelling on the way and then — some of them never having flightdeck-landed before — landed on a carrier off the Falklands. Their's was another great achievement, implying about nine hours — I think — in a cockpit which was designed for short sorties. In addition to that there also were a great many replenishment ships which were having to keep the other vessels in the force topped 54145001up with fuel and ammunition, and this of course placed a considerable strain on the support ships as well as on the captains and crews of the warships.

Well, one of the other interesting achievements which relates to the doctrine of administrative impossibility is the way in which ships were fitted out, the remarkable speed to have helicopterdecks, or to be able to replenish at sea, or to carry some kind of anti aircraft artillery. Any old gunners in this audience will be delighted to

know that the gun had quite a return to action, whether for bombardment purposes or for shooting at aeroplanes or indeed for practically any purpose. Which reminds me that one of the dangers in our delicate economies is the tendency to *cut down on demands for ammunition stocks*, and therefore to create apparent savings but ultimately to finish up with the lockers empty when you need them. I am sure that our recent experience has placed a considerable strain on the resources of our ammunition depots. But fortunately one of Mr Nott, our Secretary of State's, views did relate to the stupidity of having very expensive platforms and not enough weapons to go with them. That may seem absolutely self-evident to you, but let me take you back a short passage in history:

In 1914 the chief contribution which the British Government was able to make to the Allied cause, was the Grand Fleet — that is not to underrate the British Expeditionary Force — the most powerful element of naval power that had ever been seen. In August 1914 the British Government, in the shape of the Admiralty, after a few skirmishes in the North Sea, sent a signal to the Fleet saying that more care was to be exercised in the expenditure of ammunition and torpedoes: if the present level of expenditure continued, a serious situation would develop. One of the senior officers present said that this was 'a hampering and frustrating order', which I have registered as *the understatement of 1914*: What was the purpose of all this power if it could not actually be used when it was needed? So it is important not to neglect those areas of supply where it seems that a cheap saving can be made. Because in fact you may be nullifying something much bigger.

One of the chief defects in the British armoury was the absence of a full attack carrier complement of aircraft. We got on remarkably well using our Sea Harriers and the Harriers flown down by the Royal Air Force, but I would like to comment on the absence of the airborne Early Warning capability. It is possible, I understand, for one to be created by using a helicopter but

you will understand that the airborne EW-aircraft was a fixed wing aircraft which went out of service, as it happened, with our last strike carrier. And if I may make a little aside here, it is quite important to get two things right (it is a coincidence that these two points have cropped up in our country at the same time): one is the impression that if we had had airborne EW, we would have been surrounded by some sort of electronic screen which would have prevented anybody getting at our ships. It is not at all like that! It would simply have told us where the aircraft attacks were likely to come from so we would be able to deal with them more expeditiously and effectively. At the same time some of you may have observed that we have, once again, had some difficulties with our security, in the intelligence sense. Hence the phrase 'has he been vetted?' did come up. That is the system by which your antecedents are inquired into before you are allowed to take up a high appointment. The generals present, and some others, will know from their NATO experience that you are not allowed to touch one tiny bit of paper unless somebody has 'vetted' you. The difficulty, in England, is to get it across to people that 'being vetted' is *not* like having an inoculation or having some kind of surgical treatment, or making you take the veil: it does not change your moral habits, it does not make you a teetotaller, nor does it make you financially solvent. You are supposed, of course, if you are going to engage in secret activities, to be solvent, to be sober and to be sexually above reproach. Well, everybody seems to think that 'vetting' will cure all these problems, and the same thing applies to airborne EW. It is not quite so, I make the point in a rather heavy handed way: certainly we must get airborne EW by some means or another to render our seaborne airpower more effective. At the same time the in-flight refuelling techniques, which have been developed, will enable us to do better than we have been able to do in the past, because more aircraft will now have this capability of delivering the fuel to the aircraft on active duty. This is a particular way, as you will all ap-

preciate, of making the active forces available more of the time, keeping them on the task, and thus giving you virtually more ships and more aircraft.

But just let me mention the proviso that I had in mind. The US Marine Corps said they could have got down there with a few carriers and have wiped up the job in no time at all — I am sure they would have done — but what they don't realize is that there were times in the sea conditions experienced, when the strike carriers would have been going up and down to such an extent that orthodox strike aircraft would not in fact have been operating!

Now may I look at the future for a moment or two. First of all the carrier problem. One of the things that should be remembered is that in the days I talked about just now when we had forty battleships and battlecruisers in the North Sea alone, we still had merchant ships equipped as armed merchant cruisers. I believe we have got to go into this matter very carefully to see what we can do to use merchantship-hulls fitted with modern equipment in the form of an outfit — a package, a cell, a module of some kind — which can be made ready in quite convenient form either for fitting in an emergency, or — indeed, why shouldn't we — to try and equip some ships to have them join the active fleet. More than that: we equipped a ship called the Atlantic Conveyer, to carry S(hort) T(ake) O(ff and) L(anding) aircraft, a very rudimentary aircraft carrier, but if we remember from our wartime experience, we were able to make 'Woolworth carriers' — as they were called — by putting a flat top on a merchantship-hull. And several people, that I have known, have flown from those 'aircraft carriers' and said they were very good! The point being that it was no good waiting for HMS Formidable, or whatsoever, to appear from some dockyard in 1948, or to wait for some long range aircraft to be built in 1947: we had got to win the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942. This is my point about the Ten Year Rule operating: if you really are pressed, you have got to get on with it. And it may interest some of you to know that so

fast did some of the in-flight refuelling work go in factories, that it was actually cheaper than if they had done the job in the normal slow way. As you know, we normally are told 'Yes, I can do it quickly if you don't mind paying', but in these circumstances it actually was getting cheaper.

