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Z.K.H. de Prins der Nederlanden

generaal-majoor b.d.
E. R. d'Engelbronner

Z. E. luitenant-generaal b.d.
J. P. Verheijen

luitenant-kolonel b.d.
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R. Neervoort, kol KLu
jhr. mr. J. P. de Savornin Lohman
R. A. A. Klaver, ktz
drs. M. de Haas, kap inf
(public relations)

Redacteur

T. de Kruijf, genm gn b.d.
Inst. Defensie Leergangen
Postbus 20701
2500 ES Den Haag
bezoekadres:
Brasserskade 227a
2289 PA Rijswijk
tel.: (015) 15 27 00

Secretaris

J. Hardenbol, maj cav
Seringenlaan 25
7313 CH Apeldoorn

Penningmeester

M. P. Dekker, kol gn
Odenvelpark 15
3451 XA Vleuten

Ledenadministratie

J. J. M. Nijman
Karel Doormanlaan 274
2283 BB Rijswijk
Tel. (070) 3 94 78 36

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Voordracht

Onder de titel „Diplomacy in a violent environment”, hield generaal-majoor A. van Baal, voormalig Chef Staf Bosnia-Herzegovina Command, op 20 oktober 1994 een voordracht voor onze vereniging in het Defensievoorlichtingscentrum. In de oorspronkelijke opzet van deze avond was sprake van een drieluik: behalve generaal-majoor Van Baal, zouden ook Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, Commandant Bosnia Herzegovina Command en Mr. Sergio de Mello, Head Civil Affairs UNPROFOR, ons over hun ervaringen en inzichten vertellen. Als gevolg van de ontwikkelingen in voormalig Joegoslavië echter moesten beiden laatstgenoemde sprekers op het laatste moment afzeggen. Het navolgende is een weergave van de voordracht van generaal-majoor Van Baal, die om voor de hand liggende redenen in het Engels is gehouden.

Diplomacy in a violent environment

Just before this meeting, Mr. Sergio de Mello sent me the script for his contribution to this evening. In this, he concludes that „UNPROFOR could make a more significant contribution if the Security Council gave clearer and more coherent guidance; if the strategic and political level had greater unity of purpose; and if it was involved more closely in the political negotiations.”

Can UNPROFOR solve the problem? Is it not a mission impossible for me, after these conclusions of Mr. Sergio de Mello, even to try to solve the problem in Bosnia Herzegovina in a military way? You are right, it is impossible. That is why I have chosen a broader approach for Bosnia Herzegovina; perhaps suitable for other missions at least as a chance? My choice is Wider Peacekeeping, i.e. peacekeeping in an other

perspective. In my introduction I shall focus on the tactical operational level. Just to be clear, in my opinion New York and Brussels form the political level; Zagreb HQ UNPROFOR, SACEUR and AFSOUTH (Naples) are at the strategic level; and 5 ATAF (Vincenza) and BH Command form the tactical-operational level. Given the actual situation that a political solution for the conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina is not at hand, the question arises „What is next?“

In my briefing I shall try to evaluate the successful period in this peacekeeping mission in order to extract lessons learned. It is obvious that my period of office as Chief of Staff ended on the 1st of September and that I don't want to comment directly on situations after that period. Furthermore, you will understand that, as the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army, I shall support the official position of the Ministry of Defence on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia; please, let there be no misunderstanding about this. I would like not to focus on operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard. As you shall have heard already several times, both are very, very successful and prove that in these areas NATO has been 100% dominant, effective and ultimately successful in the containment of this conflict.

I shall focus on the humanitarian tasks, the military assistance on the ground and, in relation to the ground operations, air support. But this can not be seen apart from the political implications. If the politicians can not offer an acceptable solution; if there is no real willingness by warring parties to stop the war and go to the negotiating table; if one party can not make a decisive move on the battlefield; if the other party is not allowed to commit genocide, and at last the international community (and that means us) is not willing or able to enforce peace; then we can conclude that the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina has reached a stalemate. Apart from the tragic aspect of this situation for the people in Bosnia Herzegovina as such, UNPROFOR has succeeded in the period between February and July in helping to create a relatively stable situation.

Apparently, however, this is no longer in the interest of the warring parties at all and perhaps that is why both are creating severe problems for the continuation of the peace process. The continuous attacks on the area of Illias and on the DMZ on Mount Igman by the Muslims, as well as the strangulation of Sarajevo and the other enclaves by the Serbs are only minor examples.

But let us go back to the beginning of the peace process.

From the very start, the mission in Bosnia Herzegovina was purely humanitarian. A study of

the text of the Security Council Resolution 761 from June 1992 for the creation of a separate force for Bosnia Herzegovina clearly shows the limits of the mandate. It reads: „and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel; in the absence of such cooperation, the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs.“

The mission of the ground forces (BHC) was formulated as follows: „Provide military assistance to UNHCR and approved organizations and agencies involved in humanitarian activities.“

This means no more and no less than to establish conditions favorable for:

1. the evacuation of the wounded;
2. protection and care of the people;
3. the improvement of the living conditions;
4. to help UNHCR and others to help refugees and displaced persons and to deliver food, medical supplies and other essential stocks.

The medical involvement was extremely limited and primarily focused on the support to humanitarian agencies, transport of stocks and trying to help negotiators to bring the parties together. Although the use of force was permitted in the provision of humanitarian aid, it was obvious that the possibilities of applying force were extremely limited and risky. The general feeling was that the provision of humanitarian aid and the use of force were incompatible.

Although several peace initiatives seemed to be very hopeful, the outcome was that the war continued and that the humanitarian situation deteriorated extremely fast.

