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# Voordrachten

## "The Netherlands-Canada 1995 distinguished lecture series"

Het Nederland - Canada comité werd gevormd in 1994 om de viering van 50 jaar bevrijding extra in het licht te zetten. Het comité heeft een programma opgesteld dat de bijzondere relatie tussen Canada en Nederland benadrukt en tevens een basis legt voor nauwe banden in de toekomst. Hare Koninklijke Hoogheid Prinses Margriet is erevoorzitter van het comité. Mr. Piet de Jong is voorzitter, in het comité hebben autoriteiten van het bedrijfsleven, de overheid, en de culturele en academische wereld zitting.

De hoogtepunten uit het programma zijn:
- de instelling van een leerstoel voor Canadese studies aan de universiteit Groningen;
- studenten uitwisselingen;
- concerten;
- tentoonstellingen;
- conferenties;
- en een serie lezingen.

De Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap heeft meegewerkt aan twee lezingen uit de serie van vier "Netherlands-Canada 1995 distinguished lecture series".
Op woensdag 8 maart werd een bijeenkomst georganiseerd met als thema:"Experiences of and lessons learned from peacekeeping", in het Sofitel Hotel te 's-Gravenhage. Inleiders waren generaal A.J.G.D. de Chastelain (Chef van de Canadese Defensiestaf) en drs. A. Leurdijk (VN-expert van het instituut "Clingendael").
Op dinsdag 27 juni werd de tweede bijeenkomst georganiseerd, waaraan de vereniging haar medewerking verleende. Deze vond plaats in het Defensie Voorlichtingcentrum. De titel luidde: "The proliferation of small arms: a lost battle?". Sprekers waren C.W. Westdal (Canadees ambassadeur voor ontwapeningsaangelegenheden) en brigade-generaal b.d. H.J. van der Graaf (lid van het VN adviesorgaan voor ontwapeningszaken).
De tekst van de lezingen op 8 maart treft u in deze Mars in Cathedra aan. De andere twee lezingen worden in het januari-nummer gepubliceerd.

# Experiences of and lessons learned from peacekeeping

General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain
*Chief of the Defence Staff of The Canadian Armed Forces*

## Introduction

I am delighted to be a guest in your beautiful country and to have the opportunity to address such a distinguished gathering. I would like to acknowledge the work of the Netherlands Association for International Affairs, the Royal Netherlands Association of Military Science and the Netherlands-Canada Committee in organizing this special series of lectures, and the generous sponsorship of the ING Group. The fiftieth Anniversary of the Liberation of the Netherlands and the end of the Second World War in Europe is fast approaching. We should not miss an opportunity to remember the sacrifice our countries made in the name of peace and freedom a half-century ago.

Today, I have been asked to speak about peacekeeping. Both our countries have proud records in this area and Canada has played a major role in peacekeeping since it was first shown to be a useful tool in managing and settling international disputes nearly fifty years ago. Although changes have marked the way in which peacekeeping operations are conducted in recent years, peacekeeping itself has become an ever more important international activity as world-wide peace and stability still remain elusive.

I intend to focus my remarks today on Canadian peacekeeping experience. I will begin by discussing what lies behind our commitment to peacekeeping. Then, I will examine the historical roots of peacekeeping, and discuss how it has evolved in recent years to encompass a much broader range of activities. I also want to talk in some detail about Canada's contribution to current multilateral operations. And last, I want to discuss how Canada, with its peacekeeping experience, is applying the lessons of the past to come to terms with the new demands facing this increasingly complex and dangerous business.

## The Roots of Canada's Peacekeeping Commitment

Former Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson once said that foreign policy is merely domestic policy with its hat on. If we are to take Mr. Pearson at his word, then it perhaps follows that Canada has played an active role in peacekeeping because it is somehow in our nature or culture. Canada, after all, is a multi-cultural society, built on understanding, tolerance and compromise. Or, as Canadians like to say, we are a society striving for "peace, order and good government".

Moreover, Canadians are thought to be moderate and even-tempered. Pierre Berton, one of our most admired authors, has suggested, with tongue only partly in cheek, that "we are not an impetuous people.... Like the Mounted Police, we prefer to ask questions first and shoot only as a last resort".

The argument follows that, as Canadians, we have an inherent ability to help resolve conflict, to act as an honest broker. The Canadian Historian F.H. Soward, writing just before the Suez Crisis in 1956, noted that the role of the conciliator "only rarely calls for dramatic interventions or rhetorical displays. It calls instead for patient explorations and friendly suggestions, for persistence in the search for workable compromises, and for persuasiveness in their presentation". He went on to say that the civility, compassion and restraint of Canadians made us naturals for the job.

