KONINKLIJKE
VERENIGING
TER BEOEFENING
VAN DE
KRIJGSWETENSCHAP

OPGERICHT 6 MEI 1865

MARS IN CATHEDRA

15 APR
1978

37

Ereleden

Z.K.H. de Prins der Nederlanden

Z.E. Luitenant-Generaal b.d.
M. R. H. Calmeyer

Z.E. Luitenant-Generaal b.d.
D. A. van Hilten

Generaal-Majoor b.d. J. J. de Wolf

Generaal-Majoor b.d.
E. R. d'Engelbronner

Bestuur

C. Knulst, MWO 4, Generaal-Majoor b.d., voorzitter

H. J. L. Janssen, Commodore Klu

C. E. baron van Asbeck

A. H. Lind, Kapitein ter Zee

W. Walthuis, Brigade-Generaal der Infanterie b.d., Redacteur, p.a. Hogere Krijgsschool, Frederikkazerne, Van der Burchlaan 31, 2597 PC 's-Gravenhage

M. J. Wolters, Luitenant-Kolonel der Mariniers

A. J. E. Poulissen, Kolonel Klu

C. 't Hart, Luitenant-Kolonel MA b.d., 2e secretaris-penningmeester, Nassaulaan 6, 2712 AX Zoetermeer, girorekening 7 88 28

IN DIT NUMMER

Mededelingen van het bestuur Financieel verslag van de periode 1 okt. 1976 — 31 dec. 1977 - Balans per 1 januari 1978 - Begroting voor het verenigingsjaar 1978 - Bijeenkomst te Den Haag, dinsdag 20 dec. 1977 — 1517

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Discussie — 1531

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MEDEDELINGEN VAN HET BESTUUR

Financieel verslag van de periode 1 okt. 1976 - 31 dec. 1977

ONTVANGSTEN	Raming	Werkelijk	UITGAVEN	Raming	Werkelijk
1. Contributies			1. Vergoedingen		
1975—1976	f 550,—	f 1.367,50	secretariaat	f 4.000,—	f 2.603,80
1977	f 25.000,—	f 24.049,30	ledenadministratie	f 3.000,—	f 2.400,—
1978 vooruitbet.	—	f 437,—	inleiders	f 3.000,—	f 2.880,75
2. Subsidies			auteurs	f 3.000,—	f 1.084,—
vereniging	f 2.500,—	f 2.500,—	2. Druk- en verzendkosten		
leerstoel	f 17.500,—	f 24.134,98	Mars in Cathedra	f 32.000,—	f 27.578,01
3. Advertentie-opbrengst	f 1.200,—	f 1.583,34	3. Vergaderkosten	f 300,—	f 261,65
4. Rente	f 900,—	f 955,95	4. Onkosten	f 6.000,—	f 3.201,72
5. Diversen	—	f 105,95	5. Leerstoel	f 17.500,—	f 18.913,26
			6. Prijsvraag	f 1.000,—	—
			7. Overige activiteiten	f 6.425,72	—
			8. Diversen		f 450,—
Sub-totaal		f 55.134,02	Sub-totaal		f 59.373,19
Saldo giro op 4 okt. 1976		f 13.536,26	Saldo giro op 31 dec. 1977		f 8.932,30
Saldo bank op 4 okt. 1976		f 8.911,14	Saldo bank op 31 dec. 1977		f 9.275,93
Totaal		f 77.581,42	Totaal		f 77.581,42

Balans per 1 januari 1978

DEBET		CREDIT	
1. Saldo giro	f 8.932,30	1. Vooruitbetaalde contributies 1978	f 437,—
2. Saldo bank	f 9.275,93	2. Saldo	f 20.771,23
3. Te vorderen contributies 1977	f 1.500,—		
4. Te vorderen adv.-opbrengst	f 1.500,—		
Totaal	f 21.208,23	Totaal	f 21.208,23

Begroting voor het verenigingsjaar 1978

ONTVANGSTEN		UITGAVEN	
1. Contributies		1. Secretariaat	f 2.400,—
1977	f 1.500,—	2. Ledenadministratie	f 3.600,—
1978	f 24.900,—	3. Inleiders	f 3.000,—
2. Renten	f 970,—	4. Auteurs	f 3.000,—
3. Subsidies		5. Mars in Cathedra (druk/verzendk.)	f 25.600,—
vereniging	f 2.500,—	6. Vergaderkosten	f 300,—
leerstoel	f 18.000,—	7. Leerstoel	f 18.000,—
4. Advertenties	f 1.500,—	8. Onkosten	f 4.000,—
Saldi giro/bank op 31 dec. 1977	f 18.208,23	9. Diversen	f 7.678,23
Totaal	f 67.578,23	Totaal	f 67.578,23

Bijeenkomst te Den Haag

dinsdag 20 december 1977

De *voorzitter* opent met een woord van welkom tot de in redelijk aantal opgekomen leden en introducés de bijeenkomst, die andermaal werd georganiseerd in samenwerking met het Nederlands Genootschap voor Internationale Zaken.
Ter informatie van de aanwezigen schetst hij in het kort de persoon van de inleider, professor Christopher G. Thorne, hoogleraar in de internationale geschiedenis aan de Universiteit van Sussex die, na gedurende enige tijd te hebben gediend in de Royal Navy — waar hij o.m. het bevel voerde over een motortorpedoboot — studeerde aan de Universiteit van Oxford; momenteel is hij, behalve hoogleraar, nog hoofd van de geschiedkundige afdeling van de BBC, waarvoor hij geschiedkundige onderwerpen, strategie en politiek-historische onderwerpen pleegt te behandelen; hij heeft een aantal belangwekkende publikaties op zijn naam staan, o.m. *The approach of war 1938 1939* en *The limits of foreign policy; The West, the Leaque and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931-33*, waarna in februari 1978 van zijn hand een nieuw boek zal verschijnen, getiteld *Allies of a kind: the United States, Britain and the war against Japan 1941-1945.* (Uitg.: Hamish Hamilton, Londen.)
Zijn belangstelling voor onderwerpen als dat wat hij hedenavond zal inleiden heeft hem tot dusverre in contact gebracht met tal van autoriteiten, waaronder ook verscheidene Nederlanders die een rol hebben gespeeld in de geschiedenis van de onderwerpelijke periode. Samenvattende kan worden gezegd dat deze aanpak de spreker heeft doen worden tot een uitzonderlijk goed geïnformeerd man, aan wie de *voorzitter* daarom gaarne het woord verleent voor de te houden voordracht, onder gelijktijdige vermelding dat de na afloop te houden discussie zal worden geleid door ambassadeur Boon van het mede-organiserende genootschap.

MEDEDELING

Maandelijks ontvangen de leden van de Vereniging de Militaire Spectator.
Ten einde de toezending aan thans nog actief dienende officieren van Land- en Luchtmacht, tevens lid van de Koninklijke Vereniging ter beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap, ook na hun dienstverlating zeker te stellen, wordt belanghebbenden verzocht het secretariaat, Nassaulaan 6, Zoetermeer, in voorkomend geval in te lichten.

World War Two and the decline of the West in Asia

Christopher G. Thorne

professor of International Relations, University of Sussex

In June of this year, the American representative at the United Nations, Andrew Young, forecast that if a race war came about in Southern Africa it would lead to racial conflict in the United States as well, beginning, he thought, with whites attacking blacks in America's northern cities. And this was only one, particularly vivid and recent reminder of the extent to which racial aspects of both domestic and international politics have been coming to the fore over the past thirty years or so.

At the same time, another feature of roughly the same period, especially since the establishment of Indian independence in 1947 and of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, has been the greatly increased role played on the international scene by Asian peoples and states, no longer mainly acted upon by the white man or ruled by him, but asserting themselves in ways that have obliged Western states to react to them.

This evening, I want to relate these two broad features of the world as we know it today — a heightened awareness of racial conflict and a new set of relationships between the West and Asia — to the Far Eastern war that began with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour and ended with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Before I go any further, I want to make it clear that in developing the argument that follows, I am not suggesting that the war of 1941 to 1945 was solely a racial one. After all, the United States and her European allies were fighting alongside various Asian peoples, while Japan for her part was allied to two white powers, Germany and Italy. What is more, if we stand back from the detailed events of those years, then it is possible to view the war, in one of its aspects, as a struggle for the mastery of East and Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, without having to refer to the colours of the skins of those taking part.

Not only were there many other aspects to the war against Japan besides the racial one, economic and commercial rivalries, for example, which embraced such commodities as rubber and oil, together with the contest to win Asian markets for mass-produced goods. Even that racial factor itself was not, in my view, prominent in the immediate run-up to Pearl Harbour, when the quest for autarky and the control of strategic raw materials figured much more strongly in the discussions going on among Japan's leaders.

And yet, even so, if we step further back, and see the Far Eastern war in the context of its longer-term origins; if, in addition we observe some of the feelings that come much more strongly to the fore after Pearl Harbour; and if we look back, with the advantage of hindsight, at various developments that we know now were to follow the 1941-45 war, then, I suggest, we can see that one of the strands that lay in the tangled skein of that war involved racial consciousness and racial conflict. To put it briefly at the outset: what I want to suggest to you tonight is that our understanding of the significance of the Far Eastern war is increased if we set it within a context that reaches back to the beginnings of what has been called 'the era of Western dominance in Asia' at the end of the 15th century, and that reaches forward to encompass, not only the end of the European empires in Asia after 1945, but also the American defeat in Vietnam.