Now the other thing is that we already suffer from a *shortage of escorts* — that is the destroyers and frigates which are required to defend merchant ships. Don't let anybody deceive you that navies are there to defend sea lanes or to patrol gaps: they are there to defend merchant ships, and that is a very important task. You may think that is a very silly point to make, but you will be surprised how often the phrase crops up. It tends to blur the issue to the extent that it is being suggested that we can do with fewer escorts because we can use submarines and maritime aircraft for the job. There are some jobs these cannot do; and air defence is one of them. You may have noticed that there were some sad casualties in our fleet — four ships sunk, six or eight more damaged, and one or two less damaged — and they were all frigates or destroyers except for two landingships (which were both auxiliaries) and one unfortunate merchant ship (the one that was carrying all the tents and the helicopters). The lesson from that is that the destroyers and frigates were doing what they were paid for, that is that they were defending the merchant ships which were in their charge. Heavy losses are something which we have had to get accustomed to in the past, but people have gone on from that to 'I say, aren't surface ships vulnerable! You will have to think again, old chap...'. Well, I am afraid that surface ships have always been vulnerable: many Netherlands' naval officers can bear testimony to that from their own experience from the last war. You cannot do these jobs without taking some casualties. The main point about it is that we need more escorts but we cannot get the modern ones in sufficient numbers, so what can we do? I have been told that a Sea King for example is the equivalent of a frigate in modern A(nti) S(ubmarine) W(arfare) terms. Therefore, if you can get several more Sea King

helicopters to sea in quite a rudimentary carrier, you are in fact increasing your ASW-potential in force. We have a ship, called the Engadine, which is a very simple platform, and that has been doing the job for some time.

Mr Chairman, I wondered which tie to wear to-night. I am not a sartorial genius but every now and again I like to do courtesy to my host if I can. So I thought of wearing my Army Staff College tie; I thought of wearing some kind of naval tie that might be appreciated by Netherlands' officers who have been at Greenwich at some time or another; and I finally settled for the Joint Warfare Establishment tie I am wearing now, a talisman which is used by officers of many NATO- and Commonwealth-countries who attended the training we used to provide in Joint-Services activity at Old Sarum and more recently, at our National Defence College near London. The importance of this training has been demonstrated in what has been achieved in the Falklands, where we have been able to have a complete and, what appears to be, brilliant exercise in joint warfare by our three Services — and I include the Royal Marines as part of the Royal Navy in case any Netherlands' Marines are worried — and the merchant navy with it. It is very important that I should mention the merchant navy, because the people of the Netherlands as well as the people of Britain ought to be particularly anxious on this score. Just to take a very clear cut example of what is threatening: we in Europe are tending to neglect maritime power. That is not to say we are not spending enough on the Navy; it is not simply that. Maritime power is made up of a whole host of elements linked together; certainly naval and air forces, but also the merchant navy, the fishing fleet, the ship-building yards that helped to produce these items, the ports and services that go with them, and all the associated elements within our countries which have enabled us to trade freely. We take too much for granted the safe and timely arrival of our cargoes, but we are in fact neglecting all this. We may find one day that the muscles,

or sinews, upon which we have depended, have been allowed to atrophy. Just to give you a simple example, in the military field alone: we requisitioned twelve tankers, out of the fifty or sixty ships we chartered and requisitioned as support for our Falklands expedition, from British Petroleum. All those twelve ships have been disposed of because they cannot be afforded to run economically any more. So when we turn round next year and say 'may we have twelve tankers', where then shall we get them from? Now that is purely in a military context, and I would not wish to overstress that, although it would be a good idea if all NATO-countries could make sure that their roll-on, roll-off ferries have doors that are compatible with the Rhino or mexefloat ferries which are used by our transport companies: with these one could unload these ships even when there are no docks to unload them in. I have only been able to touch on that point as one that I like to make in a Netherlands audience, because we are concerned with this subject very much. You are rooted in the continent, perhaps more than we are, but you are in fact dependent on maritime power just as much as we are as an island.

At this present time the Select Committee for Defence in the House of Commons is carrying out an inquiry into where and which information services were operated during the Falklands crisis. One journalist gave a rather unhappy impression of what he thought about Service people before he joined the Task Force: he thought that Service people were rather odd, that they went around wanting to kill people, and that was about all. However, he found on closer acquaintance that we were quite decent, and intelligent, and were not necessarily belligerent although we had a militaristic task to perform. We do hope we have improved his view of life — as indeed we appear to have done — but how unfortunate that this is the impression which has got across in our country where our armed forces, of course, have to depend far more on public relations than in countries like yours where, having a National

Service, you have an Army which is part of the community; our Army tends to be slightly isolated because it is smaller and all volunteer.