The extent to which the Canadian temperament has shaped our role on the world stage is open to debate. What is certain, however, is that the origins of our support for peacekeeping can be found in our experience of war. Canadians, while a peace-loving people, have several times taken up arms in defence of their way of life and their ideals, and we participated in two World Wars this century because we believed we could not escape the impact of the events overseas. Canadians made a significant contribution to Allied victory in these conflicts, whether on the ground, at sea or in the air. More than 100.000 Canadian men and women lost their lives fighting for peace and democracy in such places as St. Julien, Courcelette, Vimy, Cambrai, Hong Kong, Dieppe, Ortona, Caen, and, of course, the Scheldt. This was a high price for any country to pay especially one with such a small population.

The experience of these wars taught the Canadians that, even in times of apparent peace, our

security is never assured. Canada also understood that effective multilateral institutions can help ensure security and stability, and if necessary, respond to aggression should other measures fail. For this reason, we supported the creation of the United Nations (UN) near the end of the Second World War. As a so-called 'middle power', we recognized the merits of a system of collective security as envisioned in the UN.

For several decades, successive Canadian governments have argued that a stable, rules-based international environment is an absolute necessity for Canada's continued security and prosperity. Geographically, Canada is an immense country with only a sparse population. Our commitment to multilateralism helps us address the security needs that arise from these qualities. Canada's well-being is also dependent on its ability to trade freely with other nations, which requires a peaceful, stable international order. Moreover, as a responsible member of the world community, we have a moral reason to assist, if possible, when these values are threatened.

One of Canada's central foreign policy objectives has been to work with the international community - either through the UN or other multilateral organizations - for the creation of a secure world environment. Canada has been and remains a strong supporter of peacekeeping as a useful instrument for resolving conflict.

**The Origins of Peacekeeping**

The idea that war is a problem needing solution is relatively new in international history. The efforts of the United Nations have had much to do with this development. The UN Charter commits its members to make every attempt "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

The experience of the Second World War left an indelible impression on the framers of the UN Charter. Chapter VII is entitled, *Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression*. It sets out possible enforcement actions that might be ordered by the Security Council in response to military aggression. Chapter VII was applied in the case of the Korean War. Chapter VI - entitled *The Pacific Settlement of Disputes* - encourages warring parties to settle their own differences, while at the same time authorizing the Security Council to recommend to the international community ways in which it might help resolve the conflict.

The expression 'peacekeeping', is nowhere mentioned in the Charter. Its most logical basis is found in Article 40, which authorizes the Security Council to urge warring parties to adopt a variety of "provisional measures" while peacemaking or diplomatic efforts are pursued. These provisional measures lie at the very heart of peacekeeping operations.

The term 'peacekeeping' came into common usage only with the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force during the 1956 Suez Crisis. It applies to those efforts that fall somewhere between Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter - what some people wryly refer to as 'Chapter Six and a Half'. Prior to Suez, the United Nations had authorized the use of military personnel for "peace observation" or "truce supervisory" purposes. In the years following the end of the Second World War, unarmed but clearly identified military personnel were deployed to observe peace agreements in some of the world's trouble spots.

Suez posed a more difficult challenge. It was the most serious crisis faced by the United Nations since the Korean War, and called for an imaginative response by the international community. When the UN Security Council was unable to reach a decision, Lester B. Pearson, then Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, came up with the idea of establishing an international UN Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities.

Pearson was United Nations Emergency Force's (UNEF) champion when others were sceptical, and he stage-managed the diplomacy that turned theory into reality more quickly than anyone at the time could have predicted. The time had come, Pearson told the General Assembly, when the UN should not only bring about a cease-fire but police it and make arrangements for a political settlement. Otherwise, six months later, another crisis would inevitably emerge. Quoting Shakespeare, he suggested that "out of this nettle, danger we pluck this flower, safety". Pearson, for his efforts, was awarded the Nobel Peace Price in 1957.

I should add that the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, established guiding principles for the deployment of UNEF which continue to be applied to UN peacekeeping missions even today. They include the consent of the warring parties to the composition and the deployment of the UN Force; the impartiality and independence of the Force; and the requirement that UN personnel remain lightly-armed and highly visible.

Peacekeeping remained substantially unchanged over the next thirty-five years. The great powers did not participate directly in UN peacekeeping operations because of ideological differences and, for some, because of colonial entanglements. During the Cold War Canada was well suited to contribute to peacekeeping missions, and we served in many areas - the Congo, Cyprus, Indo-China, West New Guinea, the Sinai, to mention but a few.

Since 1947, more than 100.000 Canadians have rotated through over thirty different peacekeeping and related operations, a contribution which remains unparalleled.

**Contemporary Peacekeeping**

With the end of the Cold War, we have seen a more active and assertive Security Council with a stronger commitment to peace, order, stability and justice. Indeed, the UN has authorized more peacekeeping operations in the past six years than during the past four decades. There has also been what might be called a more intrusive approach to international security, where humanitarian issues and human rights are growing concerns. As a result, the UN has given peacekeepers increasingly demanding tasks.