Ten years before Pearl Harbour, for example, Japan herself had already defied the West and the League of Nations when she seized Manchuria in the early 1930s. Earlier still, the conviction that those with yellow skins were in no way inferior to

the whites (a belief that made all the more galling the anti-Asian immigration laws of the USA, and other manifestations of racial discrimination in the West): this conviction had been greatly strengthened by Japan's victory over the Russians in 1904-5. It proved, wrote one Japanese commentator, 'that there is nothing Westerners do which Asians cannot do', while in India, too, the startling Japanese, as one historian has put it, 'freed the minds of young men from the spell of European invincibility'. Likewise, a Chinese newspaper declared that, as a result of what Japan had achieved in 1905, its readers could have some confidence in the regeneration of the yellow race'.

In China itself, what is more, an anti-Western nationalism was stirring well before the First World War, and in 1919 (when China's interests were given scant consideration at the Peace Conference) burst forth in what became known as the May the Fourth Movement, in many ways a more significant episode in retrospect than the Versailles peace conference, that was attracting all the attention at the time. In Southeast Asia, too, the French, for example, had had to close Hanoi University for a time in 1908 in the face of nationalist disturbances, while in the 1930s nationalist leaders such as Ho Chi Minh in Indochina and Sukarno in the Dutch East Indies were causing a growing uneasiness among the colonial authorities. Even where concessions were made by the imperial power, as by Britain in India and Burma, they were regarded by nationalists as too late and too little.

In other words, what Japan was to bring about by her successful assault on the Western powers in the Far East in 1941-42 was a speeding up, rather than the creation, of a process that was to result in the end of an era of Western dominance in Asia, an era that can be traced as far back as the arrival in that continent of Vasco da Gama and other European seamen and entrepreneurs, from the late 15th century onwards.

Obviously, one of the consequences of the 1941-45 war was the hastening of the end of the European empires in Asia. Had it not been for that war, in other words, it would probably have been even later than 1968 before a British Government, for instance, announced that it was to withdraw its forces from East of Suez. In this sense, the Japanese onslaught of 1941-42 can perhaps be seen as in one respect doing the European powers a service, by quickening the end of the overstretched empires and obliging them to come to terms more speedily with the rise of Asian nationalisms, a process which in turn allowed them to concentrate more fully on domestic reform and the task of creating a new framework for international relations within Western Europe.

Of course, as far as the West as a whole was concerned, the war of 1941-45 created a very different situation in the short term, in that, well before August 1945, it had become apparent that the Americans were going to wield enormous power in the Pacific in the post-war years, and to have at least a considerable degree of influence on the shaping of events in Australasia and even in East and Southeast Asia as well.

What is more, there was also a new dimension to come as regards the American involvement in the Far East: a dimension that till then had been carefully avoided by Washington, even in 1944, when Chiang Kai-Shek's China had seemed likely to collapse in the face of a major Japanese offensive; the dimension, that is, of a large-scale commitment of American ground forces on the Asian mainland, in Korea and Indochina. And yet even so, despite this vastly increased American presence in the Far East after 1945, my own view is that this phase, too, can be seen as constituting no more than a coda to the four and a half centuries of Western dominance in Asia.

It is true, of course, that even today the United States remain powerfully present in Japan and Taiwan, as well as the Pacific. But the shock of the Tet offensive in 1968 and President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election; the visit of President Nixon to China in 1972 and his insistence that henceforth Asian non-Communists must take responsibility for their own defence; the Vietnam peace terms of 1973, the final, humiliating American scramble out of Saigon two years later, and the recent announcement of Washington's intention to withdraw its land forces from South Korea: these and other events have involved a drastic revision of the confident, evangelical and in some ways aggressive attitude which Americans had adopted towards Far Eastern affairs in 1945.

A distinguished American diplomat, who served in China during World War Two and who conducted a series of important conversations there with Mao

Tse-Tung in 1944, was talking to me recently about the general mood in the United States today. And he summed it up by saying: 'I think there's a feeling: enough of Asia'. If that is so — and I believe that, essentially, it is — then, taken together with the ending of the European empires in Asia after 1945, I think there is reason to conclude that, in certain important respects, the Far Eastern War of 1941-45 was won, not by the Western powers, but by Japan.

* * *

I shall come back to the question of developments after 1945 at the end of my lecture. But I want to turn now to the Far Eastern War itself, and first of all to the heightened sense of nationalism and of racial distinctions that the war brought about in Asia.

I have already referred to the growing resistence to Western rule that existed before Pearl Harbour. And it is important to appreciate that — however uneven and varied the process — what was developing was a revolt, not simply against being governed or dominated by Western powers, but against the entire Western order of things, internationally speaking — economic as well as political — and against Western concepts involving the structure of society, law and religion. Obviously, you can find expressions of these sentiments among the writings of those who sided against the Western powers after Pearl Harbour. But so you can, too — and this is surely more striking — in the words of an Asian who was sufficiently well-regarded by the Allies to be selected as a member of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East — that is, the Tokyo War Crimes Court, which sat from 1945 onwards. I refer to Mr. Justic Pal of India, who, in his dissenting judgement at the conclusion of those trials, sought to place Japan's actions in the 1930s and early 40s within a context which included earlier Western acts of aggression against Asian peoples and states; Western racial intolerance; and a Western-dominated international economic order.

And so it was on an Asian scene that in places was already greatly disturbed, that the Japanese armed forces, in December 1941 and during the first half of 1942, achieved their dramatic and overwhelming victories against the USA, Britain, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. The strategic consequences for the West were grave enough. But above all, at any rate when viewed in retrospect, these were months of intense humiliation for the white man in Asia. It was not simply the fact of defeat, but the manner of it. This was especially so where Britain was concerned, and it is epitomized by the figures that emerge from the campaign in Malaya and Singapore, where Japanese battle casualties of less than 10,000 had to be set against British Empire and Commonwealth losses of almost 140,000; 130,000 men being marched off as prisoners of war. Small wonder that Churchill described the swift fall of Singapore to Roosevelt as 'the greatest military disaster in our history'. What is more, the white man in the shape of prisoners of war and civilian internees was thereafter subjected by the triumphant Japanese to treatment that was often as degrading as it was cruel.

It is true, of course, that were were those Asians who, in the face of the Japanese victories, either remained loyal to the cause of the Western powers, or at least refused to come to terms with Tokyo; the Indian Army, for example, so despised by Churchill; or many Chinese in Malaya; or some in the Dutch Indies.

Even so, examples of such as these were outweighed by the extent to which a genuine welcome, or even active collaboration, awaited the Japanese in the territories they overran, and the extent to which Asians elsewhere felt some sympathy for their anti-Western cause. In Burma, for instance, the Governor himself wrote at the time that the invaders were receiving 'a lot of help' from the local people as they advanced, and privately confessed 'We have not been able to create that loyalty which is generally associated with subject races'. His fellow-Governor in Malaya responded that 'We have had the same experience . . . For the most part the Asiatic population up country had thrown up the sponge at the first sign of enemy activity'. In the Dutch Indies, Sukarno of course collaborated with the Japanese, as did a number of politicians and others in the Philippines. Even Nehru (according to Edgar Snow, who talked tot him at the time) shared in the widespread 'emotional sympathy' for Japan's efforts to bring down the white man. Likewise, an Indian member of the Malayan Civil Service afterwards admitted that

... although my reason utterly rebelled against it, my sympathies instinctively ranged themselves with the Japanese in their fight against the Anglo-Saxons.

Once the Japanese had established themselves in their new empire, they lost little time in fostering local nationalisms, above all with an anti-Western emphasis. Tokyo's plans, in fact, envisaged the creation of a number of quasi-independent Asian states, and in the following years, so-called 'independence' was granted to Burma and to the Philippines, for example, while, as you well know, in Indonesia the Japanese during the final months of the war rushed through a series of political innovations aimed at creating self-government there too. In addition, a Great East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo in 1943, a gathering of collaborators which may not have produced much in the way of tangible results, but which did provide, in the view of one of those present, a focus 'for a new Asian spirit'.

Now of course there was a contradiction inherent in what the Japanese were doing, for whilst encouraging national self-consciousness on the one hand they were making it plain on the other that, under the new order, as was already the case in Manchukuo, ultimate control would always rest with them. The result was that by the end of the war, anti-Japanese movements, including armed resistance, had become fairly widespread in the conquered territories. Nevertheless, the opposition of native peoples to the idea of a reimposition of white rule had been irreversibly and greatly increased. Hence my suggestion just now that, in an important sense, the Japanese, despite their surrender in August 1945, had succeeded in achieving one of their main aims: to hasten the end of white rule and a major white presence in at least East and Southeast Asia. A Frenchman who spent the war years at liberty in Batavia summed up the situation when he wrote in a report in 1945: 'Though defeated in a formal sense, Japan has *won the war* in this corner of Asia'.

What is more, the feeling that a show-down with the white man was drawing closer, was spread or increased even beyond Asia as a result of Japan's dramatic challenge to the West in 1941. In South Africa, for instance, Smuts wrote privately:

I have heard Natives saying: 'Why fight against Japan? We are oppressed by the whites and we shall not fare worse under the Japanese'.

More marked still was the impression made by the Far Eastern struggle on blacks in the United States. The pro-Japanese black groups that were uncovered in one or two American cities in 1942/3 were very small, but the possible implications of their existence were taken seriously within the State Department. The great Swedish sociologist and economist, Gunnar Myrdal, who was in the United States at the time preparing his study of the position of the black man there, wrote:

In this war there is a 'coloured' nation on the other side: Japan. And that nation started out by beating the white Anglo-Saxons on their own ground ... Even unsophisticated Negroes begin to see vaguely a colour scheme in world events.