The deployment of our transport was of course initially a back-up to diplomatic action. There is no doubt that Mr Pym, our Foreign Secretary, would have been much handicapped in his negotiations — which proved unsuccessful but would have been much more difficult if there had not been the good bargaining counter that every hour of every day the Task Force was getting closer and closer to the zones of operations. So that is point number one: the deployment of military power in pursuit of political ambitions, or aims, or interests. The second is that I believe, generally speaking, that in our lands we tend to underrate the importance of the psychological arm. We get seen off, right, left and centre. The handling of the neutronbomb problem has been grotesque at times. The way in which the Cruise missile problem has been developed — certainly in my country — has been unfortunate because people have simply lacked the necessary information. Information has been made available from sources which are not so reliable, and therefore we have found ourselves in difficulties. But anyway, in the particular context of the Falklands, it was said from the outset that the poor Argentinian conscripts there were cold and miserable and far from home, and that they had not got enough clothing. Consequently, I had thought that perhaps we ought to beam a programme at them and say 'Look, we are coming! Wouldn't it be a good idea if you all packed up and went home?'. Well, ultimately we did, we started a programme called *Atlantico del Sur*; it provided news and songs and music and that sort of thing. We have yet to discover how successful or unsuccessful it was, but it was beamed out *not* by our Information Services who must not be associated with that kind of thing, but by a separate organization. In the meantime the BBC Overseas Service — which is quite independent of the Government although it gets money from them — broadcast round the world. Yet they are getting less and less audible and they

are having fewer and fewer services because they lack the money. We feel that they ought to have more, because it is very important to inform people all over the world about our points of view.

Mr Chairman, may I conclude by saying that I do not think that everybody has yet understood, even in the UK, how much actually hung on the engines of two of Her Majesty's ships, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible. It may easily be imagined what would have happened if those ships had broken down – and God forbid that any naval vessel ever should, but it does happen – then we would probably have had to return, to withdraw, or to take a very nasty pasting and still have to withdraw, and that would have had a very adverse effect on our Government and – as like as not, if I know anything about the alternative Government – on the relationships within

the Alliance. Therefore you see that quite a good deal depended on a bit of mechanical power.

I think it is quite important that we should give more attention to matters of Allied solidarity. Earlier on I mentioned – and it was not an empty compliment – the solidarity shown on this particular issue. It is my personal belief that we do need to get together very much more closely with the United States, and I say that advisedly. The Europeans can take a commanding position, and it will be dangerous if we do not hold with the US Government by every possible means in order to give them what we may consider to be sound advice. I like to suggest, as a final thought from my talk, that the last lesson to sum up should be 'Do not put off until tomorrow what ought to be done today': *it is far easier, and less costly in life and treasure, to deter aggression than it is to wrest from an aggressor the fruits of his aggression!*





# Discussie

*Kltz b.d. Neut* informeert naar nadere gegevens over een helikopter die, althans volgens sommige berichten, door de eigen bemanning zou zijn vernietigd na een noodlanding ergens op het Zuidamerikaanse schiereiland. Ook stelt hij belang in de actie van speciale eenheden die zou hebben geleid tot het uitschakelen van bepaalde Argentijnse Exocet-transporteurs.

*Gueritz.* It used to be said to young men and women in England that if a man came up to you in a public house and said 'I was in the Secret Service' and then tried to sell you a gold brick, or if with the same approach he tried to make a date with the young lady in his empty motorcar, you shouldn't believe him, because people in the Secret Service do not talk about what they have done. I understand — without wishing to duck your question — that there is still the same sort of feeling in this area associated with not only the Secret Service but also the S(pecial) A(ir) S(ervice) and the S(pecial) B(oat) S(quadron) in my country. Therefore, reports that we have received on these matters are, a lot of them, possibly exaggerated whereas others may be far more dramatic than has ever been reported, but we know nothing more on this score than has been successfully and fruitfully discussed. It is perfectly common knowledge that units of the SAS were deployed in the South Atlantic and the members of the SBS of the Royal Marines were also de-

ployed. Nothing has been hidden that I know of, of their activities in South Georgia. As far as other operations are concerned, I do not think that they have been disclosed. Of course, there is evidence that a damaged helicopter remained in Chilean territory, and I think that possibly the Chilean authorities are not mad about having further discussions either. I am not secretive, but it is not a matter which has been given any particular attention.

*Voorzitter.* Indien er op dit ogenblik geen verdere vragen zouden zijn, moet ik concluderen dat de inleiding volkomen duidelijk is geweest.

*Gueritz.* Perhaps I could say, as an extenuation of perhaps having given too light a touch to the landing side of the operation, that there are several aspects of this which are important to recall. One of them is the fact that in May 1942, and the date is a curious coincidence, we were able to complete a six weeks' voyage with only a short halt at Durban and go on and capture a port in Madagascar by a night approach through an unlikely navigational channel and therefore make a landing which was unopposed. The same applied forty years later on May 21st 1982, when our Royal Marines and Parachute Forces were able to land in San Carlos' water and establish a bridgehead there for the development of operations. So the first thing is

the secrecy of the landing, the achievement of surprise, which obviously means that at the end of the 8000 miles' journey the naval forces had performed their function, which is to land the landing force without loss or, obviously, with minimum loss. The second part — and no doubt the Netherlands' Royal Marine Corps officers here will appreciate this point — is that having landed it is most important that the *momentum* of the operation should then be maintained. There is a very strong tendency — particularly if you are a soldier who has just got out of a craft which has been pitching and rolling, and perhaps has got out of a ship which has been doing it for weeks — to heave a sigh of relief and thank God that that's over, then sit down and unlace your boots and empty the sea water out. That is not a good idea. If you study the history of amphibious operations you will find that all the effort which was put into the preparations, and used to bring the landing force through the tides onto the designated beaches, just went straight into the sand instead of going, as was intended, forward to develop operations and make good use of that momentum. So this was an event which we were slightly anxious about on this occasion. I think, making due allowances for the build-up of stores, ammunition and equipment for mobile force operations, that they really did a very speedy job. This was not so much a lesson to be

learned as well as merely a reinforcement of something which was very well known. But I did not want you to run away with the idea that I would shun questions on the landing parties' side of this, because I spent most of my active service life involved in this kind of work, wearing a khaki uniform and emptying the sand out of my shoes too.