The new missions represent the international response to the swift and sometimes violent changes that accompanied the end of super-power rivalry. They go beyond traditional peacekeeping and observer missions, and perhaps come under the more generic term of 'peace support operations'. They are multi-faceted and encompass a broad range of military and civilian activity. This new generation of multilateral operations includes preventive deployment, as witnessed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and post-conflict peacebuilding, as in Cambodia.

The civilian dimension of these missions deserves mention. More and more, civilians and military personnel work side by side in peace support operations, especially in the area of peacebuilding. While soldiers carry out critical tasks like mine clearance, civilians in the field are no less important. They include police officers, election observers, human rights and humanitarian workers, engineers, infrastructure specialists, and administrators. Civilians, Canadians included, have made significant contributions in countries such as Cambodia, El Salvador, and Haiti.

But there is another type of peace support operation which relies on military muscle for its effectiveness. It uses armed force to enforce the will of the international community - not only in cases of conflict between states but within states as well. These more robust forces have enforced economic sanctions and arms embargoes; provided security for the delivery of humanitarian aid; enforced no-fly zones; and protected safe areas.

Thus far, these types of missions have achieved varying degrees of success. In Bosnia-Hercegovina and Somalia, perhaps the two most celebrated cases, an end to conflict has not been achieved, although the UN has carried out its mandate of delivering humanitarian aid. In the process, peacekeeping forces have saved countless lives.

At the same time, peacekeepers have been put at increasing risk. Parties to disputes within states at times seem less willing to accept the interposition of UN Forces. Increasingly, the latter have been attacked by the various groups they were sent to help. Peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia are frequently interfered with, or attacked, and tragically there have been numerous peacekeepers killed or seriously wounded there.

**Current Canadian Commitments**

Despite these dangers, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is still rooted in the fundamental belief that a stable international order sustained by a multinational consensus is critical to Canada's peace, security and well-being.

For that reason, we continue to participate in a large number of peacekeeping missions, invariably linked to our foreign policy in some way. In Europe, where we invested so heavily in two World Wars and are now involved in the former Yugoslavia; Cyprus, where the stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Southern Flank was at risk; in Cambodia, where our growing reliance on a secure Pacific Rim has become an important dimension of our foreign policy; in Rwanda, where Canada has had a missionary and Francophonie presence for decades; and in Central America and the Caribbean, where we have 'backyard' and Organization of American States (OAS) connections. Even in those cases where humanitarian concerns demand a response - Somalia, for example - Canada still has a stake in ensuring regional stability.

Despite our record Canada's commitment to peacekeeping is not taken for granted at home. Given the increasing complexity of peace support operations, as well as our own dwindling

defence resources, Canada measures all potential operations against a series of factors that include, among others: the broad political and foreign policy context; the overall mission requirements; and, of course, our military capability.

These considerations force Canada to assess a wide range of potential missions, from preventive deployment and traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding and enforcement actions. At the same time, we are careful they do not develop into immutable criteria that limit flexibility. I will talk in more detail about guidelines in a moment.

Today, some 3000 Canadian Forces personnel are serving around the world and they will soon be joined by another 500. The scope and nature of our current operations are significant. Our commitments range in size from headquarters personnel and military observers to larger contingents based on major combat units.

We provide an aircraft twice a year for the rotation of the Headquarters of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. 216 Canadian Forces personnel serve on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria, providing logistic and communications support to the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

In the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), a mechanized infantry battalion is engaged in a traditional peacekeeping mission, monitoring a fragile cease-fire between Krajina Serbs and Croatian forces in the UN Protected Area in Southern Croatia. We, like our fellow UNPROFOR colleagues, are waiting with interest to see whether the Croatian Government makes good on its threat to expel UN peacekeepers at the end of the month.

In Bosnia, centered around Vesoko north of Sarajevo, a mixed armoured and infantry battalion - in addition to traditional peacekeeping roles - also provides security for the delivery of humanitarian relief convoys.

Bosnia-Hercegovina provides a variety of examples of new trends of peacekeeping. Canadians deployed from Croatia to open the Sarajevo Airport to humanitarian flights in the summer of 1992. In the spring of 1993 Canadians were sent to the small enclave of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Hercegovina - the first example of a UN safe area. Troops from your country replaced them a year ago, and are still doing outstanding work there in a very difficult, dangerous but crucial mission.

Our operations in the Balkans are not limited to participation in UNPROFOR. We have a frigate monitoring UN sanctions, a Hercules aircraft flying humanitarian aid into Sarajevo, and personnel aboard NATO Airborne Early Warning aircraft monitoring the UN-authorized no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In Rwanda at one point, a Canadian Forces Hercules was the only air link between that country and the outside world. The 200 medical personnel and the 300 strong Signals unit we had in Rwanda was returned to Canada recently. Currently we have 120 personnel with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), including a logistic unit of 80 soldiers and a 40-member support unit for UNAMIR headquarters and other components. A Canadian major-general serves as the UNAMIR Force Commander.

Twelve Canadians are serving at the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) under the auspices of the UN Development Program. They conduct mine-awareness programs, clearance training, and the planning of mine-clearance operations to deal with the estimated six to ten million mines remaining throughout Cambodia.