In 1993 the international press played a crucial role in keeping the tragedy of the strangulation of Sarajevo and Srebrenica on the television screens. General Morillon used this to launch his ideas about the demilitarization of Srebrenica and to create safe areas. For the first time Security Council Resolution 836 expressed the real concern of the international community to stop the genocide of the Muslim population in Gorazde, Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo. This resolution was to be respected, but unfortunately it was proven that, like in many other situations, the international community was focused on the initiative itself and not on its implementation.

In Security Council Resolution 836, the preconditions for effective implementation are quite clear: military presence of UN troops, determination of the boundaries of the safe areas and demilitarization of the civilian and military people in the safe areas. Instead of insisting on the proper execution of the Security Council Resolution, the international organization formulated

and accepted a serie of new Security Council Resolutions. The warring factions aware of the absence of a deterrent UN Force misused the situation, especially the Serbs, as showed in their operations against Muslims and Croats. And please, don't forget the continuous fighting on a lower scale (but at least as severe) between Muslims and Croats. Everyone will remember the events in the last month of 1993 and January 1994.

In the meantime, the UN had discovered that a strong political team was necessary to support the military in former Yugoslavia. A very successful special representative of the Secretary General, Mr. Akashi, was appointed and after a few months one of his assistants in the mission in Cambodia, Mr. de Mello, was appointed Head of Civil Affairs, with a very positive attitude towards solving the problem and returning peace to the Balkans. They immediately discovered the real difference with the Cambodian crisis: the absence of peace treaty and the lack of will to cooperate.

In the UK a future BHC Commander made his preparations for taking office. As a Director of the Staff college and, perhaps even more important, with experience in the Falklands and Northern Ireland, Micheal Rose developed an approach to peacekeeping which he called „wider peacekeeping". This concept was based on the following assumptions which, in my opinion, are realistic and generally recognized:

1. as stated before, the war had reached a stalemate situation;
2. the international community was still neither able or willing to enforce peace;
3. every political solution so far had failed, both the Soviet Union and the United States had their own reasons not to get involved in the Balkan war;
4. from a historical perspective, the people in Bosnia Herzegovina had only lived together under foreign suppression or had been dominated by one party;
5. the situation on the ground was clear: the Serbs had won the war, the Muslims and Croats were divided. The legal government was very weak and its forces were ill-equipped, badly trained and without a proper C2 system.
6. the sympathy of world opinion was undoubtedly with the Muslims;
7. every contributing nation and of course the UN bureaucrats feared a longlasting peacekeeping operation (such as the Cyprus Mission) or a sudden deterioration as in Somalia;
8. NATO was still in a restructuring phase and was not in a position to give proper answers to the solution of this problem or to substitute UNPROFOR successfully.

Under these circumstances, Lieutenant General Rose developed his ideas on how to be proactive in his mission. What he really wanted to achieve was a situation stable enough to enable the politicians to bring the parties together. What he needed was the commitment of the contributing nations, the UN in New York and of course the support of both the Special Representative of Secretary General and the Force Commander.

In „commuter" diplomacy he introduced himself to the involved leadership and ordered me to come tot Sarajevo.

What was his basic assumption?

People in the Balkans were used to a situation in which it was possible to live together in a melting pot. These situations are well-known from history. Yet there were even more times when they had live separately. These temporary divorces were usually changed by use of force. Moreover, suppression of one party by the other gave the right, even the obligation, to seek revenge. One should not be blamed for not taking this revenge quickly. It could take one or two generations, bu the most important conclusion is that the use of force is fully accepted in the Balkan culture. People in the Balkans understand the use of justified force. They even do not accept parties which are weak or have abandoned the use of force.

An other observation was also typical of the Cold War era, namely that the former communist countries, including Yugoslavia and especially the JNA, wanted to *control* everyting.

From that perspective it was possible to improve the situation in Bosnia Herzegovina by extending the peacekeeping mission as follows: „Establish favorable conditions for protection and care of the people; cessation of hostilities; and a transition to peace." To make this possible, the military had to transfer from being a supporting force to become proactive by threatening with force or selective use of force.

BHC had to adopt the following concept of operations:

1. stabilize the military situation to encourage the return to normality;
2. enhance military assistance to improve humanitarian aid and make it more visible to the world;
3. to fulfil the mission it is absolutely necessary to have full freedom of movement;
4. make it clear to the people of Bosnia Herzegovina and their leadership that this was must come to an end and that the only way to solve this problem is to go to the negotiating table.

This message should be supported by a targeted public information campaign. The return to normality, improvement of living conditions and

sufficient humanitarian aid should encourage people to convince their leaders to change their attitudes.

How should the concept of operations be launched? Here we touch upon the secret of military leaders. I call it „context management“; General Rose did not give it a name, but he implemented his concept of operations after the massacre on the marketplace on 6 February and in the following weeks. He was supported extremely well by the Force Commander and the political advisors, but, most important, support came from the international community, which had been extremely reluctant until then. The Secretary General had asked NATO to impose an ultimatum on Sarajevo: the ranks had closed! The circumstances were used in a proper way; the 68 lives at the marketplace were not sacrificed for nothing. The successful cooperation between NATO and UNPROFOR made it clear that without losing impartiality and the status of non-combatant the threat with or the selective use of force could be successful for UNPROFOR. In the weeks and months thereafter, this concept was practiced in several occasions by using selective force (Gorazda) or threatening with force (Sarajevo, Gorazde, Bihac, Tuzla, Sapo, Bugogno, etc., etc.).

Selective and proportionate use of force and, if necessary, warning time makes it clear to the parties that UNPROFOR:

- does not want to be a party to the war;
- wants to be non-combatant;
- makes it clear that it is determined to fulfil the mission;
- makes it clear that further fighting is useless, pointless and a waste of energy and young peoples' lives.