*Lkol Van Vuren* meent een tegenstrijdigheid te hebben opgemerkt in de door de inleider getrokken lessen, in het bijzonder waar hij pleitte voor het ontwikkelen van goed uitgebalanceerde strijdkrachten die zouden moeten beschikken over voldoende munitievoorraden in relatie tot de aan te schaffen aantallen wapens. Anderzijds evenwel lijken de hedendaagse politici vaak uit te gaan van de opvatting dat wapenvertoon op zichzelf reeds voldoende afschrikkend is, onder veronachtzaming van de noodzaak daarbij ook de benodigde munitie te hebben. Die feitelijke tegenstrijdigheid, die nogal wijd verbreid is in alle lidstaten van de NAVO, zou misschien toch een kern van waarheid kunnen bevatten, althans uit het gezichtspunt van de politici. Hoe denkt de inleider daarover?

*Gueritz*. If you will excuse a naval introduction, there is a concept which is hallowed in naval history and has been carried into our strategic thought. It is called the *concept of the fleet in being*, and was enunciated in 1690. The Admiral, the Earl of Torrington, who was at that time commanding the combined British-Dutch naval forces, withdrew from the possibility of an action against the French fleet near Beachy Head, and made some justification in the phrase. 'I said that whilst we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' The concept in fact had originated earlier, that you

have a force in being which remains a threat to the enemy and therefore exerts an influence quite disproportionate to its size. The Admiral, incidentally, had three months in the Tower of London to think over whether it is a good concept or not; he came out with his head still on. This concept has been used particularly by the German Navy in the two World Wars, and it is important to remember it in World War I when the Grand Fleet of Britain was in the North Sea and the German Fleet tended to stay in harbour. Now, the moment it appeared that that fleet had no ammunition on board or that its crews had been sent to the Western Front, and no smoke was seen coming out of the funnels of the ships, that would have ceased to be 'a fleet in being' because it would not have posed a serious threat. And I believe that if you try and pose too empty a threat in deterrence, then you would soon be 'bowled out as being a bit of a sham'.

However, I take your basic point, and I think perhaps I may not have made myself sufficiently clear about the more general aspects. I said, we have the conflict — your contradiction — between preparing for a war we hope we shall not fight, and at the same time having to deal with certain situations which we cannot avoid. . . and the British have just been confronted with such a one. Now for that situation it is no good having empty ammunition lockers. And I believe that our policy in this particular matter was probably proved to be right. I can only go back to the example which I gave: I think it is a sham to have fine equipments, inadequately supplied with the missiles or ammunition that they require.

There is a subsidiary point to this, and that is that if you do not have enough missiles and ammunition your crews will not be properly

trained. There is one lesson that stood out far above any other: the greatest advantage of all our forces is training, training, training. And some of that must be with live ammunition, live missiles, in order to ensure that the people's morale is maintained as well as their skills. It simply is not on to have routine dummies all the time, I think.

*Lkol Van Vuren* verduidelijkt dat hij heeft willen wijzen op de mogelijkheid toch afschrikking te bereiken terwijl tevens op de munitie zou worden bezuinigd. In het conflict over de Falklands heeft het Verenigd Koninkrijk slechts een gering gedeelte van zijn totale krijgsmacht ingezet, en bijgevolg kon dat gedeelte gemakkelijk worden voorzien van wat het nodig had: een deel van wat er in de totale munitievoorraden aanwezig was. Niemand kan voorspellen hoe intensief een bepaalde oorlog zal blijken te zijn, en zo'n oorlog op het Europese operatietoneel zou zeer wel kort kunnen zijn en uiterst hevig. In dat geval zou het slijtageproces wel eens zo intensief kunnen zijn dat er vrij spoedig geen wapensystemen meer zouden zijn voor het verschietsen van de nog beschikbare munitie. En om dié reden zou het wellicht aanbeveling kunnen verdienen het beleid te herzien: misschien zouden geringere voorraden per wapen uiteindelijk tot een betere afschrikking kunnen bijdragen.

*Gueritz*. Two things. One is that of course the recent circumstances enabled us to do a check on the intensive rates of consumption: a practical example of that is always very valuable. The other point is that I still maintain my point that if you are not only concerned with the Central Front, there may be peripheral operations where you require ammunition, even in the NATO context. I am not suggesting outside NATO at this mo-

ment, but there may be operations in which you will be involved and in which there could be circumstances of needing ammunition stocks. And lastly, I would hope that the Netherlands would be particularly one of those involved, as they have been involved with the Netherlands Marine Corps, in deployment of forces in general situations, not necessarily in the NATO area, from time to time in my concept of maritime power.

*Cdr b.d. Kramer* wijst erop dat de geschiedenis zich weer eens herhaalde: in 1942 gingen de Prince of Wales en de Repulse verloren ten gevolge van het volkomen ontbreken van luchtsteun. En ditmaal verplaatste zich opnieuw een marine-eenheid over grote afstand zonder enigerlei luchtdkking behalve dan de vliegtuigen met korte actieradius die van de vliegdekschepen opereerden. Hij acht het bijna onvoorstelbaar dat een maritieme macht in deze tijd een smaldeel durft uitzenden zonder adequate dekking in de lucht, en is benieuwd naar 's inleiders commentaar.