There are numerous Canadian observers and staff officers serving with missions in Kuwait, the Sinai, Cyprus, Israel, Iraq and Korea. But the last operation I would mention is in Haiti. Canadian warships monitored and enforced UN sanctions there and Canadian observers monitored the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. At the moment, a Canadian contingent of about 500 personnel is being deployed with the United Nations Mission to Haiti (UNMIH).

The new Canadian defence policy makes it clear that, given the country's serious financial crisis, cuts to the defence budget have been unavoidable. But the Government's commitment to peacekeeping and related operations has actually been strengthened. Canada will add 3000 soldiers to the field force army, which carries the burden of our peacekeeping operations. Canada is prepared to contribute multi-purpose land, sea and air forces of up to 10.000 personnel to multilateral operations - including peacekeeping - for a limited period of time.

We have also increased our commitment of stand-by sea, land and air forces, to be capable of deploying to 4000 personnel and sustaining them for an indefinite period. By the end of this month some 3500 will be so deployed. Canada will also make available, for limited periods, me-

dical personnel, signals units and engineers in humanitarian relief roles.

I should stray from the subject of peacekeeping for a moment and talk about war-fighting. Canada's army, navy and air force are structured, organized, manned, trained and equipped for war. Since the end of the Cold War we, like most other countries, have had to reduce defence spending and the size of our standing forces. But those that are left continue to maintain core combat functions. Thus we have the ability to field the ten-thousand-strong sea, land and air expeditionary commitment I just mentioned. Our field forces are designed to fight.

Some would have it that with the Cold War over, and fiscal problems at home, Canada is turning to peacekeeping as the main *raison d'etre* of our Armed Forces. That is not the case. But our experience of peacekeeping over the past forty years has demonstrated to us that those who are prepared for the war are those best suited to do other tasks, like peacekeeping. Certainly our recent experiences in the former Yugoslavia, in Somalia and in Rwanda have underlined the importance of the combat imperative for the effective peacekeeping forces.

For Canada, peacekeeping is not a residual function. We take it seriously, and we give our war-trained personnel the additional specialised training and the sensitization that is required for peacekeeping in a given theatre. But our Armed Forces' reason for being is to meet the defence requirements of our nation and our allies, first and foremost, and that includes readiness for war.

**Lessons for the Future**

Although the Cold War is over, the world is neither more peaceful nor more stable than in the past. The use of force remains a central feature of international affairs. Numerous regions throughout the world are torn apart by conflict, and with the massive global changes of recent years there is little room for optimism.

The challenge for the global community is to create institutions and mechanisms that can meet the threats to international security as we approach the twenty-first century. The UN represents the will of the international community, but it must rely on the support of its member states. Because of the scope and the complexity of modern peacekeeping operations, the UN has had to call upon regional organizations to play a greater role in conflict resolution, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Canadians have decades of experience working with the UN, and we are one of the original members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the OSCE. Thus the international community associates Canada with a tradition of peacekeeping expertise. We have a wealth of experience in preparing, deploying, sustaining and repatriating peacekeeping forces of various sizes. More recently, we have been in the vanguard of new concepts, including preventing deployment, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the protection of safe areas. But each mission has been unique an we have been able to learn new and valuable lessons about peacekeeping.

We have identified certain characteristics in purpose, design and operational conduct of peacekeeping missions that enhance their prospects for success. In terms of purpose, an operation should address genuine threats to international peace and security or emerging humanitarian tragedies. It should also be part of a comprehensive strategy aimed at securing long-term achievable solutions. Peacekeeping should not become an impediment to problem-solving, as some might suggest it has become in case of the force that has been in Cyprus since 1964.

We believe in the need for clear and enforceable mandates. Finite political direction representing the will of the international community is critical to the success of peacekeeping missions. Increasingly, mandates have been left open to interpretation. At times they have evolved too quickly, challenging the capabilities of peacekeepers on the ground. What is needed is more precise mandates and peacekeepers arriving in theatre trained and equipped to carry them out.

Peacekeeping missions must reflect the political will of the international community and enjoy the community's full support. Support extends not only to the provision of personnel and equipment but to funding as well.

Some other design principles should be kept in mind: an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority; an effective process of consultation among mission partners; a recognized focus of authority; a clear and efficient division of responsibilities; and agreed operating procedures in missions involving both civilian and military components.

From an operational perspective, the fundamental lesson Canada has learned is that the best peacekeepers are well-trained and suitably-

equipped military personnel. We believe our peacekeepers have the reputation they do because of their combat training. More than ever it equips them with the complete range of skills and level of professionalism needed to meet the challenges of peacekeeping. With peace support operations posing ever-greater challenges, we see no reason to change our approach. At the same time, we are committed to enhancing training in such areas as cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law and dispute resolution.

We have identified other operational guidelines. The size, training and equipment of the force must be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission. As well, there must be a confined concept of the operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement that do not put peacekeepers at unacceptable risk.