The objective is to encourage the parties to solve their problem at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield.

In Bosnia Herzegovina the parties were flabbergasted when they discovered that BH Command was not dealing with the causes of crises, but used crises as the appropriate moment to launch new initiatives. Of course the successes were not endless but they created a situation in which the UN had the initiative.

Can this work again? Yes, in my opinion it can.

The current situation in Bosnia Herzegovina could be used to impose the demilitarization of Sarajevo in the TEZ. This could be a new initiative to leave the current stalemate. Moreover it forces the international community to take the position on the contact group proposal.

At the end of my briefing, which has been far from complete, albeit by force of circumstances, I would like to give you my conclusions.

Humanitarian aid supported by military forces can be successful if under certain circumstances the forces are allowed to use force, selectively, proportionately and if necessary after warning. In that case, there is a real possibility that the forces can stay impartial and non-combatant.

An unsolved political problem can only be contained by long-lasting military peacekeeping commitment.

Every wider peacekeeping operation bears the risk that aspects of peacekeeping or peace-enforcing have to be envisaged once impartiality has been lost, so troops should better be ready for that: they must be equipped for and trained to transfer to that spectrum of peacekeeping operations.

Although history will prove that the BH Command mission was very successful during the first six months of 1994, it is doubtful whether it will be so on the long run. The warring parties will regain *control* of BHC.

NATO's concept of Combined Joint Task Forces can be very helpful in the future to structure the peacekeeping force; however, it does not mean that in reality more NATO must mean more force.

Voordracht

Op 23 november 1994 hield Dr. Mats Berdal, verbonden aan het International Institute for Strategic Studies te Londen, een voordracht over de toekomst van Peacekeeping. Op de goed bezochte bijeenkomst sprak Mr. Berdal onder de titel „Whither UN Peacekeeping: an analysis of the changing military requirement of UN Peacekeeping.“ Het navolgende is een weergave van de tekst van de voordracht.

Beyond Peacekeeping?

Reflections on the Evolution of International Peacekeeping After the Cold War¹

The view that the „international community“ should move „beyond peacekeeping“ has been a persistent theme of academic and policy dis-

¹ This paper is based on a lecture first given at an international conference on the UN organised by the Japanese Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo in June 1994.

cussions about the role of the United Nations in international relations since the revival of UN peacekeeping in the late 1980s. The central premise underlying the call for a more proactive approach to international peace and security on the part of the UN, whether explicitly stated or merely implied, has always been that the end of the Cold War represented a historical disjunction between periods of world politics. According to this view, the end of superpower bipolarity meant that the UN would cease to be what Hans Morgenthau had dismissively described as no more than a „new setting for the old techniques of diplomacy”.² While the goal of world government is still conceded as unrealistic even by the most ardent proponents of a UN-centric „world order”, the end of East-West confrontation meant that the organisation could, at the very least, provide the basis for a more „centrally regulated and well ordered international system”.³

The record of UN involvement in the settlement of regional and internal conflicts between 1988 and 1992 lent some support to this view, and was used to justify the optimism expressed at the first ever Security Council Summit meeting held in January 1992.⁴ The UN's role (albeit peripheral and modest) in facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (UN-GOMAP), its involvement in the transition process from South African rule to independence in Namibia, and its contribution to the peace process in Central America, were all seen as foreshadowing a more constructive pattern of UN involvement in conflict resolution. The UN's legitimising role in support of military action against Iraq in 1991, and the apparent convergence of views among members of the Security Council on issues of international security, convinced many that the paralysing influence of the Cold War would no longer impair the effectiveness of the Security Council as the organ with „primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”⁵

It was also partly against the backdrop of these developments that „peacekeeping” – described as a „growth industry” by the Secretary General in late 1992⁶ – came to be seen as an instrument whose further development would give the UN an even more prominent role in the field of international peace and security. Attempts by academic analysts to develop concepts for operations „beyond peacekeeping” went hand in hand with the actual tendency to downgrade the requirement of consent as a basic for UN action, thus going beyond the „established principles, procedures and practices of peace-keeping”.⁷

This earlier optimism has been profoundly shaken by the experiences of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Somalia and Rwan-

da. Too many observers, the course of events in these places has been taken as evidence of a broader failure on the part of the UN to adapt to the changing circumstances of the post-Cold War era and, in particular, to reform its peacekeeping management practices. It is the contention of this paper, however, that the alleged inability of the UN to adjust itself to the changing character of the international political system is merely one aspect of the current malaise of UN peacekeeping. The question of whether one should or can realistically expect to move „beyond peacekeeping” is more complex than it may at first seem. To address it, I propose to examine three sets of questions:

1. Does the recent experience of UN peacekeeping, especially in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia, suggest that the *fundamental* character of peacekeeping as a distinctive form of neutral, third party intervention, has lost its relevance in contemporary international relations? If, as I shall argue, the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force remain central to peacekeeping after the Cold War, what are the implications of this when forces operate in situations where consent is fragmentary and incomplete at the tactical level?
2. Is the UN, as an institution, capable of providing the kind of executive direction and management of peacekeeping operations which the present range and variety of UN field operations demand? Have the reforms introduced so far effectively addressed the major weaknesses in the UN system for managing peacekeeping operations?
3. What are the broader „world order” issues raised by the expansion and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts? Is peacekeeping likely to remain the kind of „growth industry” envisaged by the Secretary General in late 1992? In particular, what are the obstacles, apart from the narrow institutional ones, which will continue to limit the role of the UN in the realm of peace and security even after the passing of the Cold War?

² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p. 497.

³ Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, „The UN's Role in International Society Since 1945”, in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations* (Second Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 4.

⁴ „UN Declaration – World Leaders Optimistic on Future”, *Financial Times*, 1 February 1992.

⁵ UN Charter, Article 24 (1).

⁶ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, „Empowering the United Nations”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5, 1992, p. 89.

⁷ Murrack Goulding, „The Evolution of United Nations Peace-keeping”, Cyril Foster Lecture, University of Oxford, 4 March 1993.

I. Peacekeeping and the „Middle Ground Debate“

The Debate over Doctrine

The failure of „forceable pacification“ in Somalia in 1993 and the continuation of ethnic war in Bosnia have highlighted the need for a reassessment of the *doctrinal* implications of operating in politically fragile and divided communities, in which clear front lines or legitimate political authorities cannot easily be identified, and where consent among the warring factions is often sporadic and patchy. Within military establishments and, to a lesser extent, among civilian analysts, the debate about „peacekeeping doctrine“ or „operations other than war“ has come to focus on the question of whether it is possible to conceive of an area of military activity between „classic“ peacekeeping and enforcement based on traditional war-fighting doctrines.

On the one hand, attempts have been made to develop a concept of „second generation multinational operations“, in which the key assumption has been that an outside force need not necessarily rely on or be guided by the requirement of consent from the parties to a conflict.⁸ Instead, a military force that is properly equipped, trained and governed by the right operational concepts can engage in various intermediary „levels“ of enforcement.⁹ It is this rejection of *consent* and *impartiality* as determinants of operational activity which has been at the heart of the calls for action „beyond peacekeeping“. ¹⁰ Proponents of this view argue that a „middle ground“ of military activity exists between „classical“ peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement, and that both intellectual and practical efforts should be geared towards developing the requirements for „aggravated“ or „muscular“ peacekeeping. Of the countries that have participated in recent peacekeeping operations, the United States has been the most receptive to the idea that there is indeed an area of military activity „beyond peacekeeping“ (this, curiously, in spite of the debacle in and ignominious withdrawal from Somalia).

While this debate has been conducted, there has been over the past two years a very real tendency to downgrade the importance of consent as a basis for UN involvement; a tendency taken to its ultimate conclusion in Somalia.

The question of whether there is an area of military activity between „classic“ peacekeeping and enforcement should be approached from two perspectives. In the first place, it requires a closer look at the actual nature of the changes in peacekeeping since 1988, because a key as-

sumption of those who argue in favour of a „middle ground“ is that Cold War peacekeeping has little relevance to contemporary operations. Second, it is necessary to examine the operational consequences of the downgrading of consent which has taken place in recent operations, most notably in the case of UNOSOM II.

The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping since 1988

Viewed from a historical perspective, the evolution of UN peacekeeping since 1988 has involved two significant developments. First, a very considerable increase in the „scale, participation and hybrid nature“ of operations has taken place. Between 1948 and 1987 a total of 13 operations was launched by the UN; since 1987, 20 new operations have been embarked on. At the same time, the permanent five members of the Security Council have become more directly involved with military personnel on the ground.¹¹ While there has also been a notable increase in so-called „multi-dimensional“ operations, few of the tasks and problems facing peacekeepers in the 1990s are in fact qualitatively new.¹² For example, many of the specific difficulties in the areas of command and control and logistics support posed by the juxtaposition of civilian and military operations occurred also, albeit on a smaller scale, in the Congo operation between 1960 and 1964.¹³

Second, as a general trend the operational environment in which UN forces operate has become increasingly volatile, complex and „more prone to violent escalation“. ¹⁴ This development stems from the growing involvement of UN peacekeepers in intra-state conflicts. One as-

⁸ John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations* (Providence RI: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1993), p. 4-5.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ In the words of Richard Connoughton, „consent and impartiality are too fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built“, see Richard Connoughton, „Time to clear the doctrine dilemma“, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 April 1994

¹¹ There were some exceptions to this „rule“ of non-participation by the P5 in UN operations during the Cold War. Britain, France and the USSR all provided some personnel for UNTSO, while Britain also contributed to UNFICYP.

¹² For an excellent analysis of the elements of continuity in „non-quantitative terms“ of peacekeeping before and after 1987, see Alan James, „The History of Peacekeeping: An Analytical Perspective“.

¹³ D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Force: A legal Study of United Nations Practice* (London: Steven & Sons, 1964), p. 387-415.

¹⁴ *Wider Peacekeeping* (Army Field Manual, 3rd Draft).

pect of this has been that at the tactical level peacekeepers have often been forced to operate with only partial or sporadic consent from warring parties. It has also meant that peacekeeping forces face greater risks and are now much more likely to sustain casualties.¹⁵

While both these developments have exposed major deficiencies in existing structures for mounting and sustaining UN operations, they do not in themselves indicate that the defining characteristics of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and its essentially non-threatening character – have no relevance for operations after the Cold War. The object of deploying a peacekeeping force remains that of assisting and reinforcing a political process towards the resolution of a conflict; it is not in itself designed to impose a solution. For this reason, local support, sustained and encouraged by the impartial character of UN activities, is essential if a peacekeeping force is to accomplish its mission. Although consent in civil wars is unlikely ever to be absolute, it is the conscious promotion of it – through adherence to principles of minimum force, constant liaison and negotiation – which separates peacekeeping from enforcement. Consent at the *strategic* and *operational* level remains a requirement for effective peacekeeping, while operations at the tactical level should be geared towards sustaining, promoting and expanding the margin of consent that exists. In short, the philosophical framework of traditional peacekeeping, retains its viability and provides the basis for thinking and planning future operations.