*Gueritz*. A very fair comment. The risk that was taken in sending the Force to the Falklands area was a very carefully calculated one. As I indicated the alternative was to do nothing, with consequences which could have been extremely serious politically. Maybe it would only have been politically from a party point of view, but I venture to suggest it might have been wider than that. A risk was being taken that the range of the available shore-based aircraft of the opposition would be outmatched by the aircraft that we could deploy afloat. This proved to be the case, but it was a very close thing. But then so were quite a lot of operations during the war where we had aircraft carriers present. What we have to understand — and I believe that

the Royal Netherlands' Navy and the Royal Australian Navy and a number of others I could mention would be foolish to reject — the possibility of using V/STOL-aircraft as a concept, though it is not ideal today. If it had had the right impetus put behind it in the last fifteen or twenty years, we should have seen much more development of that concept, I think. We, the British, have left the development to the US Marine Corps, to our shame. If we had put a little bit more behind it, we would have had airborne Early Warning, which would have made our situation better. I think that unless we are going to leave ourselves with a very severe handicap, we ought to welcome the fact that — just at a time when we all feel that we cannot afford heavy attack carriers any more — there should have been the means of getting round the problem through the Vertical Take-Off aircraft. Bear in mind that one of the firmest forms of arms control that is at work at the moment is not the European disarmament movement, but in fact the costs of military equipment. If anybody thinks my country is engaged in an armament race at the moment, they ought to read the figures for our forces over the last twenty years: the decline of the numbers of men and women in our forces, and the number of ships or aircraft or any other criteria you like to use, is *that way down!* And as I have said elsewhere it is a very bad idea for an island when it has more tax-collectors than sailors, but that is the situation in our country at the moment.

Certainly the United States felt we were taking no end of a risk. They wondered 'why didn't they send down strike carriers?', but we had not got any; so we had to get down with what we had got. And I am convinced that by skilful management of our forces we managed to

get by. All we do not want is to change the man who arms the bombs for the Argentine air force; but it was not his lack of skill, it was in fact the bravery of the pilots who were tending to bring their aircraft in to such a level that the bombs were not properly armed when they struck our ships.

*Bgen Berkhof* koppelt het in de inleiding gepresenteerde aan de kwestie van de zogenaamde 'extended deterrence', en citeert uit Alice in Wonderland dat het antwoord op de vraag in welke richting iemand zal *moeten* gaan, ervan afhangt in welke richting hij *wenst* te gaan. Zowel in de Verenigde Staten als in de Sovjet-Unie zijn voorstanders te vinden die de ruimte willen benutten voor de 'extended deterrent': volgens Igen b.d. O'Graham van de US-luchtmacht zou de Amerikaanse ruimtevaartindustrie dank zij haar hoogwaardige technologie gemakkelijk de balans naar de Verenigde Staten kunnen doen doorslaan, en kort voor zijn dood verklaarde Brezjnev nog dat ook de Sovjet-Unie zich in die richting zou gaan inspannen. Prognoses in O'Grahams boek *Space, the hind frontier of strategy* voorspellen dat er binnen de eerstkomende tien jaren slagschepen, lanceerinstallaties en een ballistisch verdedigingssysteem kunnen worden verwacht die voor 70% bestand zijn tegen zelfs massale aanvallen. Maar in die zelfde periode is het Verenigd Koninkrijk voornemens de Trident in te voeren, een duur en bovendien vrij onnauwkeurig middel dat zelfs zó duur is dat Groot-Brittannië wel gedwongen zal zijn de 'Woolworth-carriers' te nemen omdat er anders helemaal geen carriers zullen kunnen zijn. Spr. wijst erop dat ook de Polaris van geen enkel nut is gebleken tijdens de Falklandcrisis, en herhaalt daarom nogmaals dat de essentiële vraag is waarheen men *wenst* te

gaan, ergo: wat wil men ermee doen, en hoe onafhankelijk zal de Britse afschrikkingsmacht uiteindelijk kunnen zijn.

*Gueritz.* General Berkhof presents an alarming description of some of the thoughts that have been published about the future. First of all there are a few points I would like to get off my chest. One of these is that I am not a Trident admirer myself, my reason being mainly on the matter of strategic obsession. We are asked to believe that there will be no change in our circumstances between now and 1995 if not 2005 when these forces may have come into being. I find this extremely difficult to accept, and therefore such a system could be strategically anachronistic by the time that it comes into service.

The second point on which general Berkhof puts his finger is, can we really afford in the sound balance of things to do this? There may be two points which may be marching hand in hand. Could we defer our decision without spoiling the effect of our current Polaris force as modified by the latest Chevaline improvements? I believe that perhaps we could have been able to, even if we had only done it from a psychological point of view. Everybody in our country feels that we are starving the Navy, the Army, the Airforce, in order to have Trident. We have not got enough people in the National Health Service, there is not enough money for the hospitals and the schools and it is psychologically therefore such an unfortunate piece of timing. And I think one has got to be blunt about this.

Of course viewed from another angle, I do not suggest for one moment that one should make some unilateral gesture to achieve some moral credit. 'I wash my hands of this nuclear business because it is corrupting and all that kind of thing, but I do not mind sheltering

under somebody else's nuclear defence system.' No, I think we should have our share as long as we can. Now, how are we to face up to the future? I do not believe that we should worry too much about what rumours may be spread. This is why I keep harping on the necessity of seeing the broad view.