Canada has joined other nations in helping the UN improve its ability to manage and maintain peacekeeping operations. We have nine military personnel working at UN Headquarters in New York to help improve the Secretariat's ability to carry out missions. A Canadian major-general serves as the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, and other Canadians assist the UN in such areas as finance, logistics and transportation.

You will be familiar with the UN Secretary-General's paper of June 1992 entitled *An Agenda for Peace*. The ideas expressed in this document were contributed by UN member states, including Canada. In April of 1992, Canada, along with the Nordic countries, Australia and New Zealand, jointly submitted a paper to the Secretary-General on preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Canada has been an active participant in peacekeeping conferences and other international fora. We hosted a meeting in 1994 in Ottawa of leading peacekeeping troop contributors and UN staff to address ways of making UN peacekeeping more effective. The follow-up meeting in New York produced a series of papers which the greater international community is now examining.

At his speech to the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1994, our Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that Canada would lead a study on improving the UN's reaction capability in times of crisis. The study is now under way and it is expected that the results will be submitted to the next General Assembly in September 1995.

Canada has long called maintained forces on stand-by for possible UN duty, but our Government believes the time has come to explore other possibilities. As The Economist magazine recently suggested, before the UN can put out a fire at present, it must first build the fire station from scratch each time. Canada is well-aware that the Netherlands is looking into the possibility of establishing a permanent Rapid Reaction Force. Our officials have been in close contact to coordinate our respective efforts.

Finally, the Canadian Government has provided funding to establish a private and independent peacekeeping research and education centre at the former Canadian Forces Base, Cornwallis, in Nova Scotia - the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre. As part of its mandate, it will sponsor peacekeeping training for military personnel from other countries.

**Conclusion**

At the end of the Second World War, the framers of the United Nations Charter put in place a system that seemed, on paper at least, to hold unlimited potential for promoting international peace and security. With the onset of the Cold War the dream was quickly shattered. The UN, as a result, was forced to improvise. Peacekeeping, born of necessity to help prevent a greater conflict during this period, served its purpose well during the decades of the East-West confrontation.

Canadians are proud of their peacekeeping record. They hold their Armed Forces in high esteem and continue to support the Canadian Forces in their role as peacekeepers. We are, I believe, the only nation in the world that has erected a monument to peacekeepers.

We will continue to play an important role in the international peacekeeping community. Although the direct military threat to North America is greatly diminished, Canada cannot escape the consequences of regional conflict, whether in form of refugee flows, environmental degradation, obstacles to trade, or threats to important principles such as the rule of law, respect for human rights or the peaceful settlement of conflict. Given the long-standing values of our society, Canadians expect their Government to respond when they witness violence, suffering and genocide in many parts of the world.

We realize the road ahead will have its rough patches. With the end of the Cold War the international community is seeking to discover how

the United Nations can play a more useful role in today's international environment. As the UN's fiftieth anniversary approaches, we are still finding our way.

At the moment, we are witnessing the rapid growth and difficult maturing of contemporary peacekeeping in a changing world. It is a period of great challenge, marked at times by failure and disappointment. But there has also been success. Important lessons are being learned, and new concepts developed. This trend must continue if peacekeeping is to remain a constructive tool.

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## Dick A. Leurdijk

*Senior research fellow and UN expert at The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael*


I have understood General de Chastelain's introduction mainly as a plea for multilateralism and Canada's active involvement in UN missions. That approach is similar to the traditional and present Dutch position with regard to the United Nations (UN). Here we see, what I would like to call, 'like-mindedness'.

Canada's contribution to peacekeeping is, in the words of the General, still rooted in "a premise of Canadian security policy"; namely that a stable international order is critical to Canada's peace and security and well-being. I found it very interesting to understand how Canada links its participation in peacekeeping to explicit foreign policy considerations, such as the security of Europe, the stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Southern Flank, regional security in the Pacific Rim, its historical presence in Rwanda, its 'backyard' connections and humanitarian concerns.

A similar debate, these days, is taking place in the Netherlands; of course, with similar considerations of national interest - Dutch membership in the UN, criteria for the use of Dutch personnel in UN missions, etc.

After having listened to General de Chastelain, I realized that Canada and the Netherlands, apart from their common involvement in the Second World War and Canada's role in the Dutch liberation in 1945, have more in common:

1) both countries share a 'peacekeeping experience', based on a strong commitment to peacekeeping (at present, 3000 and 2500 troops, respectively);
2) both were among the founding fathers of the UN;
3) both are committed to multilateralism, including multilateral institutions;
4) both are committed to the rule of law in international relations and share the need for a peaceful, stable international order and a moral imperative to become involved;
5) both share an interest in the development of instruments for maintaining international peace and security; and, finally,
6) both share an interest in the idea of a UN rapid reaction capability.

General de Chastelain's statements lead to a number of interrelated conceptual, political and operational reactions from my side.