Only yesterday, I was reading, here in The Hague, a letter which the Chairman of the Netherlands Indies Commission in the United States, Dr. G. H. C. Hart, wrote to Dr. Van Mook in April 1943 on the subject of the Indonesian sailors on Dutch ships who were demanding equal pay with Dutch sailors on the grounds of racial equality. Hart wrote of how, even for the simple Indonesian crews, this matter had become one of deeply-felt principle, and how no other point in the Queen's Speech of December 1942 had made more impression on those Indonesians who were beyond the clutches of the Japanese, than the one about the abolition of racial discrimination.

Now the cause of Indonesian sailors on Dutch ships (and of Chinese sailors on British ships) was championed by American labour unions. And of course, many white Americans — probably the great majority — continued to see their own country as being far more enlightened and disinterested in its attitudes and policies towards Asia than were the incorrigible imperialists of Europe. And it was, indeed, the case that there were Asian nationalists — Ho Chi Minh among them — who, during the war, looked to the United States of sympathy and assistance.

And yet it remained apparent (and this feeling was more widespread by 1945 than it had been in 1942) that for many Asians the United States was, in the final analysis, to be included in a single category of white, Western powers, along with the Europeans. I believe that this was a correct judge-

ment, and it is interesting in this respect to turn to what a Japanese ultra-nationalist, Okawa Shumei, had written in 1925 in his book, *Asia, Europe and Japan*:

The coming war between East and West, between Asia and Europe, will be... the dawn of a new day in world history, when all mankind will be awakened from their slumber... The strong power representing Asia and the other strong power representing Europe will be chosen by Heaven as champions of the East and the West... The strongest country in Asia is Japan... The strongest country that represents Europe is America.

Even in war-time India, though for a while, in 1942, there did exist the hope that Roosevelt would intervene and compel Britain to grant the country immediate self-government, if not independence, America was seen as possessing certain characteristics that related her, sometimes very closely, to the other white, imperialist powers. Gandhi for example, when appealing to Roosevelt for help in 1942, thought fit nevertheless to remind the President that

...the Allied declaration that they are fighting to make the world safe for freedom of the individual sounds hollow so long as India and for that matter Africa are exploited by Great Britain, and America has the negro problem in her own home.

Uneasiness also arose in India as the war continued over the possibility that the more formal type of imperialism exercised by the British might be replaced, after the achievement of independence, by an American imperialism of an economic kind.

In China, too — which so many Americans liked to think of as a grateful protégé — Mao Tse-Tung, for all that he may well have genuinely desired the friendship of the United States, was bound to include that country in his category of the 'cities' of the world, as opposed to its newly-assertive 'country-side'. Moreover, if we turn to the Nationalist régime of Chiang Kai-Shek, even there, despite the support it received from the United States through to 1945 and beyond, there was no liking for the role of grateful and subservient protégé that many Americans in senior positions assumed would and should be China's. What, after all, was Chiang Kai-Shek's own book — or the one ghosted for him — *China's destiny,* if not a call for his country to find strength and inspiration in its own past, and a condemnation of the extensive damage inflicted upon her by the intrusion of Western ways, which included American ways?

* * *

I want to turn now to the Western side of the picture, and first of all to risk making one or two generalizations about Western ideas and attitudes towards Asia that existed before the war of 1941. I must emphasize that I am generalizing, and that if we were to examine the subject in more detail it would quickly become apparent that, over, say, the two centuries before Pearl Harbour, considerable variations were involved, for example among the British who ruled India. And in talking to Dutch officials who spent much of their lives administering the Indies, I have been made very aware of how much they could identify themselves with the Indonesians, and find themselves working to protect the interests of the Indies against governments and officials here in The Hague.

But even so, I think that it is valid, within the perspective set by our subject this evening, to highlight certain widespread Western views of Asia and the Asians in the way that Professor Kiernan has done, for example, in his book, *The lords of human kind,* and as Dr. Needham has done in his collection of essays, *Within the four seas,* where he suggests for instance that

... the basic fallacy of Eurocentrism is the tacit assumption that because modern science and technology, which grew up indeed in post-Renaissance Europe, are universal, everything else European is universal also.

Western approaches to Asia before Pearl Harbour abound with examples of this kind of assumption, and of what is sometimes called 'cultural imperialism', which followed in consequence. I will merely recall now the basis of the French 'mission civilisatrice' in Indochina; the way in which the League of Nations' Lytton Report on the Manchurian crisis in 1932 called on China to 'follow lines similar to those followed by Japan' in adopting rather than resisting the blessings of Western civilisation; the demand issued by the British Government in 1929, that 'Western legal principles should be understood and found acceptable by the Chinese people at large not less than by their rulers'; and the observation of Sir Alexan-

der Cadogan, Britain's Ambassador to China in the mid 1930s, that what is wrong with China is that there is something wrong with the Chinese; something at least that makes them unable properly to adjust to Western standards'.

These are a few examples taken from Europe. But if you wish to discover expressions of belief in a Western nation's special 'mission' to civilise East Asia in the 20th century — something akin to the convictions that British representatives, be they missionaries or Benthamites, had carried with them to India earlier — then this evangelicalism of empire is to be found above all in the United States, and in respect of China. This line of thought and its more assertive consequences had to coexist, of course, with the deeply-embedded anti-imperialist traditions of America, the result sometimes being a dregee of contortion compared to which the posture of Laocoön and his sons could be taken for a study in relaxation. I have time this evening merely to recall the particular contributions made to the American sense of 'mission' and to the allied one of a 'manifest destiny' extending Westwards, beyond the now-tamed North American Continent, by Captain Alfred Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt, for example, and by the extensive American missionary presence in China. You will remember too, how President McKinley, faced with the decision as to whether to annex the Philippines in 1898, paced the floor all night and then saw the answer: take the islands and 'uplift, civilise and Christianise them'. A subsequent Governor of the Philippines, General Wood, argued between the Wars that the colony had in any case to be retained 'in order to sustain Anglo-Saxonism in the Pacific, Far East and India'. Henry Stimson, too, as Secretary of State in the early 1930s, was likewise convinced of the need, not only to hold on to what he called this 'islet of growing Western development and thought surrounded by an ocean of Orientalism', but to use the Philippines as 'the base of our economic civilisation in that hemisphere' and the Filipinos as interpreters of American idealism in the Far East', the aim being to 'develop a foothold in the minds of the Chinese people', and to lead those grateful Chinese along the path of 'modern civilisation'. Self-interest and altruism were seen by a man like Stimson as going hand in hand, so that he could write of both 'the real nobility' of America's China policies, and 'the enormous possibilities of a commerce with her as she develops'. 'We will lift up China', declared one Senator, 'higher and even higher, until Shanghai becomes like Kansas city'.

(Note, however, that insofar as the American public — stirred by the reports sent home by missionaries or by the writings of Pearl Buck or, in 1937, by the press coverage of the Japanese assault on Shanghai — loved the Chinese people, they preferred to do so, as in the case of other Asians, at a distance. In this respect the pre-1914 troubles involving Chinese and Japanese immigrants in California, for example, and the 1924 anti-Asian Immigration Act thereafter, established a pattern that was to continue during the Second World War.)

Meanwhile, despite this sense of inherent white superiority over Asians, there also existed within both American and European official circles considerable unease during the years before Pearl Harbour. For example, there were fears among senior officers of the Royal Navy concerning Japan's military ability to damage Britain's imperial interests east of Suez; fears that were expressed during the debate in 1921 over whether or not to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Or in a different field, a Foreign Office and board of Trade Mission in the early 1903s was reporting with alarm on the commercial successes in Asia and Australasia that Japan was achieving at Britain's expense, and forecasting 'bankruptcy and disaster at home and the abandonment of our great trading stations overseas' if the trend continued.

But there were deeper reasons still for anxiety. Eden put it succinctly in 1938. What was needed, he declared privately, was to 'effectively reassert white-race authority in the Far East'. And yet, of course, by the time that Eden was making this observation, for Britain, France and the Netherlands, at least, the likelihood of being able to realize the intention in practice appeared more remote than ever as the possibility grew of war with Germany. In this perilous situation, even so, white men in official positions on both sides of the Atlantic can be found deriving comfort from two assumptions about Asians, and about the Japanese in particular, which, although they may appear at first sight to have been mutually contradictory, both sprang from a continuing belief — implicit or explicit — in inherent Western superiority.

The first of these assumptions was that, however

formidable the Japanese might seem, they were inferior as a people, and that this would immediately become apparent were they to be so rash as to clash with the Western powers. The Australian Minister to China, for example, wrote in his diary when he visited the Dutch Indies in 1941 that senior Dutch officials there were 'full of contempt' for the Japanese after successfully resisting the latter's demands for increased oil supplies, while the British Military Command in nearby Malaya, in the words of the official historian, 'consistently underrated the skill' of the forces Tokyo could employ. The Japanese had 'particularly slow brains', reported Britain's Naval Attaché there in 1935, and two years later the Royal Navy's Commander in Chief China described Japanese and Chinese as 'these inferior yellow races'.

If this kind of assumption failed to provide comfort enough before Pearl Harbour, there was also to hand the belief that, when the Japanese eventually came to decide whether or not to embark upon a war with the West, they would reason in an essentially Western — or perhaps one should say an idealized Western — fashion, and that the result would be that they would appreciate the futility for themselves of such a war, and would back down accordingly.