The last Defence Statement just after the Falklands crisis developed, had a statement that we had added, I think, a hundred more tanks to our deployment in Germany as a result of various measures or reorganization. At the same time our Secretary of State said 'What is Mr Brezhnev going to be most concerned with: a few more tanks in Germany, or Tridents?' There is a total contradiction in this. My point really is that I am not so worried about Mr Brezhnev's counts of our tanks in Europe, but about our general capability. And I think that the UK, as one of the countries with strained economic resources, ought to be very careful about major undertakings of the kind that you have mentioned.

The last part of my point goes twenty years from now: with what you, younger members of the audience, are going to be concerned with in your time as colonels and brigadier-generals? Because this is the area where weapons development and equipment problems have got to be considered. I believe that there will be substantial changes in the strategic positions in the world; if the Kremlin cannot solve the problems which are facing Mr Andropov at the moment, there may be a case there for considering the possibilities of structural collapse in the Soviet empire. And what would the situation be then? At least we must discuss it, we must think what the results of that might be. Not all of them would be satisfactory, but some of them might be dramatically help-

ful and others would be very complicated. But we also have to remember that twenty years from now the communists in the People's Republic of China will have developed a bit more industrial power. There is another aspect in our case: it could quite well be that the major deterrent we selected in NATO is not at all suitable for dealing with the customers who in twenty years time may be cropping up on the other side of the world.

I am a great optimist. I believe that changes are going to take place but they are not necessarily to be of the detrimental kind. I am a great believer that we have got to maintain the stability of the Alliance and keep a steady development rather than by fits and starts. So really I have no more to offer you than that. My Government is committed to the Trident development programme. I am not in government employment so I do not have to say exactly what they say. But if you wish to argue the case with me I can do both sides of the question.

*Cdr Van Waning* huivert als hij denkt aan de mogelijkheid dat een Nederlands smaldeel onder vergelijkbare omstandigheden zou moeten uitvaren om onze maritieme belangen buiten het NAVO-gebied te gaan verdedigen, zonder enige hulp van bevriende naties. Hij heeft de inleider in het kort horen spreken over mogelijke conflicthaarden, zoals onder meer Noord-Noorwegen, dat dan uiteraard een NAVO-verantwoordelijkheid zou zijn; ook werd geduid op Latijns Amerika — zij het dat daarbij nog niet zou vaststaan in hoeverre dat een aangelegenheid zou zijn voor de NAVO dan wel een mogelijk multilateraal probleem voor een aantal Westelijke bondgenoten — en ten slotte werden ook de ASEAN-landen genoemd. Spr. vond dat wel een zéér brede zwaai over de aardbol, en wil graag van de 'esteemed lectu-

rer' horen op welke gevallen of mogelijkheden deze bij voorkeur de inspanningen van bijvoorbeeld Nederland zou willen doen richten.

*Gueritz.* Nobody has called me 'esteemed' for years, so thank you very much! May I clarify a point, first of all: I was very quick at that particular stage because I realised I was dragging my remarks too much and therefore I had to speed up.

The four A's are to illustrate areas of possible conflict, and I would like to deal with that as my main reply. But can I deal with Latin America first: this was a broad political-strategic point about how you need to adapt your mind. At the time when I first started talking about Latin America, we were concentrating on the Far East. It was quite obvious that the Middle East, like the poor, would always be with us, or at least for quite a long time. And Africa was the next candidate after the Far East, as events have proved roughly already. But Latin America was not in anybody's thoughts, and my whole purpose was to make people think about it. Let me illustrate a very simple example. At that time — in the middle of the Sixties — we were at Singapore and we had to consider the future of our repairship HMS Triumph and we considered it against the background of Singapore's dockyard — which is a first class one — and Hongkong, and the possibility of facilities in Trincomalee, and so on. But what we really should have been considering — and I venture to suggest we should consider — is the future of HMS Triumph in the context of operations in the Caribbean. We might not have access to all the facilities we wanted — although the American ports would perhaps be available at some range — immediately in the Caribbean or further south in Latin America. We did

not see it in that light, and so HMS Triumph is gone; yet we would have been extremely glad to have her, being an aircraft carrier, because for one thing she would have been another deck, as it happens. But now let me go back to the four A's. First Antarctica. The whole point of my remarks is to try and look at these problems and if possible work out some way in which policing or diplomatic action can be taken in advance: some kind of agreement, multinational too, a demilitarization, and in our case some kind of Commonwealth patrol-force that has to be provided. In the Arctic it is different. As you rightly said, there it is a NATO problem. But are we ready to deploy in such a way that the Soviet Union would be deterred from encroachments on to Norwegian sovereignty in the Svalbard area? Are we really ready to make it quite clear to the Norwegians that they can stand up to the Russians because we will back them? I would wish that we had it all prepared.

In the Aegean there are two Allies in Southern Europe who have got a new source of argument, that is the resources under the Aegean. We have enough troubles and quarrels to get on with as it is, but there is a new one. What are we doing about that? We cannot ask General Rogers to be the major arbitrator down in those areas; he is always trying to cement the wall together, and we are just going through another difficult phase with Prime-minister Papandreou at this very moment.