**Peacekeeping: A Primary Task of the Armed Forces**

General De Chastelain emphasized, as far as the tasks of the Canadian Armed Forces are concerned, the importance of the linkage between peacekeeping, on the one hand, and the need to prepare for war, on the other hand, the combination of which he defined as "the combat imperative for effective peacekeeping forces".

A similar 'dual-capability' approach can be identified for the Dutch Armed Forces, as a consequence of Dutch membership in both NATO and the UN. In the official defence-policy paper, called Priorities Review, published in early 1993, two main tasks of the Armed Forces were identified as follows:

1) "To protect the integrity of national and allied territory and to protect national territory against threats resulting from participation in crisis management operations";
2) "To carry out crisis management operations as part of Dutch security policy".

The first main task is directly related to Dutch membership in NATO, and takes into account the implications, as defined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, of that membership:

***"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all..."***

The second main task is, mainly, a direct consequence of the Dutch membership in the UN, taking into account the new role, with the end of the Cold War, for the UN in maintaining international peace and security, coupled to the conceptual framework of Boutros-Ghali's *An Agen-*

*da for Peace*, in terms of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian assistance or intervention.

A similar 'mutual assistance' provision as in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, however, cannot be found in the UN Charter - although Article 49 of the Charter says:

***"The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council."***

But the UN Charter has a different international legal status, as compared to the NATO Treaty. Thus, Article 49 of the UN Charter does not have the status of an obligation, taking into account the non-committal character of the UN Charter, and thus UN membership. Member states are not obliged to make available troops for UN operations, that is a political choice made by the member states themselves and - this should be emphasized - on their terms (taking into account the constraints, or, the basics of peacekeeping, such as the consent of the parties to a conflict, the neutral status of the UN and the principle of the non-use of force, except in self-defence).

At the national level, the implications of the involvement of member states in providing troops for UN missions, among others, are:
- the political dimension of the willingness, in principle, to make available 'national contingents', since there is no international legal obligation to provide troops for UN operations;
- the explicit *ad hoc* character of the decision-making process, avoiding any automaticity, taking into account the political and military risks involved in each separate conflict situation;
- the involvement of the parliament in the decision-making process to provide national units for UN missions; and, finally,
- the so-called opt-out clause, giving member states the right unilaterally to withdraw their contingents on their conditions (like the Netherlands did in 1985, when it decided to withdraw its contingent in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), justifying its decision by pointing to the life-threatening situation for the military, and UNIFIL's impotence to implement its mandate and reach a political solution).

**The Concept of Peacekeeping**

In discussing the concept of peacekeeping, General de Chastelain made an interesting comparison with the traditional performance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, based on: ask questions first and shoot only as a last resort. This approach has been a basic feature of the concept of peacekeeping, as originally defined by Lester Pearson, a Canadian former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Peacekeeping, as traditionally understood, suggests the deployment of a UN Force, creating the conditions for negotiations aimed at finding a political solution for the problem at hand. The concept, at the same time, is characterized by a number of constraints: the explicit consent of the parties to a conflict with UN presence in the conflict area (giving them, in fact, a right of veto: i.e., without consent, no UN presence); impartiality by the UN - avoiding taking sides in the conflict; light armaments, emphasizing the peaceful intentions of the UN presence; the principle of the non-use of force except in self-defence; and the composition of a peacekeeping force on the basis of national contingents. The combined effect of this approach reflects a deliberate effort, on the part of troop contributing countries, at minimalization of the risks for the military acting under the UN flag.

**New Peacekeeping**

I agree with General de Chastelain's comments on the increasingly complex character of contemporary peacekeeping.Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has shown a new dynamism in performing its task to preserve international peace and security, both conceptually and qualitatively. More and more the role of the UN has to be understood in terms of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, and humanitarian assistance or intervention - a conceptual framework developed both in Boutros-Ghali's An *Agenda for Peace* (1992) and the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995). Since the Gulf War, the UN has undertaken more peacekeeping operations than ever before. At the same time, the nature of UN involvement in the field has changed, because the conflicts themselves have changed. In traditional conflicts between states, peacekeeping operations were primarily of a military character, involving the deployment of a peacekeeping force after a cease-fire or a peaceplan had been agreed with monitoring tasks (monitoring a cease-fire, monitoring a buffer zone, and/or monitoring the disengagement of troops). Under contemporary circumstances, the UN involvement concerns primarily conflicts within states, the so-called intra-state conflicts. This has led to:
- the involvement not only of regular armies, but also of militias, warlords, factions, armed civilians, etc.;

- the involvement of civilians as victims and often as deliberate targets;
- an increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- the collapse of state institutions, such as the government, police, judiciary, etc. (the issue of 'failed states').