Only a few days before Pearl Harbour, this process of reasoning lay behind the assertion loudly made within the State Department by its senior Far Eastern adviser (later Ambassador here in The Hague) Stanley Hornbeck, who, in a hugely untypical moment of abandon, offered his colleagues five-to-one that ' the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States'. Henry Stimson, too — now Secretary of War — had believed until very late in the day that a flexing of Anglo-Saxon muscle would suffice to keep the Japanese in their place. As for Churchill, he continued until the last moment to assure the Australians and New Zealanders in private, together with his Cabinet colleagues, that the Japanese, 'an extremely sensible people (who) would not run such a risk', would not think of attacking Singapore, and would be deterred from taking other belligerent action by the presence in the Far East of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse,* which he duly despatched, against the wishes of the Admiralty. The existence of 'possible but unlikely dangers' was the most that the Prime Minister would concede when he surveyed the Far Eastern situation on 12 November 1941. It was by no means the only serious error concerning that part of the world that he made during the war years.

* * *

What, then, of Western views of Asia after Pearl Harbour? Not surprizingly, the stunning events of December 1941 and the early months of 1942 forced upon individuals in the West a new respect for the capabilities of the Japanese. Churchill belatedly informed the Cabinet, for example, that it was clear now that Japan was a most formidable and dangerous antagonist'.

At a deeper level, there was also an increased awareness on the part of at least some white people that they were witnessing a major change in the relationship between the West and Asia as a whole. In the United States, Roosevelt himself had tended to see things in this light even before Pearl Harbour. Now, in the early part of 1942, he drafted a message to Churchill on the subject of India (in the event he sent a milder version) in which he urged the Prime Minister to realize that 'the old relationship . . . between Europeans and Americans on the one side with the many varieties of races in eastern and southern Asia . . . on the other. . . ceased to exist 10 or 12 years ago. . .'. In public, the same theme was developed more forcefully still by Roosvelt's opponent for the Presidency in 1940, Wendell Willkie, notably in his best-selling book, *One world,* while many other Americans joined Roosevelt and Willkie in asserting that the Atlantic Charter (which Churchill and Roosevelt had promulgated in 1941, and which included the declaration that peoples had the right to choose the form of government under which they lived) was applicable to Asia every bit as much as to Europe.

Meanwhile on the British side too, there were those who sought to establish a revised and relevant perspective within which those responsible could develop policies for the war years and beyond. For the most part their efforts were in vain, in the sense that they quite failed to shift the reactionary stance of the Prime Minister, ignorant of and relatively indifferent to Far Eastern affairs, and insisting, both in public and in private messages to Roosevelt, that when he had signed the

Atlantic Charter he had not thought of it as applying to Asia or Africa.

But it is important to recall that in this respect, as in the sphere of radical social and economic domestic reform, Churchill, while retaining the overwhelming support of the country as its war leader, was becoming widely separated from the general movement of British opinion.

Now where imperial policies were concerned, I am not, when I say this, thinking simply of, say, the arguments being put forward by the *New Statesman* or within the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions; indeed, the proceedings of the latter body strike one in retrospect as being remarkably moderate. I refer also to the fact, for example, that the Foreign Office, in interdepartmental discussions concerning the conduct of political warfare against Japan, insisted, despite the Prime Minister, that the Atlantic Charter was applicable universally, and must have a bearing on Britain's colonial policies. Margery Perham was making the same point in articles and *Times* leaders.

Within the Cabinet, of course, Bevin and Cripps for their part were anticipating an entirely new status for India, while even a much less radical member of the Government, Duff Cooper, who was sent out to the Far East to report on the situation there towards the end of 1941, asserted on his return:

We are now faced by vast populations of industrious, intelligent and brave Asiatics who are unwilling to acknowledge the superiority of Europeans and their right to special privileges in Asia.

(This observation of Duff Cooper's came to mind only yesterday, when I was reading the conclusion drawn by Dr. Sitsen, Chairman of the Netherlands Indies Commission in the USA, who in 1944 recalled how there had been a sudden increase in demand for industrial products in the Indies between 1935 and 1939. It was, he wrote, 'a turning point in the socio-economic life of the Indies... People, formerly satisfied with a minimum of goods which they produced and bought only when absolutely necessary, gradually demanded more and were willing therefore to exert themselves more... A new spirit has been born and its influence has become perceptible'.)

Another particularly interesting example is provided by the Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. He, too, was no radical; he had been Conservative M.P. for Petersfield and Minister of Agriculture under Chamberlain. But he, too, was convinced that once the Atlantic Charter had been signed, Britain was bound to give Burma its independence as soon as possible after the war (for stating this view to Churchill mid-way through a weekend stay at Chequers he was told to leave the house forthwith), and that as a prelude to independence, British firms operating in Burma should be required to give the Burmese people a stake in their affairs, so that it could be ensured, and seen, that a reasonable proportion of the profits made was retained in that country. Another prominent figure who warmly agreed with Dorman-Smith's approach — though the two men were to fall out in 1945 — was the Supreme Commander of South East Asia Command, Lord Mountbatten, who frequently despaired of London's slowness and caution when it came to announcing publicly radical new policies for Southeast Asia, policies which his Command could broadcast to the peoples of those territories ahead of its military advance. As ever, it was Churchill above all who stood in the way.

One possibility that greatly concerned a number of Western officials — American, Australian, British and Dutch — was that of a pan-Asian movement developing under the aegis of Japan, a movement that might transform the post-war scene even if Japan herself were defeated in battle. Apprehension of this kind persisted in Washington above all, where the need to keep China and India firmly within the Allied camp was seen as being vital as much for this reason as for strategic ones. A State Department survey of 1942, for example, forecast that if India were to be overrun as a result of a total collapse of the morale of its people (a collapse that American officials expected to happen if Britain failed to grant India major constitutional concessions), then:

... psychologically, Japan might well obtain such a secure place as the leader of the Asiatic races, if not the coloured races of the world, that Japan's defeat by the United Nations might not be definitive.

Even towards the end of 1944, when the enemy was clearly heading for defeat, Cordell Hull, the American Secretary of State, was continuing to warn Roosevelt that the Japanese were practising

... a 'scorched earth' political course as they retreat, in order to ... lay the foundations of a possible resurgence of Japanese influence in Asia by identifying

themselves as the champions of liberations who were thwarted . . . by the Western imperial powers.

The President himself frequently talked in similar terms, being greatly concerned lest British insensitivity should foster pan-Asianism in India and emphasizing in the same broad context that it was 'a triumph to have got 425 million Chinese on the Allied side' — friends, he suggested, who would be 'useful 25 of 50 years hence', meaning against the Soviet Union'.

Obviously there was a particular domestic reason why these fears of racially-based strife were especially marked on the American side of the Atlantic. Quite apart from the shadowy hints that some blacks at least had a degree of sympathy for the Japanese, which I mentioned earlier, there was also much stronger evidence of the heightened racial tension domestically during the war, such as the Detroit race riots of 1943. Moreover, the Office of War Information had already, in 1942, reported secretly to the President that the attitude of blacks towards the war was characterized by frustration, pessimism, cynicism and insecurity'. Meanwhile, of course, regardless of the Atlantic Charter or Willkie's *One world*, many whites in the USA, every bit as much as in Western Europe, remained profoundly convinced of their own racial superiority. The Office of War Information, for example, was in 1942 again reporting secretly to Roosevelt that its surveys showed that

. . . large numbers of white people in all regions show what must be regarded as an illiberal attitude towards Negroes. In such issues, indeed, it appears that rights which have long since been granted to them are still opposed by large numbers of white people.

With the President himself remaining extremely cautious over such issues, blacks were still frequently discriminated against when it came to securing well-paid jobs in war industries. The US Navy, until quite late on in the war, was for whites only. In the Army, blacks were placed in segregated units that usually had a labouring rather than a fighting role. Stimson, as Secretary of War, was convinced for his part that blacks made only 'fairly good soldiers when they are officered by white men', while he regarded social equality between black and white as 'basically impossible . . . because of the impossibility of race mixture by marriage'.

In this same American domestic context, as I mentioned earlier, the heightened war-time concern for the fate of China and India did not lead to any great change where immigration policies were concerned. When the Chinese Ambassador raised the question with Hull in 1942 — a time when his country and people were being acclaimed in the USA in the most high-flown language — he received in return only clouds of the old man's rhetoric. And it was only with great difficulty that the Administration eventually persuaded Congress to agree at the end of 1943 to a princely annual quota for Chinese immigrants of 105. Where Indians were concerned, resistance proved stronger still, with American labour unions and other bodies helping to prevent any opening of the door until 1946, when a quota was agreed upon of 100 a year. Meanwhile in wartime Canberra too, there was no intention of abandoning the White Australia policy, though it was euphemistically renamed 'the established Australian immigration policy' as a gesture towards inter-Allied fellowship.

For Britain, of course, the greatest single issue in this area during the war was that of the future of India. I have already emphasized that a great variety of attitudes is to be found among the British who had had dealings with India in earlier periods, and the same was true during the war — as between for example, the two war-time Viceroys, Lords Linlithgow and Wavell. And there is ample evidence to show that British servicemen arriving in India for the first time could be every bit as shocked by conditions they encountered there as were many Americans.

But is not difficult to find, also, either as regards India in particular or Asia in general, examples of British war-time attitudes that rested still on an assumption — sometimes explicit, sometimes, one suspects, scarcely conscious — of white superiority. Such a conviction underlies much of the private and official correspondence of Linlithgow, who remained Viceroy until 1943. And like Linlithgow, Sir P. J. Grigg, formerly the senior financial member of the Government of India and now Secretary of State for War, believed that Britain must reassert her will to rule in India and Burma for a lengthy and indefinite period. The Atlantic Charter, wrote Grigg, was great poppycock'.