This conclusion has been construed by some as evidence of a lack of moral resolve or a shortage of intellectual imagination in the face of seemingly intractable civil wars. The fundamental point here, however, is that the military and political requirements of enforcement are wholly different in character from peacekeeping and that any attempt to combine peacekeeping (the objectives of which rely ultimately on building a maximum of local support) and enforcement in one operation is certain to destabilise the operational environment in which forces are deployed. Moreover, the need to maintain the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement is also based on a recognition of both the inability of the UN to engage in enforcement and the paucity of political will among member states to take action except where a compelling „national interest“ can be seen to be at stake.

Applying these considerations to the UN operation in Bosnia in 1994, it becomes clear that to caution against precipitate military action is not born of a belief that „peacekeeping“ has always been the *only* option available to the international community in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁶

The central problem throughout the Yugoslav conflict, however, has been the lack of political will among the Permanent Five for action beyond that of relieving the humanitarian consequences of the war. It is in light of this *political reality* that maintaining impartiality remains a critical determinant of operational activity.¹⁷ The difficulty with the „lift and strike“ policy (air strikes and the selective lifting of the arms embargo) promoted by the US under President Clinton, was that it would destabilise the operational environment to such a degree that only withdrawal or an escalating level of involvement in favour of one party could be pursued. Given the US administration's persistent refusal to send ground troops into the area *before* a comprehensive settlement was agreed in Yugoslavia, withdrawal would have been the only option.¹⁸ The history of UNOSOM II since May 1993 highlights these lessons even more starkly.

UNOSOM II and „the dynamics of war“

The continuing precariousness of the humanitarian situation in Somalia in early 1993, the abundance of weapons, and the general state of anarchy characterising many aspects of Somali society, were all deemed to require a more forceful mandate for the UN forces preparing to take over from UNITAF in May 1993. Consequently, the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was „endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter“ and became the „first operation of its kind to be authorised by the international community“.¹⁹

The overall task of the UN in Somalia was to assist „the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's constitutional structure; achieving national reconciliation, [and] recreating a Somali State based on demo-

¹⁵ As of 9 March 1994, the total number of fatalities from on-going missions was 677, of which 201 occurred in 1993.

¹⁶ Indeed, a strong case can be made for the idea of a UN „trusteeship“ for Bosnia, especially in the earlier stages of the evolving conflict. See Jane M.O. Sharp, *Bankrupt in the Balkans: British Policy in Bosnia* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993), p. 17-19.

¹⁷ Reflecting on the „lessons of Yugoslavia“, Cedric Thornberry, former Head of Civil Affairs in Zagreb, has noted that „without impartiality, the primary virtue, a UN peacekeeping operation will self-destruct“. Cedric Thornberry, „The Lessons of Yugoslavia“, Paper Presented to Centre for Defence Studies seminar, King's College, London, 7 December 1993.

¹⁸ „America welcomes Russian troops for Bosnian mission“, *Times* (London), 18 February 1994.

¹⁹ S/25354, 3 March 1993, paras. 58 and 101.

cratic governance".²⁰ Clearly, these objectives could only be achieved with the support of the Somalis themselves, and it was essential, therefore, to ensure that military operations were subordinate to and closely coordinated with the broader political process. This in turn meant that the third party, neutral and impartial status of UNOSOM II had to be preserved.

In early 1993, following the death of more than 20 Pakistani soldiers at the hands of „forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)"²¹, UNOSOM II became largely a US-directed operation. The enforcement provisions of the mandate and Security Council Resolution 837 were interpreted by the US military leadership in Mogadishu as requiring a significant escalation in the use of force, including the targeting of the top hierarchy of the SNA loyal to Aydeed.

This course of action was fully endorsed by the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who claimed specialist knowledge of the situation in Somalia. The new phase of operations began on 12 June 1993 with a series of night and daytime attacks by US attack helicopters of the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and AC 130 SPECTRE gunships in an effort to destroy SNA weapons sites and Radio Mogadishu. Throughout the entire operation in Somalia, the QRF remained under the direct tactical command of the Deputy Force Commander, US Lt. General Thomas Montgomery.

More damaging in terms of undermining the overall objectives of the operation, however, was the attack on 12 July on the house belonging to Abdi Abdiid, described as „a major SNA/Aydeed militia command and control centre, serving as a militia meeting site, staging area and rally point". Described immediately afterwards by Admiral Jonathan Howe (SRSG) as a „clean, surgical attack", the operation was estimated by the ICRC to have killed more than 50 Somalis and injured a further 170, including key religious and clan elders. The high casualty figure in this attack stemmed from the fact that, unlike previous QRF actions in the month of June, *no* warning had been given before the attack. The aim had been quite simply to „eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants"; consequently the policy of prior notification designed to minimise collateral damage had to be abandoned in favour of preserving the element of surprise.²²

By the time of the Abdi House attack, the SNA had already gone on the offensive and in UN communications references were now made to „enemy" rather than „hostile" forces, as had hitherto been the case. The US-UN forces had been drawn irretrievably into the clan warfare of

Somalia, being seen as anti-Hawiye and pro-Majerteen by the SNA.

A confidential report completed in late February 1994 by a Commission of Enquiry, established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of UNOSOM II personnel in Somalia, concluded that after the 5 June incident the UN had gradually become involved in what amounted to a „war" against Aydeed's SNA. The commission noted that Resolution 837 (authorising the hunt for Aydeed) was interpreted as providing the basis for an offensive against all of the SNA's power bases. Although, as noted above, attempts were initially made to avoid collateral damage, the commission members still did not feel that Resolution 837 had really envisaged the bombing of houses, radio stations and meetings. As the report perceptively added, however: „presumably the war, when it started, followed its own dynamics".