Contemporary peacekeeping operations no longer have an exclusive military character; they are characterized by what General de Chastelain mentioned, the 'civilian dimension' (police and civilian officers), coinciding with an unprecedented variety of functions, including, as summarized by Boutros-Ghali:

***"the supervision of cease-fires; the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons ('micro-disarmament'); the design and implementation of demining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction."***

The increasingly complex character of UN involvement has also led to increased risks for UN personnel, who in some instances even became deliberate targets for the parties in conflict situations (e.g., Cambodia, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia). Underscoring this aspect of the growing involvement of the UN in crisis management at the internal level, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali already indicated in 1992, in his *An Agenda for Peace*, possible consequences of this development:

***"Given the pressing need to afford adequate protection to UN personnel engaged in life-endangering circumstances, I recommend that the Security Council, unless it elects immediately to withdraw the UN presence in order to preserve the credibility of the Organizations, gravely consider what action should be taken towards those who put UN personnel in danger. Before deployment takes place, the Council should keep open the option of considering in advance collective measures, possibly including those under Chapter VII when a threat to international peace and security is also involved, to come into effect should the purpose of the UN operations systematically be frustrated and hostilities occur."***

It was only under the pressure of developments in the field in Bosnia-Hercegovina that the Security Council, in 1994, introduced the concept of close air support, calling in NATO fighter planes for the explicit protection of UN military both in Bosnia and Croatia[1].

The increasingly complex character of the UN involvement has also been illustrated by the development of a series of new concepts which have become relevant for the functioning of peacekeeping operations, such as no-fly zones, safe havens, safe areas, and United Nations Protected Areas - raising questions about the powers and military means, or the lack thereof, to monitor or enforce the measures, and, ultimately, about the intentions of the Security Council in taking decisions - in not, or insufficiently, providing the means to implement them. A main issue in this respect is the linkage between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, two policy options which, conceptually, were completely at odds with each other, but were deliberately linked to each other in the UN role in the former Yugoslavia.

**The Conceptual Debate**

General de Chastelain's statements concerned peacekeeping; on the one hand he argues - and I agree - that the concept of peacekeeping has no formal basis in the UN Charter. Apart from the question whether Article 40, as he has said, is perhaps the most logical basis for peacekeeping, it surprises me to see that, in dealing with contemporary peacekeeping[2], he discusses what he describes as "peace support operations", defining them (a) as recent missions which "go beyond traditional peacekeeping" and (b) "another type of peace support operation", which uses armed force to enforce the will of the international community.

Here I disagree with General de Chastelain, if I may do so, for two reasons. Firstly, it is of fundamental importance to differentiate between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. A peacekeeping operation is such, even in those recent cases which go beyond traditional peacekeeping. What counts is the mandate for the operation as determined by the Security Council. What counts are also the so-called 'basics' for peacekeeping operations, as indicated above. A peace-enforcement operation is fun-

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[1] See: Dick A. Leurdijk, *The United Nations and NATO on former Yugoslavia. Partners in International Cooperation*, The Hague, September 1994.

[2] Article 40 of the UN Charter has not been written with peacekeeping in mind - a concept still to be invented in the fifties - , and certainly was not drafted for internal situations within member states - a concept that became policy relvant only in the nineties!

damentally different from a peacekeeping operation, taking into account (a) the principle of acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (implying the absence of the need of consent), (b) calling upon member states individually or through regional organizations to help implement resolutions, (c) the power to use all measures necessary (the power to use force), and (d) the availability of the necessary heavy military means.

This brings me to my second point of criticism: peacekeeping indeed, has no formal basis in the UN Charter; peace-enforcement, however, does have an explicit basis in in the Charter, namely Chapter VII.

For a good understanding of the on-going debate, therefore, I think, it might be useful to make a differentiation between three levels of debate:

1) peacekeeping, taking into account traditional and more recent missions;
2) peace-enforcement under Chapter VII (economic and military sanctions); and, finally,
3) the linkage between peacekeeping and the other elements of Boutros-Ghali's conceptual framework:

- peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy (e.g.: the deployment of UN Forces in Macedonia along the border with Serbia);
- peacekeeping and peacemaking: the traditional linkage which suggests that peacekeeping is a function of the peacemaking process. This means, in other words, that the deployment of a peacekeeping force is meant to create the conditions for peacemaking, the negotiations necessary to find a political solution for the conflict;
- peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance: the involvement of the UN in former Yugoslavia led to a new form of interagency-cooperation between two UN organizations: the so-called United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR)-United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) model, with UNHCR being the lead agency for the humanitarian aid operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and UNPROFOR providing military protection within the traditional peacekeeping guidelines;
- peacekeeping and post conflict peacebuilding, aimed at rebuilding a scattered society after a conflict with the help of the international community, creating the conditions for avoiding a relapse into conflict. One illustration can be mine-clearance programmes, with the aim of creating conditions for both the functioning of a peacekeeping operation as well as a return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes;
- peacekeeping and peace-enforcement: probably the most hotly debated and most sensitive issue in the present circumstances in the former Yugoslavia. While it is conceptually impossible to combine peacekeeping and enforcement action in one UN operation, this is exactly what the Security Council did when it decided to enforce (a) the no-fly zone in the air space above Bosnia-Hercegovina, (b) the six safe areas in Bosnia and (c) the security of UNPROFOR personnel through the use of force, by calling upon NATO to provide the necessary air strike capability. The possible use of air power, however, led to much confusion, both in terms of the conditions necessary for acting, the division of labour between UN and NATO, including the double key formula, and the possible negative repercussions of acting on the safety of UN personnel, the UN's peacemaking efforts and the humanitarian relief effort of the international community. The experiences in the former Yugoslavia in linking peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, which called into question the credibility both of NATO and the UN, led Boutros-Ghali to the following warning:

***"(...) nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so. The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate. To blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and endanger its personnel. (...) Peacekeeping and the use of force (other than in self-defence) should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum, permitting easy transition from one to the other".***[3]

**The Future Course**

It is often said that the main problem of the lack of effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is their lack of clarity with respect to the mandate: what are they supposed to do? I believe, however, that that is only part of the problem. The question should be: what is the goal of the mission, what are the peacekeepers supposed to do, and how (the concept of operation), with what powers and with what means? The mandate of each operation is defined in the relevant Security Council resolutions - which are the outcome of sometimes complicated political negotiation processes. This explains why under some circumstances decisions of the Council are deliberately kept vague. In other cases, manda-

[3] S/1995/1, January 3, 1995.

tes are being formulated without any indication of the means necessary - both in terms of personnel and equipment - for their implementation. As far as the powers of a mission are concerned, it should be clear whether the mission is a peacekeeping operation or peace-enforcement action. In the latter case (resolutions on the use of force), the Security Council explicitly indicates that it is:

(a) acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (thereby identifying a situation as a threat to international peace and security (Article 39);
(b) calling upon member states individually or through regional organisations or arrangements (such as NATO in the case of the former Yugoslavia);
(c) giving those states the right to use all measures necessary (UN jargon for the use of force).

But even if the UN has delegated its powers to use force, that is not by definition a guarantee for success, as the UN operation in Somalia has shown. In the past few years the Security Council has been acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in situations of so-called humanitarian emergencies, always stressing the exceptional character of the situation (such as in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti), demanding an exceptional response, aimed at ending a humanitarian disaster, large scale violations of international humanitarian law, establishing a secure and safe environment for the provision of humanitarian relief and even restoring democracy.

A further strengthening of the role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security, by definition, implies the full support of member states in providing the necessary personnel and military means, either individually or through regional organizations, or *ad hoc* coalitions - given the dependency of the UN on its constituency, the member states, as long as there is no independent UN Force. They will have to reconcile their conceptions of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement with their perceptions of national or vital interests, including questions of command and control, the rules of engagement and the acceptability of risks in performing military functions under the UN flag. These same states also have to make available the necessary financial resources as long as the UN has no autonomous source of income.

**Rapid Reaction Force**

I do not know whether it was coincidental, but at the UN General Assembly in September 1994, both Canada and the Netherlands showed a common interest in the establishment of a UN Rapid Reaction Force. Canada's Foreign Minister Ouellet, speaking about the need for a strengthening of the UN's rapid response capability in times of crisis in particular, suggested "to study the possibility, over the long term, of creating a permanent UN military force". His Dutch counterpart, Van Mierlo, suggested "the establishment of a full-time, professional, at all times available and rapidly deployable UN Brigade". Both Ministers justified their suggestions in referring to the experiences, in 1994, in Rwanda, stressing (a) the need for a rapid deployment of forces in a humanitarian emergency situation, and (b) the inadequacy of the existing procedures for peacekeeping operations, in particular the UN system of stand-by arrangements. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, arguing along the same lines, in his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, also recommended the idea of a Rapid Reaction Force, to be deployed "when there was an emergency need for peacekeeping troops", comprised of national units. In a reaction to Boutros-Ghali's position paper, the Security Council, while encouraging the Secretary-General to continue his study of options, said: "The Council believes that the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing stand-by arrangements", for peacekeeping purposes.
One of the most crucial issues in the debate will have to be the question whether the Force will have peacekeeping or enforcement powers. Given the fact that, under the present circumstances, the Security Council is not yet interested in Boutros-Ghali's suggestion on a Rapid Reaction Force for peacekeeping, both Canada and the Netherlands know where the Security Council has drawn the line on the drawing table of the international diplomacy. The thinking about the modalities of rapid deployment (as an idea, a force, a capacity or a capability) has only recently begun, with both Canada and the Netherlands in a leading role.

"We are perilously near to a new international anarchy", wrote former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in his first annual report to the General Assembly, in ... 1982! The big question for the coming years will be whether peacekeeping, in the traditional UN sense, is the answer, or whether peacekeeping and peace-enforcement - or for that matter, peacekeeping combined with peace-enforcement - will become the main instruments for maintaining international peace and security. Ultimately, it is about multilateralism, again in the perspective of what in Canada has been described as the 'coming anarchy'!