Even Amery, the Secretary of State for India,

whose attempts to develop a constructive policy towards that country were far more sympathetic and persistent than is generally realized, retained assumptions about racial characteristics and capacities which were not so very far removed from those of some Nazi works on the subject. Writing privately in 1943, he suggested that

... if India is to be really capable of holding its own in the future without direct British control from outside, I am not sure that it will not need an increasing infusion of stronger, Nordic blood, whether by settlement or intermarriage or otherwise.

Closer still to the centre of power (and Amery was often bullied — even shouted down — in Cabinet by Churchill), Lord Cherwell was, his biographer tells us, 'filled with physical repulsion' by non-white people. He could also be relied on to adopt an unsympathetic and even harsh line when it came to responding to appeals by Wavell and Amery for additional grain supplies to be sent with all speed to India in order to avert a recurrence of the famine which in 1943 brought about something like a million deaths in Bengal. In 1945 he was still making what Wavell privately described as 'fatuous calculations' to demonstrate that India already had food enough.

Cherwell's approach chimed with that of Churchill himself, of whom you will remember his doctor wrote: It is when he talks of India or China that you remember he is a Victorian ... He thinks of the colour of their skins'. Amery indeed, was driven to describe privately the Prime Minister's attitude to this question of sending emergency grain supplies to India as being 'Hitler-like', and to Mountbatten, too, it seemed that Churchill 'regarded sending food to India as an *appeasement* of Congress'.

There is as yet no established definition of the term 'racist'. But I will follow Professor Hugh Tinker, who suggests in a recent book that 'racism' is present when an individual or group claims a dominant position, and justifies that position by the supposed inferiority of another group, which they hold to possess distinct, racially-based qualities. And, accepting that definition, I have no hesitation in describing Churchill as a racist. Recently-published letters by Sir Desmond Morton provide a reminder of his former-master's child-like, stereotyped images of other peoples; and the Prime Minister himself succinctly spelled out his underlying belief in this respect when he demanded, at a select luncheon gathering at the White House in 1943: 'Why be apologetic about Anglo-Saxon superiority? We *are* superior'.

Thus, for him, Indians could be described in private as 'gross, dirty, and corrupt baboos'; the Chinese were 'Chinks' or 'pigtails' or 'little yellow men'. To the Cabinet in 1940 he blunty asserted moreover that strife between Hindu and Moslem in India was 'the bulwark of British rule there', which he therefore hoped would continue, lest the two Communities should unit and 'show us the door'.

His war-time attitude over Burma, too, was equally harsh, and I have referred to his clash with the Governor, the late Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith. A year or two ago, Sir Reginald also recalled for me a conversation of the time in which, apparently, the Prime Minister told him that what the natives of the Empire wanted was 'a taste of the sjambok'. Amery, for his part, summarized the situation as he saw it when he wrote in 1941:

The real truth is that in the world of political ideas (Churchill) *has never really advanced beyond the mid-Victorian period...*

while two years later he concluded that:

... the thing is that he has an instinctive hatred of self-government in any shape or form and dislikes any country of people who want such a thing or for whom such a thing is contemplated.

(This attitude of Churchill's, when set against the international scene of 1944-45, is only one reason why, in my view, that incomparable war leader, who had saved his country in 1940 as probably no other man could have done, had on balance become, by the final stages of the war, a liability as Prime Minister.)

Although, as I have already pointed out, Churchill's imperial attitudes during the war were far removed from those of many of the people he led, he did, at the very least, set severe limits to the country's policies in that regard. What is more — and I think this was of considerable significance — it was easy for Americans and others, when they made assumptions about Britain's approach to colonial issues, to do so partly on the basis of the belief that the Prime Minister spoke for his country in this respect, just as he had indeed spoken for it during the defiant days of 1940-41.

Conversely, of course, many Americans continued during the war to see their own country as being unique among the Western powers in its understanding of and friendship for the subject peoples of Asia and those like the Chinese whom Mao Tse-Tung described as being in a 'semi-colonial' state. But it is scarcely surprizing, bearing in mind what we have already observed of the pre-war American scene, to find numerous indications that there, too, there existed a strong awareness of and concern for the status of the white man in Asia. I will give just a few, brief illustrations of this aspect of American thinking. Early in 1942, for example, when the Japanese threat hung over Australia, just as Churchill was talking of being 'unable to stand by and see a British Dominon overwhelmed by a yellow race', so Admiral Ernest King, the United States Chief of Naval Operations and no lover of the British, was writing that Australia and New Zealand must be defended because they were 'white men's countries which it is essential we shall not allow to be overrun by Japan because of the repercussions among the non-white races of the world'.

Or again, in 1942, when the stunning realization descended on London and Washington that Singapore might be about to fall, it was the Chief of the State Department's Far Eastern Division who lamented that such an outcome would 'lower immeasurably the prestige of the white race and particularly of the British Empire and the United States' in the eyes of the subject peoples of Asia. A similar thought was in MacArthur's mind as he worked to ensure that he would return in triumph to the scene of the defeat of American armies in the Philippines.

Moreover, there existed in a good many American minds during the war a deep-seated belief in the inestimable benefits that would accrue to Asian societies if they could be brought to adopt the American way of life . . . an echo of Stimson's ideas in the 1930s, in other words. Thus MacArthur for example (for whom the future and 'very existence' of the United States herself were, as he put it, 'irrevocably entwined with Asia and its island outposts, Western civilisation's last earth frontier'), while he ritually denied, like Theodore Roosevelt and others before him, that the USA entertained any 'imperialistic' ambitions, privately defined her interests in the Pacific during the war as being 'the development of markets and the extension of the principles of American democracy'. In public, the same idea was expressed more directly still by the famous novelist and Sinophile, Pearl Buck, in a speech in 1942. Having declared that 'the American stake in the Far East is far greater than it is in Europe', she added:

If the American way of life is to prevail in the world, it must prevail in Asia, whether it prevails in Europe or not . . . We have so far the ideological leadership of Asia, and Japan knows it.

(Not very subtly, perhaps, but with no little foresight, a senior Australian diplomat noted in his diary that Pearl Buck could turn out to be a greater disaster than Pearl Harbour.)

This kind of thinking tended to focus on China above all, of course, described by the *Chicago Daily News* in 1942 as 'our *white hope* in the East'. 'How many people', demanded the *Christian Science Monitor*, 'have considered what a different balance the world might have today were not Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek a Christian, and his wife American-educated?'. Roosevelt himself — and this was in a private note, written to General Marshall in 1943 — depicted Chiang in terms that suggest a combination of George Whasington and John the Baptist — so that he becomes, as it were, a species of honorary American:

All of us must remember that Chiang came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of 400 million people — an enormously difficult job. . . whereby he (has) *created in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain . . .*

This projection of American experiences and values onto Asian peoples came to embrace the Chinese communists as well during the war years, just as it was later, in the early 1960s, to involve South Vietnam, where President Diem tended to be seen — and sometimes to be specifically referred to — as an Asian Abraham Lincoln, who stood for freedom against the slave-system represented by Hanoi. And a broadly similar process can be seen at work during MacArthur's 'reign' in Japan as Supreme Allied Commander, following that country's defeat. For example, when George Kennan arrived in Tokyo to make contact with the great man on behalf of the State Department ('like nothing more', Kennan recalls,

'than an emissary charged with opening up communications with a hostile and suspicious foreign government') MacArthur, as part of the monologue which he delivered for his visitor's benefit, informed him that 'the Japanese were thirsty for guidance and inspiration, and it was his aim to bring them both democracy and Christianity'. What is more, in his own eyes, MacArthur succeeded in his mission with remarkable speed. For he tells us in his memoirs how he had had thousands of Bibles distributed among the population, and how this brought about 'a spiritual revolution' which 'almost overnight tore asunder a theory and practice of life built upon 2,000 years of history and tradition and legend . . .' Happy indeed, the commander who can win not only his battles but the hearts and minds of his defeated foes.

And yet, if American war-time attitudes towards parts of Asia included aspirations that were almost wholly absent on the British side, at the same time in the United States as in Britain there was a great deal of ignorance about Asia, so that four months after Pearl Harbour, when Chinese and Indian affairs were commanding headlines in the American press, 60 per cent of a national sample failed to locate either country on an outline map of the world. More striking still (given the way in which Pearl Buck and others were emphasizing the natural harmony that existed between Americans and Asians) is the evidence which suggests that on the contrary many of the former retained a sense of superiority, and in some cases still held Asians in contempt. And fear was sometimes present, as when two senior Senators warned a State Department advisory committee that a racial war between the white and the yellow man might be at hand and we may be liquidated', adding for good measure that, just as 'Genghis Khan had got into Europe', so America could now be helping 'to unleash in Asia forces so great that the world will be deluged'.

In accounts of their experiences, later published by American journalists who were serving in India, Southeast Asia and China during the war, it is often mentioned that GIs usually referred to the natives of India as 'wogs' and to the Chinese as 'slopeys'.

(It is interesting, incidentally, to find one American journalist-come-officer writing later that 'British color prejudice seemed much less than our own'.)

Cases also occurred of American troops taking pot-shots at Indians in the fields as they passed by in their lorries, which would seem to anticipate an attitude that was to become more apparent in Vietnam. What is more, I believe that a foreshadowing of later American attitudes towards Vietnamese 'ghooks', and the treatment of those people accordingly, can be found in United States' wartime attitudes towards 'the Japs', not so much human beings as 'rats' or 'barbarians', as Admiral Halsey for one publicly termed them. There may be good reasons, especially because of how they had acted, and episodes like the Bataan death-march make this phenomenon understandable enough. But it gives one pause to find, for example, that when, at the end of 1944, a Gallup Poll asked a sample of the American public what should be done with the Japanese at the end of the war, 13 per cent of those responding suggested that the entire nation should be exterminated; and that when, in September 1945, another poll asked whether the United States had been right to drop atomic bombs on Japan, not only did 54 per cent approve of what had been done, but an additional 23 per cent argued that 'we should have quickly used many more of such bombs before Japan had a chance to surrender'. Or to take what was, apparently, a different sentiment: that of war-time American admiration for the Chinese.