The dynamics of war reached its tragic climax on 3 October, when 18 American soldiers were killed and 78 wounded in a firefight which also killed anywhere between 300 and 800 Somali civilians.²³ After this, the relationship between US forces and Somalis in Mogadishu deteriorated further, to the point where the US forces had become completely estranged from the local population. Indeed, the final withdrawal of US troops in late March 1994 was aptly described by the *Washington Post* as a „guns-cocked withdrawal".²⁴

It is worth noting that non-US forces operating outside Mogadishu were markedly more successful in encouraging the process of reconciliation and were even able to disarm local factions. In Kismayo, initially one of the most fiercely contested battlegrounds, one Belgian battalion and two companies of Botswana soldiers conducted patrols on foot, consulted with community leaders, hoisted the UN flag and created a local police force. As a result, they were able to stabilise a large sector. Similarly, in

²⁰ Report by the Secretary General, S/25354, 3 March 1993, par. 91.

²¹ Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) (my emphasis), USC/SNC were loyal to clan leader Mohamed Farah Aydeed.

²² The attack so enraged a crowd of local residents that four international journalists covering the scene were turned upon and killed.

²³ This is a Red Cross estimate and is extremely difficult to verify. It is worth noting that an apparent reason for withholding the aforementioned report by the commission of enquiry is that it recommended that *ex gratia* payments should be considered by the UN for innocent Somali civilians killed or injured as a result of implementing Resolution 837. See, „Intern FN-rapport kritiserer alle og foreslar erstaning til somalieme", *Information*, 8 April 1994.

²⁴ „US to Leave Somalia With Its Guard Up", *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1993.

Baidoa – known as the „city of death“ during the crisis of 1992 – French troops were successful in reestablishing order, disarming factions and alleviating large-scale human suffering.

For future peacekeeping operations the principal lesson that emerges from the Somali debacle has been succinctly summarised by Charles Dobbie who, well before the US decision to pull out had been made, observed that UNOSOM II demonstrates:

... what seems likely to happen in theatre if a peace-keeping force crosses the impartiality divide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its security. The force's resources will then become ever more devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall campaign aim. Such a situation will almost certainly result in the loss of popular support, a loss of control and uncontrolled escalation upwards in the ambient level of violence which will heighten political tension and foreclose opportunities for resolving the conflict. To cross the impartiality divide is also to cross a rubicon. Once on the other side, there is very little chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be by leaving the theatre.²⁵

II. The direction and management of UN peacekeeping operations

The UN headquarters in New York

Reforms introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali since February 1992 have not addressed the root cause of the peacekeeping management problems: the growing decentralisation of peacekeeping functions in the Secretariat and the consequent diffusion of authority in the management of operations. Indeed, recent developments within the Secretariat appear, rather ominously, to have reinforced a process of fragmentation of decision-making power.²⁶ Although progress has been made in certain areas, the management of UN field operations – much like in Cold War period – continues to rely to an unusual degree on improvisation, *ad hoc* arrangements and „close working relationships“ among members of the Secretariat and between officers and civilian personnel in the field. There are two aspects to the issue of enhancing

the machinery for peacekeeping in New York: (1) *vertical integration* – streamlining procedures and decision making within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and (2) *horizontal integration* – improving overall coordination among the key departments, offices and divisions involved in various aspects of UN field operations, i.e. the DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the Department of Administration and Management (DAM).

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations: successful vertical integration

Since March 1993, a number of initiatives aimed at upgrading the DPKO in New York have produced significant results by UN standards. The initiatives include: an expansion of staffing levels;²⁷ the creation of an embryonic Planning and Coordination Cell headed by a newly appointed Deputy Military Advisor; and the establishment of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre was set up in April 1993 with a view to monitoring UNITAF/UNOSOM II operations in Somalia and has since been upgraded and now operates in accordance with proper and regularised staff procedures. Steps have also been taken to enhance the flow of information into the UN HQ from member states through the installation of an intelligence processing system in the DPKO (JDISS). The value of the Situation Centre is now widely recognised and accepted (by member states, officials in the field and at UN HQ) though its capacities for collection and dissemination of information are still underdeveloped.

Most encouragingly, however, the important step of incorporating the Field Operations Division (formerly located within the DAM) into the DPKO has finally been taken. Sensibly, it has been relocated within the newly created Office of Planning and Support (DPKO), to be headed by an Assistant Secretary General for Planning and Support. His role will be critical in effecting the necessary integration within DPKO. The incorporation of the FOD should help to remedy the old problem of dual lines of reporting between the administrative and logistic aspects of an operation and the military.

²⁵ Charles Dobbie, „Wider Peacekeeping – A Peace Support Operations Doctrine“ (Presentation Script), ND.

²⁶ I refer here to the increasingly important role of the Secretary-General's immediate circle of advisors, reflected in the expansion of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), with both geographical and functional responsibilities accorded to USGs in the EOSG. See below.

²⁷ This includes both contract and seconded personnel with specialist officers given responsible for training and coordination, demining issues and civilian police matters.

These are all steps in the right direction and the DPKO should be encouraged to further improve its ability to engage in *mission support, force generation and planning*. The Department (and indeed UN HQ more generally) should not, however, aspire to become an „operational headquarters" in the strict military sense. The exercise of command functions – i.e. „the authority to assign force elements to tasks and direct their actions on a day-to-day basis" – should not come from New York but instead be delegated to the Special Representative/Force Commander in the field. The reasons for this are both practical and political. From the practical point of view, the ability of New York to direct nearly 20 separate operations is bound to be fragmentary and selective. More crucially, no government and especially not the Permanent Five wish to see the UN HQ given responsibilities for „Mission command" as opposed to „Mission support".²⁸

The Failure of horizontal integration

While measures of vertical integration have undoubtedly enhanced the ability of the DPKO to coordinate activities in the field, the problem of horizontal integration persists. The nature of the problem is well illustrated in the long-awaited report of the Secretary General on „Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping", requested by the Security Council in May 1993 and released by the Secretariat in March 1994.