As far as the Far East is concerned, the A(ssociation of) S(outh) E(ast) A(sian) N(ations) is quite a success story. I am sure that Ambassador Froger would agree with me that, when we were out there many years ago, it was said 'It is a domino-situation: they are all going to go, they will be gone tomorrow'. But it has not worked

like that and I hope it will not turn out badly. Anyway we do not want them to quarrel over resources in the South China Sea. What we are doing in terms of the Five Power Agreement — Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia — is that we are helping to smooth over the possible difficulties and do what can be done to make the area less liable to conflict. Bear in mind on this particular matter that there is one example which possibly is not generally remembered by this audience, and that is that these five Commonwealth-countries united together to resist the aggression of President Sukarno in 1965 and 1966. Their efforts were successful and may be therefore not much written of. I am sure you have newspapers in this country that prefer to print bad news rather than good news; we have the same problem and this sort of thing does not get much written up. Let the commanding general go off with the petty cash or his secretary and it will get in the news alright, but if a thing is successful it will perhaps not be so well known.

In the case I mentioned just now we actually had to do fighting. It was in a very low level, and it was kept that way by the deterrence of a form.

*Lkol marns Spiekerman* heeft een drietal opmerkingen naar aanleiding van hetgeen de inleider stelde over command-and-control. In de eerste plaats memoreert hij dat de MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) van de Amerikanen is opgebouwd overeenkomstig de daar geldende amfibische principes en beschikt derhalve *organiek* over eigen vliegtuigen en helikopters, artillerie, landingsvaartuigen en logistieke ondersteuning. In de tweede plaats hebben de Royal Marines een volledig andere organisatie dan het USMC en zijn zij niet uitgerust voor het uitvoeren

van landingen op vijandelijke kusten. En in de derde plaats is het een onaantastbaar principe dat men luchtoverwicht dient te hebben alvorens kan worden geland. Hij wil graag weten in welke mate deze drie factoren een nadelige invloed hebben gehad op de operaties in de Falklandarchipel. Ook is hij benieuwd naar de rol die de pers heeft gespeeld.

*Guertiz.* Just to inform those people present who are not privileged to belong to the RNMC: the Royal Marines were formed in the UK in 1664 to fight the Dutch; the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps were formed in 1665 to fight the British, and the United States Marine Corps was formed in 1775 to fight the British, that is one year before the US became independent. The USMC therefore has remained very independent ever since and, I may say, equipped in a fashion which makes all European forces green with envy; not least because they get the US Navy to pay for all their ships, they get the Airforce to pay for their aircraft, and they seem to get the Army to pay for most of their heavy equipment. Anyway, they are extremely well equipped. There is no doubt that the way in which their doctrine registers on this axiom of air superiority — firmly demonstrated during World War II — and the way in which they go ashore, equipped with their own mobile shore-based air facilities as well as the ones they have embarked initially, really is something which we could all admire and wish to copy. I am not at all clear how we are ever going to overcome the problem of carrying out amphibious operations against sophisticated air power. I have a strong suspicion that we shall never be confronted with doing it against the Soviet Union in the sense of an opposed landing, but that does not say we should not be able to de-

ploy forces in an operational posture in North Norway, for example. At the same time we have to be able to do the same perhaps down on the Southern flank. Going further afield, the sort of opposition that we might have to encounter should make it impossible, unless we developed a light carrier concept and carried it through to its logical development. And that is where I believe that the future of our mobile forces rests.

But could I just emphasize one point, and that is that I do hope that to some extent the members of the Alliance will individually consider whether there is any role that they can perform in the provision of mobile forces — Navy, Army or Airforce, whatever they may be — to be associated with the actions that may take place outside the boundaries of the NATO area: that is *not* something that NATO can do, it is something that individual countries can do!

Now it has been suggested, a propos of the balance of money between this task and that, that we — the UK — should pay a lesser part on the ground in Europe and more at sea, and that the German forces should be more emphasized into the land role. I do not see that is logical at all: the whole purpose of the deployments in Europe is a multinational confrontation rather than one force, particularly if the latter were to come from the Federal Republic one has to say, because that might upset relations in various ways. The important thing is that there is no reason why the German Navy should *not* take on a larger role, and certainly the Netherlands would be the most welcome addition, I am sure, with a larger emphasis on that field if this were possible. So I believe we have got to consider that.

Now the press. First of all, we were, I think, not particularly well prepared. I must be careful, because our select committee is sitting,

and I am one of their advisors and I must not prejudge any of the points that they are going to put their fingers on. But anyway, the evidence that has been produced by a number of newspapermen suggests that the Ministry of Defence was perhaps somewhat less well-prepared for the press-side of this than it was for the other aspects.

It has been said that Admiral Jellicoe may have won the Battle of Jutland, certainly as a moral victory, but he lost it as a result of his dislike of the press, and the dislike of his fellow admirals in the Admiralty, so that they absolutely messed up the public announcement. It became a German victory in all psychological terms, much to the discomfiture of our Allies, to the great distress of the British people and to the great elation of the Germans at that time. Now, in the same way it has been said that our Navy was ill-prepared to receive a group of reporters and have them on board. And one has to remember, they were going to be on board — as it turned out — for a very long time. And some of them were very inexperienced; I mentioned a man who was quite well-educated but seemed to think we were a bunch of savages. Some of them had no experience of war correspondence work, they were ill-equipped — no boots, no warm clothing — and all sorts of problems had to be resolved. But the big point is, that it was technically impossible for television films to be sent back from that area. So we had, *faute de mieux*, to rely on Argentine material or material produced perhaps by the US agencies. Should we have imposed censorship immediately, should we have had as we did, a formal 'Vetting' — 'please don't say what we are going to do next, even if you know; please don't speculate; be careful what you say about casualties because it can be very upsetting' — should we

have informed the press better? These were all sorts of things that really should have been done, and I hope that this will emerge in a report which comes up and tells how we should do this better in future. We have to get away from the Lord Kitchener idea of 'Out of my way, you ruffians!', that does not tend to get you very far along the line.