Well, on the question I have already referred to, of whether or not to admit Chinese immigrants into the States, one of the main pressure-groups set up to bring this about, put it this way in a pamphlet issued in 1943: 'Without China's goodwill, we shall incur the risk of another war in which white supremacy may be openly challenged by the Oriental races'. . . the implication being, in other words, that 'white supremacy' would, and should continue.

It might be expected, in view of his public image as champion of the colonial peoples of the world, that Roosevelt himself stood far above Western-centred racial assumptions of the kind I have depicted. And yet he, too, could, talk and write in private in a remarkably condescending fashion — even an ugly one — in this context. For example, he wrote to Churchill of how he would 'never like the Burmese', while he came to believe that it was

probable that the Japanese for their part were inherently aggressive because their skulls were far less developed than those of Caucasians. As for the future, one of the possibilities he had in mind was a programme of racial inter-breeding (its basis to be a Euro-indo-asian one) that would help create 'order' in the Far East, with the delinquent Japanese being left to 'languish in Coventry' in their home islands.

(I have not time, alas, to raise the question of attitudes among Dutch politicians and officials concerning the question of relations between Asia and the West after the war, and more especially those between the Netherlands and the Indies. But from talking to senior administrators of the Indies such as Dr. Van Hoogstraten, who were waiting in Australia to return there, and from reading the letters of Dr. Van Mook and others, it is clear that there was little or no idea of the extent of the nationalist resistance to the reinstatement of Dutch rule that was going to be encountered in September 1945.)

And yet, however much notions of inherent Western superiority might persist in various forms, it was clear, even before the end of the war in 1945, that there could be no question of a return to the Western dominated pre-war situation in the Far East. In Southeast Asia, for example, nationalist movements were beginning to assert themselves to an extent that was soon to create an entirely new pattern of politics. 'So much so', wrote the British colonial administrator and Cambridge scholar Victor Purcell, 'that the observer who had been fairly closely in touch with the situation in 1940 . . . would find himself unable to recognize what he saw (if he returned in 1948)'.

What is more, post-war changes have involved something that has been as significant as the drastic reshaping of the structure of international relations and a redistribution of power: that is, a remarkable upsurge of confidence among Asians, vis-à-vis the West, and a corresponding emphasis upon their Asian identity. Thus Richard Harris, writing in the *Times* in 1974, observed that 'independence to the East Asian mind means first the removal from the totality of East Asian civilisation of all Western intrusions and the complete fulfilment of an acquired nationalism'. Or to take a specific case, that of the Philippines; a territory for so long designed and assumed by Washington to be a bastion of the American way of life; a survey of that Republic in 1976 emphasized that above all she was 'attempting to cast off the alien influences of (her) long association with the West and to reassert (her) essential character as an Asian nation'.

Conversely, in the West there have been many, especially among the young, to whom the notion, as expressed by Eden in 1938, of 'reasserting white-race authority in the East' seems utterly alien and for some of whom, moreover, the 'wave of the future' has appeared to lie not in their own Western part of the world, but there in the East or perhaps in other 'non-Western' movements and figures nearer home, such as Che Guevara.

The West had indeed travelled a long way since Tennyson confidently proclaimed that '50 years of Europe' were infinitely preferable to 'a cycle of Cathay'. For some young men and women, rather, it was now Jean-Paul Sartre who came nearer the mark (however much the historian might deem him to be exaggerating) when he wrote, in his Preface to Franz Fanon's book, *The wretched of the earth:*

What then, has happened? It is simply that in the past we *made history. And now it is being made* of *us.*

That ideas of this kind were being put forward in the 1960s owed not a little to the war that had been fought between the West and Japan between 1941 and 1945. Indeed, when we come to study that conflict today, with Hiroshima over 30 years in the past and Japan in some senses, at least, a major power once more (by the end of the century not only it per capita income but also its Gross National Product is likely to exceed that of the USA, if present trends continue, while its economic power is great over a region not so very different from what was to have been its Great East Asia Coprosperity Sphere); today, when the Europeans are virtually without Asian territories, and the dream of a Henry Stimson or a Pearl Buck, of spreading the American way of life throughout East Asia, seems as derelict as the war-time road which General Stilwell built through the North Burma jungle to China and which that jungle reclaimed long ago; from today's vantage point the question of who were the victors in 1945 surely permits of no simple answer.

Detailed sources of material contained in this lecture can be found in the author's new book: *Allies of a kind: the United States, Britain and the war against Japan, 1941-1945* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1978.)

Discussie

De heer Jaquet. It is rather difficult to ask questions of a speaker who treated in one and a half hours time a subject which might as well take one and a half year to go into. Some of his remarks were to my mind rather absolute and generalized, so they should not go by undisputed. Without completely disagreeing I have to make at least a few critical remarks because I want to put some question-marks here and there.

I agree with the main thesis, that the West lost the war in a political sense, but I doubt whether it is really true that Japan won the war; that, it seems to me, reveals too much of a subconscious feeling that nationalism in Asia is just an object of Big Power games. To judge on the question of who did win the war we could as well look at the reception the Japanese Prime Minister got in the Asiatic countries a few years ago and then I am not too sure that it was Japan that won.

That brings me to my second point, about the racialism. Now I lived and worked in Asia for a number of years before, during and after the war and dealt with Asiatic affairs for another five years' post-war period in our Foreign Office. Therefore I speak from practice in judging that the speaker did make the racial thing too absolute. I do not deny the Western arrogance, nor do I deny from personal experience that quite a lot of the political overtones in the positions of Asiatic leaders can be explained from some racial insults they suffered during their youth, of whom Mr. Sukarno was one of the examples.

Now your thesis, that everything we saw in South East Asia during and after the war was not so much in the first place a revolt against Western dominance but a revolt against Western concepts, strikes me once more as being too absolute. I think it was more the concepts of the 16th and 17th centuries that made Asiatic nationalism revolt: trying to get rid of everything that penetrated into their culture. Again I have to refer to Sukarno, in particular to the speech he delivered in the United States where he spoke about zealots and Herodians and in which he argued that for completely pragmatic reasons he did not intend to oppose the West trying to kick the Westerners out and maintain the Indonesian culture for one hundred percent, 'no, we should learn their tricks, as the Japanese did a century ago, to be able to defeat them with their weapons'.

That seems to me to be more an opposition against dominance than against concepts, although there are racial undertones against dominance present as well, but they are not the only thing.

Moreover, speaking from practice once more, before the ware the Indonesians were most certainly not pro-Japanese. Sukarno argued rationally and scientifically that he had to be anti-Japanese, because those from their point of view would have to do the same things the Dutch did a couple of centuries earlier: exploit Indonesia for its raw materials; then, after a few more centuries, the Indonesian people could possibly benefit from Japanese rule but certainly not sooner. I was not at all surprized that afterwards he did collaborate with the Japanese, and I think Sukarno — who was intelligent and charming but politically an opportunist — was mainly honest in the story he told to Cynthia Adams in which he explained: 'Why did I collaborate with the Japanese? Well, that was my chance to get independence for Indonesia'. So once again I think this indicates opposition against dominance, not against racial overtones.

As far as racialism is concerned — I am not defending the Dutch, I could cite a few French examples as well — the speaker's quotations, very embarrassing though they were, were all American and English. But from that, I hope, you cannot generalize on the Anglo-Saxon approach towards nationalism. I do know that there were Dutchmen and French who might have argued in the same sense, but there were also others. You may be familiar with a few names of the famous professors of the Leiden school like Van Vollenhove, Snouck Hurgronje and others whose ideas penetrated the whole spirit of the Dutch civil service. To make my point on our underestimating the force of Japan because they were 'just Asiatic', I can refer to the famous note of the Dutch Governor-General's principal advisor, dr. Idenburg, who strongly emphasized 'do not be deceived: Japan is a very strong power!', adding that he doubted whether we would have many, if any chances.

Whether Pearl Harbor had anything to do with racial proudness I do not know. It was undoubtedly a matter of perception: 'things like that simlpy cannot happen here!'. That had practically nothing to do with racial superiority; Roosevelt's policy can be wholly explained by adding to his fear of Congress the fact that he simply refused to believe that such a thing could ever happen to the USA. So once more I think there

was a misperception more of political than of racial origin.

Professor Thorne. Well, I am not quite sure what I can do except try to stress again what I did stress before, because I do not take exception to anything you have said. I can only recall that at the outset of the talk I did try to emphasize that I was going to pick out the racial theme, but that there were many others. And I emphasized that I was not trying to say that it was absolute; that there were many other themes that I have explored, but that for the sake of one lecture I was going to concentrate on that. So I am afraid I must disclaim any thought that I tried to make it absolute: at the risk of seemingly being very tedious, I tried to say very hard that it was *not*. So I do not think there is a single point you said that I would dispute. But I do not think that your remarks do in any way contradict what I tried to emphasize in my talk. For if I did convey something of that, then I failed absolutely: I just tried to say it was only one of several themes, and I was going to qualify it.