In an attempt to clarify reporting channels and delineate the respective roles of key departments (DPA, DPKO, DHA, DAM), the report embodies a formula which reflects bureaucratic interests as much as any desire to rationalise decision-making procedures. Under this „new order", the DPA is described as the „political arm" of the Secretary-General, the DPKO his „operational arm ... for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations", while the DHA is responsible for „coordination and humanitarian operations". Peacekeeping operations, however, by their very nature, encompass overlapping political, military and humanitarian components, and it is simply not possible to separate the „political" and „operational" aspects of a mission from each other. Within a bureaucratic structure such as the UN, this contrived allocation of functional responsibilities makes effective decision-making particularly contingent on close working relationships between Departmental heads and officers further down the hierarchy. At present relations at the USG level appear smooth, though current arrangements ensure that the potential for future conflict is built into the system. More worryingly, it also

means that unity of reporting and, therefore, unity of strategic instructions from UN HQ to the field remains deficient.

As indicated above, there is a further development that since 1992 has complicated the management of operations in New York. This is the increasingly important role of the Secretary-General's immediate circle of advisors, reflected in the expansion of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), with both geographical and functional responsibilities accorded to his immediate advisors (the geographical distribution of responsibilities took effect from mid-January 1994). This has resulted in a top-heavy structure in New York and has, in effect, created another layer between the Secretary-General and the substantive departments of the Secretariat. At the very least, this development increases the potential for policy differences in New York to slow down decision-making. This may in turn create critical delays in making decisions of urgent concern to Special Representative of the Secretary General or the Force Commander in the field.

Problems in the field

As noted above, the scale and hybrid nature of many contemporary peacekeeping operations have placed severe strains on traditional UN practices for initiating and supporting field operations. Recent and on-going operations have shown that many of the self-imposed restraints which have come to characterise UN peacekeeping – ad hoc mounting procedures, the lack of pre-deployment planning, a complex procurement system, and restrictions on the collection and use of intelligence material – are undermining the ability of multinational forces to carry out their missions. Whilst differing markedly in the complexity and the nature of their mandates, contemporary operations all point to certain basic weaknesses that have been accentuated by the necessity of operating in the context of actual or latent civil war with only sporadic consent from the parties on the ground. Four areas of weakness merit particular attention:²⁹

1. *Logistics planning and support*. The limited logistic capabilities available to the UN and the absence of an effective planning agency to co-

²⁸ Terms are used by David Ramsbotham, „UN Operations: The Art of the Possible", *RUSI Journal* (December 1993).

²⁹ I have addressed these and other problems in much greater detail in *Wither UN Peacekeeping? Adelphi Paper 281* (London: Brassey's/IISS, 1993). I have singled out these four areas in this paper as they appear particularly important in terms of improving future operations.

ordinate and direct logistics support continue to bedevil operations.³⁰ The creation of a Planning Division within the DPKO and the incorporation of the FOD, should begin to address the problem of planning.

2. *Command, control, coordination and intelligence (C3I)*. The failure to establish an efficient command and control system in the field and to provide Force and unit Commanders with intelligence of a political and military nature, have plagued all missions. The command and control issue, however, is not merely a „UN problem“.

On the one hand, reliable communications are notoriously difficult to establish in any multinational coalition because of differences in staff procedures and training, language barriers and equipment incompatibilities among participating forces. These problems have been magnified in the UN context by the increasingly broad geographical spread of contingents involved in peacekeeping. On the other hand, the tendency for national governments to intervene directly in the chain of command of a peacekeeping mission has become a growing obstacle to command, control and coordination by the UN. This tendency has increased in proportion to the perception of danger to soldiers involved in operations, and has been facilitated by the ease with which contingent commanders can now communicate confidentially with national authorities. As a result, the formal command status of contingents (under the Operational Control of the FC) has often been more apparent than real and the „United Nations-ness“ of operations has been called into question. This problem has been particularly acute in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

3. *Training and lack of specialised units*. Peacekeeping operations also continue to suffer from inadequate training of many participating contingents and, especially, from the acute shortage of specialised units and personnel in three areas: logistics, communications and engineering.

4. *Tactical mobility and procurement*. Lack of tactical mobility (especially air assets) to support operations and outdated procurement regulations continue to create major complications on the ground as recent events in Mozambique illustrate. In late February 1994, the grounding of 8 MI-8 heavy transport helicopters after contracts expired threatened to derail the entire demobilisation schedule in the country. Although the UN headquarters knew about the problem for some time, procurement regulations prevented a rapid resolution of the problem. When the UN did eventually hire some more helicopters, these turned out to be unsuitable (i.e. there were too few crews per helicopter; they did not have night-flying capability; and

their range and loading capacity was too limited for operations in Mozambique).

In addition to these four areas, the UN's financial predicament remains very serious indeed. The most immediate problem in terms of the organisation and support of peacekeeping operations stems from the structural delays that have been built into the budgetary allocation procedure.³¹ The apparent difficulties of addressing this issue owe much to the reluctance of the General Assembly to relinquish its prerogatives in the financial sphere.