At the same time it is up to a number of members of the media to understand that some of our operations are not actually laid on for their benefit. On the other hand the Services have to accept that we are a public organization and must expect to be reported upon. So there we are: we are confronted with the problem of having press reporting for the benefit of our public in a democracy, we have the problem of giving information away to the enemy, of creating an adverse effect on public morale by publishing unauthorised or unfortunate information, and we have, I think, to maintain an absolutely solid reputation for the truth. If it means not saying anything, until you are sure, then you have got to accept that penalty. It happened several times that they did not want to report on a certain thing because they did not know if it was true or not, and this is a very good reason for withholding news. But otherwise I think that one of the things that will emerge, is the necessity of a good deal of extra training on both sides of the public information circuit.

I have got a lot of brickbats thrown at me because I have been involved in television and radio reporting and talking to interviewers about what was going on. One or two of my colleagues have gone too far by saying things like 'I would have gone down like this, with left wing down and my machineguns firing' giving rather too much information which the enemy could use on the next occasion

when he carried out the same operation; or a speculation 'if I were General Moore, what would I do? I would land there, and I would have my main effort there!'. That is out. If you are going to be involved in this you have got to be extremely careful that you are informative to the public in explaining what is evident already, and not displaying your knowledge for the benefit of the other side.

*De heer Brussee* informeert naar eventuele ervaringen die men heeft opgedaan met de verschillende middelen die tegenwoordig in zwang zijn voor de gevechtsvoering onder omstandigheden van slecht zicht en duisternis: zijn er nachtelijke gevechtsacties geweest, en welke conclusies ten aanzien van de specifieke nachtzichtmiddelen heeft men daaruit kunnen trekken?

*Gueritz*. The answer to this question in fact has been given already about two or three years ago, when the R(oyal) U(nited) S(ervices) I(nstitute) for Defence Studies conducted a short study into what we called 'continuous operations'. Some people did not understand what it meant, so we had to explain that it meant 'going on fighting all the time'. We had the presentation made by an officer from the School of Infantry with one of his colleagues, supported by air force and naval officers as well. Because in fact there had been rather little attention paid to this matter of continuous operations, that is not only twentyfour hours a day, but day after day after day after day. So it is not only a matter of being able to fight at night, it is being able to fight for more than five days: particularly those who are in command positions should be able to command their men for that length of time.

As you all know perfectly well exercises tend to end at 10 o'clock

on Friday afternoon, or sometimes at 10 o'clock on Monday morning if they are really protracted. But everybody knows when it is going to happen, and they can pace themselves so that they do not get too tired. It is after five days, you know, that you will become virtually useless, because you start suffering from hallucinations and things like that. So exercises to be realistic must have no advertised conclusion, and there must be times when you are all tested in these matters and when there must be replacements and secondary commanders and all that sort of thing.

On the specific point of fighting by night I am not able to give answers on equipment questions, because they are still all being discussed, and anything I said would be most unhelpful. But I can tell you this: when there was fighting by night, the Argentinian forces were found to have quite good — if not very good — nightfighting equipment in the forms that you suggested, of image-intensifiers and the like, but they did not use it particularly well.

On the other hand I understand that our forces found that what they had was pretty good. I think that the main point that emerges will be, that in training more attention has to be given — in NATO as well as in national forces — to the pressures of continuous operations in all its aspects.

In connection with this: I remember when I was in Staff College for a time, we had a Japanese student. As we were fighting a battle on the board, which involved Japanese forces during World War II, we said 'why was it that you were so good at night fighting in this particular battle?'. And he simply said 'we trained for it' and sat down, and we got no more out of him.

After all, that is a very good answer. So that is it, at least for this moment. No doubt there will be full reports on equipment in va-

rious fields, which you will be able to read about in due course.

De *voorzitter* vertolkt de gevoelens der aanwezigen door de inleider van harte te danken voor diens boeiende presentatie. De beste leermeester is immers nog steeds de praktijk, en hoe betreuenswaardig ook de verliezen mogen zijn, de te trekken lessen zijn ui-

terst waardevol en verdienen te worden geleerd en gehanteerd opdat een onverhoopt toekomstig conflict niet door een beter voorbereide agressor worde gewonnen. Hij is ervan overtuigd dat de lessen uit het Falklandconflict eerst na gedegen studie officieel beschikbaar zullen komen, en rekt erop dat zij alsdan zullen kunnen leiden tot hernieuwde bezinning in de

trant van de hedenavond gevoerde gedachtenwisseling. Voor hun deelname aan de discussie dankt hij de vragenstellers; de niet-leden die de bijeenkomst hebben kunnen bijwonen, wekt hij nogmaals op de Koninklijke Vereniging ook metterdaad te steunen en lid te worden; en vervolgens sluit hij deze uitstekend geslaagde bijeenkomst.

**M**  
**iC**

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## MILITAIRE SPECTATOR

Maandelijks ontvangen de leden van de Vereniging de Militaire Spectator.

Ten einde de toezending aan thans nog actief dienende officieren van Land- en Luchtmacht, tevens lid van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap, ook na hun dienstverlating zeker te stellen, wordt belanghebbenden verzocht de ledenadministratie van de Vereniging (Karel Doormanlaan 274, 2283 BB Rijswijk) in voorkomend geval in te lichten.