Now to take for example what you said was embarrassing: the business about racial arrogance. I did try to say that there were very, very many variations. And that even in India, or even among Americans or what have you, you could find examples of people who did *not* have this arrogant point of view towards Asiatics. And I did specifically say that I was well aware that you could find many such people in the Dutch Indies. Nor did I say — because frankly I just do not know and therefore would not be in a position to say it or not — that Sukarno and others were pro-Japanese before Pearl Harbor. The point I tried to make was, that when the Japanese did attack and did achieve successes against the white man, there is evidence to show that a good many people were pleased by what was happening. Of course what I was talking about was a very great range, and I tried again to start by saying that there was a huge difference between the behaviors of different peoples in South East Asia: there were those who either collaborated or were pleased by what the Japanese were doing. I based that on what you referred to as 'books', in inverted commas, as if that were some kind of purely secondary material. Of course I was not there. But I based that on primary reports — letters from people who were present, the Governor of Birma, the Governor of Malaya, and people less than governors — when I said that some Dutch officials appeared to be contemptuous of the Japanese. And I very clearly stated that indeed that was a secondary piece of evidence in that it was in Sir Fredric Egglestons' diary, and I did add that it was something *he* observed in passing through and wrote down in his diary in Batavia on the spot at the time. Now he may be right, he may be wrong, but even if he was right it does not mean that there were not, as you mentioned, Dutch officials who were not contemptuous. There were also such officials in Malaya. For example, there was the Civil Defence advisor to the Governor of Malaya, a man named Vlieland, of Dutch ancestry I believe, who clearly warned time and again about the Japanese capabilities as he saw them. When I made the point about the British defence preparations in Malaya, I was generalizing — I quoted the official historian who, he himself a major-general, examined the records in detail, as well as my own view — and I found that the contemptuous attitude was the one that got the upper hand. But again, if I may say so with all repect, you are putting into my mouth things I tried — obviously without success — *not* to say, *not* to generalize. I did not try to say that the war was solely racial in origin. In fact I tried to emphasize that, if you look at the immediate causes of the war, you will find the racial factor to be not so very big. I would put the racial factor as becoming bigger, though by no means sole, and very often not dominant, which was what I was trying to say at the beginning in two ways: first, if you stand back and look at the longer period before the war to things like the Russo-Japanese war, etcetera, and secondly, if you look at the period following Pearl Harbor. I think in the months preceding and in the year or two preceding there are many other factors which were probably much stronger for the Japanese: oil, the threat of economic strangulation, and so on. And I happen to believe that the Americans treated the Japanese in 1942 with great clumsiness. That does *not* mean that they were responsible for the war, that would be absurd; but I think that they did not always negotiate very cleverly. As for Roosevelt being confident about it: he actually in the last weeks was sure that war was coming, and he did privately say so.

Now just if I may finally take your first point, about whether Japan won the war or not, again I tried very hard to say that I was being very, very qualified, and I was saying 'merely in that one respect'. By that I did not mean that Japan won the admiration of all fellow-Asians, and of course — very striking as you said — the visit of the Prime Minister recently showed that they had not done so. What I did try to say was, that if you go back to the twenties and thirties one of the themes of the Japanese ultranationalists (the 'double patriots' as Dick Story calls them in his book) who were becoming more influential in the thirties, was the need to in the end resist not just the white presence but white domination in East Asia in particular. This, as far as I understand it, involved an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the Chinese for example: that is that at one and the same time you had to resist Chinese nationalism which had been infuriating in stopping our goods, which might well mean that you would have to bang the Chinese very hard indeed on the head, and yet there was a sense in which you recognized the Chinese as being fellow-Asians you might have to lead by the hand against the white man some day.

All I meant by Japan winning the war, in that one limited sense, was that if you look into the twenties and thirties, there is among the nationalists in Japan the aim of bringing to an end white dominance, as they see it, in East Asia. In that sense only I mean they achieved, or helped to hasten, that particular aim which they had. I meant that, and no more.

If I applied more, then I must still qualify to it again. I am sorry I have to be so competitive but I really have to plead not guilty.

Dr. Snapper. I would like to raise one point, not so much as a criticism but as a possible addition. After the severe beating we took from the Japanese we — meaning the peoples of Western Europe and North America — did feel no urge to make the oncoming military victory a total one. Moreover, whereas in the last part of the 19th century there were 10,000 Dutch troops fighting in Atjeh, all of which were volunteers, equalling about one quarter percent of our countries population, I like to compare these figures with the maximum of American troops in Vietnam around 1968: they numbered about 500,000 which constituted also one quarter percent of the American population. But these were mostly not volunteers but conscripts. The changes in our society prevented us from getting enough volunteers, so conscripts had to be sent overseas, even though that was adverse to the peoples' will. So I do think in a way even the changes in our society may have contributed to the impossibility of our restoring the old prestige in Asia.

Professor Thorne. Perhaps one might make certain distinction: that is, that I think that there were certain parts among the Allied ranks where a determination for total victory was marked. I think you found this towards the end of the war in the United States, and I am judging by opinion-polls an the press, etcetera. I think you found this in Australia on the whole, which wanted a harder peace. I do not think you found it so much in Britain, nor elsewhere in Europe. There is a clear distinction here among officials: there were those officials in both London and Wasnington, and I am sure among Dutch officials too, who said we must not have such a total, crushing victory that Japan will be down forever; because not only will this be bad for Japan and for Asia, but if we are not careful — as Mountbatten's advisor stressed very strongly — we will create more sympathy for Japan among the other Asians. Similarly Sansom, distinguished British diplomat and historian of Japanese culture, was convinced, like Joseph Grew — the former American ambassador in Tokio — that 'the throne must be restored in Japan and must be kept as a pillar'. Not the existing emperor necessarily, but the throne as a pillar of a rebuilt Japanese society. But wheareas in London Sansom's idea was treated as being interesting and from a very detached point of view — and generally was accepted in the Foreign Office — in Washington Grew was for a long time in the minority: when he referred to this fact in a speech in Chicago in 1943, just alluding to the idea of keeping the emperor, he was made 'public enemy number one' for a while ... because you must not be soft on Japanese. So I take your point, but one must not perhaps generalize too much, because there were those who did want total victory, for a time.

LtZ 1 Van Waning. I have listened with admiration to the speaker's interesting quotations, which proved to be very enlightening on the attitudes of some wartime leaders. It may be wrong to generalize, yet I think it is disturbing to have to realize the shortsightedness of such highly regarded men. But it does seem to me — although you repeatedly mentioned that this was only one theme out of a great many other factors — that you emphasized the racist thing far too much. You, as a historian, are now being wise after the event. But could you try to be forward-wise as well and venture to look into the future also? Did we really lose the war there? Maybe in, say, about fifteen years from now we could be glad that the West — having entered in Asia centuries ago because of its superior economic systems, administration, technology, and so on — has been kicked out of that continent in a much quicker way, referring to Vietnam for example, than it would have been anyhow. I think it was us who after all did win the war, though we lost the East, our colonies: so much the better.

Professor Thorne. I agree, because that was the point I tried to make. I obviously expressed myself very badly; I said that I thought that you could see this as being a mercy, because it allowed the West to concentrate on domestic reform and to escape long, bloody conflicts. It was my fault that I obviously was not clear enough.
Just to take briefly your opening remark. You did say again the racial theme was too much in the talk. I did try and said at the start that I was going to make the whole talk upon that theme, and therefore it went through the whole presentation. But you did say 'racist', and there is a difference, I think. I did not want you to feel that Western *racism* figured too much; that would be a criticism I could not accept, because in the other way I did define my terms and simply stick to them. What I tried to emphasize was, that if you look at Britain — simply because there is a lot of evidence there, much more than I have naturally on the Dutch side — you will find that the racism (and the racial angle is not the same as the racist angle!) of a man like Churchill, or Linlithgow, had become the exception rather than the rule. And if the quotations from Churchill are vivid and startling, they are *not* because he just is Churchill, but because he was in a very powerful position — if only a negative one — to block. To me that was most striking. When I embarked upon this, I did not know what to expect indeed. When I begin a work of research I try to think 'what are the preconceptions that I have?', and then to put them down so that I will be aware of them, and guards, because it is so easy to have preconceptions — we all have them — and then very conventiently find exactly what will back them up. Now what I wrote down as my preconception on Churchill was, that the picture of him as being reactionary in imperial matters (which is nothing new about him, because in the 30s he had fought the whole India Bill on this basis) would turn out to be exaggerated or oversimplified. But what I did find was the reverse: that it was understated! So in fact I did not go expecting to produce Churchill the racist, I expected in fact that where he was con-

cerned I would find him increasingly isolated and probably misunderstood; but then I found things like the note to the Cabinet about the Hindus and the Moslems.

To emphasize once more that I certainly did not want the *racist* aspect to be the dominant one in my talk, just another example of what I found. I am not merely talking about the men at the top, the Foreign Office, the Governor of Birma, who argued against Churchill; I am talking about the public where the opinion-polls testify to a totally different attitude. When the black American GIs came to Britain, the British people did not have the race problem. So white British crowds often intervened against American Military Police on behalf of black GIs. There are many instances of black GIs drinking in a British pub, and white Southern GIs come in and tell them to get out, and are themselves thrown out by a British crowd: that even became a matter of Cabinet importance, up to top level!

I am sure the same is true of the Dutch public. The whole history of relations in the Indies, I am well aware, is such that there has hardly ever been an emphasis on racial inferiority, certainly not as an official policy. And I think, what is ironic — that is what I tried to convey — is that it is often among the Americans, who are the first to condemn the Europeans for being arrogant imperialists, that you actually find the most profound feelings of white superiority. I could illustrate that by talking about people from the Dutch East or West Indies, or maybe from British India, who would be refused admission to hotels in Washington, whereas the same people were being told that they were arrogant imperialists.

The same is true in France: if you look at the meetings of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Americans time and again go for the three of us, British, French and Dutch; we are in the dock together. And time and again it is the French who say 'wait a minute, we do not regard these people as being inferior, we intermarry, etcetera, same as in the Indies; and what about the Negroes, what about the people from Portorico?'.

If you would find racism on the white side, leaving aside exceptions like Churchill, you would find it more in America. That was Edmund Taylor's remark in SEAC from his personal observation on the spot: racism was more pronounced among his fellow-American GIs than among British troops — he did not say 'other European troops', but I am sure it would be so — because they had lived with these people, they had had the problem of living and working with them over the years, which was very different from the Philippines, where racism was very pronounced indeed. It is very ironic that after the war in the treaty which the Americans drew up with the Philippines before they gave her independence, one of the things that they were most concerned about was to insist upon exterritorial legal rights — so that, if an American serviceman was accused of a misdemeanour, he would be tried not by a Phillippino but by his own compatriots — thus sticking to the old legal system which they had condemned.

To take one final example: every American book that you read on World War II — take Barbara Tuchman, who is a good historian, on Stilwell — gives the clear impression that, when Britain joined America in giving up exterritorial rights in China in January 1943, it was because they were forced to do so by an enlightened America, and reluctant to do so. The idea was enthusiastically accepted in the Foreign Office, long before; the Americans said 'well, we think it's a bit early yet', then they turned suddenly round and said 'let's do it!', the British said 'all right' but of course they had, like the Dutch no doubt, much more complicated things to negotiate: they had more property, more rights. The Americans, having less at stake, did cut through, and the world was presented with the notion that the Americans had forced the reluctant Europeans to surrender exterritorial rights in China!

Dr. Van Eekelen. Chairman, since the time of Oxenstierna and the King of Sweden we know that the affairs of the world are indeed often governed with little wisdom, and of that fact today we have heard some interesting examples. I indeed do regard Churchill primarily as a great war leader, and I wonder to what extent his opinions about the situation in the Far East are really all that relevant especially in combination with the situation in the United States where, as we all know, the Americans have a tendency to have on the one hand moral overtones in the explanation of their policy, and on the other hand a tremendous public relations apparatus which then tries to sell that policy to everybody who does — or even does not — want to hear about. But my main problem with some of the quotations given by the distinguished speaker is: if you fight a war, you paint your enemy as an enemy indeed, and a very bad one for that. Take the First World War, what was said about the Kaiser; take the Second one, what was said about the Germans, the Huns, the beasts, and so on. I think it is quite normal to regard them as something terrible. Perhaps even as something inferior, just to make your own side believe he can be beaten; that element should be there as well: on the one hand you want to speak slightingly of your opponent because otherwise you will never have the necessary self-confidence, on the other hand with regard to your people's public opinion you have to depict him as really awful. That then, in the process, the racial element creeps in, seems to me to be very understandable.

But I do not really know whether it matters all that much, particularly — and that is my second point — since after the war, as soon as independence was granted for instance to India, the relationship between the Asians and the Europeans was better than ever before. In Indonesia it took us a bit longer, but at present I think our relations with the Indonesians are quite free from racial aspects. And that makes me wonder whether in the war that racial characteristic was — although I accept that you qualified it — so pronounced as you made it seem.

Professor Thorne. On the last point

I agree with you, that after the war relations often were much better, for example between yourself and the Indies once they had gone, and between ourselves and India, but that has nothing to do with whether it was important *in* the war or not. You are talking about whether on being important *after* the war. Now on the instance that you mentioned, I absolutely agree. But again in the American case, as I tried to indicate, there was in American attitudes towards for example the Vietnamese an element which did involve a sense of racial arrogance and racial superiority: the very notion of referring to Vietnamese as 'Ghooks' and so on.

I do not know if you have read the remarks of General Westmoreland and others, that these are people who do not value life very highly and therefore they are happy to die, and don't mind taking lives, etcetera, I think that *is* a racial element. And although for Europeans I agree the racial tension began to go very strongly the moment independence had been granted, I have been trying to show that it did come to the fore *in* the war.

Of course I agree with you that one very strong reason why it came to the fore was, that you painted your enemy black. We have been talking about the West, but of course the Japanese tended to paint the West as absolute monsters; early on rather perhaps they were different, early on they were almost clever-contemptuous, then, when the Americans particularly began to hit back they became 'barbaric people, who had bombed Tokio with firebombs', and so on. On both sides of course you get this, but I do not think it matters.

There are many reasons for it. I was concerned to say that the phenomenon did come increasingly prominent. I accept your point that for Europeans, after independence had been granted to overseas territories, it became much less prominent. But I am saying that it went on in the American instance as a sort of coda. And one hopes that post-Vietnam that element in relations between Asia and the West can gat a great deal better. I do not say that it will go on for ever and ever, I just said it was important in the war, came to the fore, and lasted through independence and afterwards.

Finally, to take your first question, I do not understand why Churchill's opinions about Asia and the Asiatics are 'not relevant', as you said. To me they are relevant, because I have been conducting a study of British and American and other Western policies in Asia in the war. And Churchill's attitudes *were* relevant. They in many respects were not representative of his time but because of his position, because of the way in which he was seen, like them or not, they were relevant to my studies because he could greatly influence British policy, even in a negative way, over the British Empire. If you had had someone like Attlee, who would have been nothing like the war leader, then I am sure that maybe the final evolution of the British Empire would have been a very different process.

It was very important in another way: you cannot divorce, in my opinion, Anglo-American relations over the Far East from Anglo-American relations as a whole. Whereas on the whole relations between the Americans and the British were, with ups and downs, good and in some ways often very remarkable — one has to admit that what was achieved between the Allies was the most astonishing wartime achievement and harmony and working together ever, quite extraordinary! — yet on the American side the strong feeling was that they had nothing in common in Asia. Henry Luce, the publisher of Time-Life, came over to London and to a group of British journalists and officials he said 'what a pity that the common ideals which unite us in the West are totally absent in the East, where you are totally repressive, you and the Dutch and the French', and so on. In private, Adolph Burley, as senior official of the State Department wrote to Roosevelt 'we are miles apart in Asia'. (Therefore this notion: one reason why my new book is called *Allies of a kind*, is meant to be a terribly clever play on both words in that they were Allies 'of a kind' in a sense that in Asian eyes they were often seen as fellow white status-quo powers, and in another sense they were 'of a kind' because their relationship in the Far East was very bad.) That went to the top: Roosevelt assured a few officials privately at the end of 1944 that the British and the Dutch and the French were secretly working together against American interests in South East Asia.

Not true! He privately assured his staff that Britain was trying to totally destroy everything America wanted to see in China, whereas at that very time the Foreign Office papers, briefing for Yalta afterwards, were saying 'we must have a strong united China after the war. Amongst other things it makes common sense for trade, it is a very pragmatic thing, and also a weak China would be an absolute grant for clashes between other powers, not least the United States and the Soviet Union, and we shall then be embroiled, it will be another Poland, only much worse'.

So all the British papers said 'we must have a strong China', but the difficulty was that the American images of European imperialists in general and British imperialists in particular, for alle these reasons going back to the 18th century — which every American had, as it were, imbibed with his mother's milk — were so strong that the evidence really was neither here nor there: is was a feeling. Stanley Hornbeck came to London in 1943, and a week of discussions were conducted in great detail with the Foreign Office on all aspects of Far Eastern policy; there was *no* fundamental disagreement! It was drawn up and Ashley Clarke, to whom I have talked about this, wrote at the end: 'There can be no difficulty for us in following America in these lines of policy'. Hornbeck himself wrote to Ashley Clarke: 'I am so glad we are one in these matters'. Then he went home; and there in his papers is the private report which he then drew up for Cordell Hull, in which he said: 'Nothing, I am afraid, was clearer than that we are miles apart and the British do not understand the marvellous Chinese people'.

Finally, you may remember General Hurley, ambassador to China at the end of the war — to whom your

ambassador to China, Dr. Lovink, referred in a letter I found in the Dutch archives, saying: 'I realize that I am an oldfashioned diplomat, and then times change; but is it really done to utter piercing Sioux warcries in my dining-room?' — who was privately assuring Roosevelt that the British, Dutch and French were working closely together in thwarting the American aims and interests in South East Asia and China. Roosevelt accepted that as a fact. Then Hurley came to London in the spring of 1945, and enormous efforts were made because the British realised they must convince this man. They showed him everything and asked him to address the Chief of Staff to begin with, Alan Brooke and his colleagues. He began by saying: 'I am glad to say there is no difference between us in China'. He then went on to Churchill who had been briefed very thoroughly and at enormous length by the Foreign Office. Waste of time: Churchill's own record, which I think is absolutely to be relied upon, said: 'The general-ambassador seemed disposed to talk only in polite and banale generalities. I made it clear to him that we could on no account give up Hongkong. (Something which the Foreign Office was ready to do, even the Colonial Office at one time in 1942.) He did not demur.' Hurley went back, and wrote a letter to Truman (which is in the Truman papers): 'I stood up to Mr. Churchill and I told him that he only possessed the British Isles . . .'

I am very much afraid we could go on like this for a considerable length of time, but I think I finally made my point, so thank you very much for listening.

Ambassador Boon dankt ten slotte de spreker voor diens boeiende uiteenzetting, daaraan toevoegende dat het hem heeft verbaasd iemand van de Britse eilanden zo snel, en toch zo duidelijk te hebben horen spreken. Hij brengt tevens dank aan degenen die aan de discussie hebben deelgenomen en stelt vast dat daardoor de bedoeling van de inleider merkbaar in een duidelijker licht werd gesteld. Hij wenst alle aanwezigen een goede thuisreis en een geslaagde viering van de komende jaarwisseling toe, en sluit de bijeenkomst.

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

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