The picture which emerges from this overview of UN peacekeeping practices points to the need for centralisation (or, at least, increased coordination) of management functions within the Secretariat on the one hand, and greater delegation of operational, financial and administrative responsibility to the field on the other. Delegation to the field does not imply that the UN HQ's overall political and strategic control of operations will be lost; such control must remain firmly with the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The delegation of administrative and financial authority will certainly, however, increase the operational efficiency of peacekeeping forces.

III. The future of International peacekeeping

The recent expansion of peacekeeping operations in the context of internal conflicts cannot be divorced from the broader issues that these conflicts have raised and which are central to the debate about a „new world order“. Even if the institutional weaknesses outlined above are effectively remedied, there are other factors which suggest that peacekeeping is unlikely to remain the kind of „growth industry“ in which so much hope was invested only two years ago. Two factors in particular are worth highlighting. In the first place, the sheer complexity of the issues raised by contemporary intrastate conflict is reflected in the absence of an international consensus as to how such conflicts should be approached. An increasingly salient aspect of this is the problem of „selectivity“ (or indifference) on the part of the Security Council with regard to which conflicts deserve priority and

³⁰ For a discussion of UN logistics problems, see *ibid.* p. 32-39.

³¹ See Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker (et al), *Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1993), p. 16.

attention. This has been powerfully illustrated by the limited interest shown in Angola after the resumption of civil war and, more recently, in the response (or lack of) to the genocide in Rwanda. Second, and closely related, „there are unmistakable signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend ... assistance through the United Nations”.³² This diminishing political will of member states has been particularly pronounced in the US.

Outside intervention in internal conflicts

Violence in the international system, especially after the collapse of multiethnic federal state structures, occurs primarily at the sub-state level. The UN Charter, however, is a document essentially about inter-state conflicts, and as such does not include provisions „by which the Security Council or General Assembly may relate to non-state agencies such as liberation movements, communal minorities, or political parties”.³³ The UN – or rather the member states that compose it – have yet to examine how it may effectively intervene in civil wars. The muchvaunted *Agenda for Peace* did not address this issue as it placed its analysis explicitly „within the framework and provisions of the Charter”.³⁴ An important reason for this was undoubtedly an awareness of the sensitivities involved. Indeed, the mixture of civil and international conflict in the former Yugoslavia and changes in the law on humanitarian intervention since 1989 have raised issues on which there are few signs of a common approach.³⁵ The Yugoslav conflict and the break-up of the Soviet empire, for example, have highlighted the potentially violent consequences of basing the principle of self-determination rigidly on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with regard to internal borders (i.e. within federal states) when these boundaries are highly artificial and largely administrative in character.

With regard to the question of intervention, Hedley Bull, writing on the subject, observed that the „way forward ... lies not in seeking to replace the rule of non-intervention with some other rule, but rather in considering how it should be modified and adapted to meet the particular circumstances and needs of the present time”. He noted further that the „rule of non-intervention should not be allowed to obstruct” developments in the „field of human rights, and the wider changes in moral attitudes to international relations ...”. Bull then posed the question of how the rule of non-intervention could „best be formulated so as to meet the requirements of world order in the closing decades of the twentieth century”.³⁶ The relevance

of this question and the divergent responses it elicits among member states of the UN, are even more obvious in the mid-1990s than they were when Bull explored the subject in mid-1980s. Ever since the revival of international peacekeeping in the late 1980s, non-aligned and developing countries have expressed deep concern about the tension between the new-found activism of the UN with regard to internal conflicts and the cardinal principle of international society of states, namely, the sovereign equality of states and its corollary that there is a duty of non-intervention by states in the internal affairs of other states. On the Security Council, the People's Republic of China has been a champion of these concerns. Thus, whilst supporting the decision to send Task Force to Somalia in December 1992, the Chinese delegate to the Security Council made it clear that the military operation authorized by the Council was „an exceptional action under the unique situation in Somalia”.³⁷

With respect to the future of peacekeeping, the Indian submission to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping in April 1993 succinctly summarises concerns widely felt among developing countries. It is worth quoting *in extenso*:

*... the new dimensions of peacekeeping have resulted in ... a new responsibility for the UN and its member states to ensure that these new departures in peacekeeping operations are in conformity with the principles and provisions of the UN Charter ... Most important amongst these principles and guidelines are respect for the sovereignty of the State, non-interference in matters under the domestic jurisdiction of a State and the requirement of consent of all concerned parties for such operations.*³⁸

Further echoing the concerns of developing countries, the Indian submission to the Peacekeeping Committee concluded that:

³² S/1994/12, 6 January 1994, par. 46.

³³ Sydney Bailey, „The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946-1964”, *International Affairs* (Summer 1982), p. 469.

³⁴ *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, June 1992.

³⁵ On changes in the law of humanitarian intervention, see Christopher Greenwood, „Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?”, *The World Today*, vol. 49, no. 2, February 1993.

³⁶ Hedley Bull, „Conclusion”, in Hedley Bull, ed. *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 187-189.

³⁷ „Statement by Ambassador Li Daoyu, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at Security Council in Explanation of Vote on Somalia Questions”, Press Release, 3 December 1992, (my emphasis).

³⁸ Statement by Permanent Representative of India, „Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peacekeeping in all their aspects”, 20 April 1993.

*The focus, it would seem, has shifted from development to peacekeeping. We hope and trust that this is only a transient phenomenon and that in the not too distant future, the UN can dedicate its energy and resources to the realisation of wider objectives of the UN charter and its intrinsic balance.*³⁹

Diminishing Political Will

The second reason, alluded to above, for the growth of UN peacekeeping in recent years having reached a ceiling, has to do with the increasing reluctance of member states to support peacekeeping involvement in internal conflicts as distinct from passing resolutions about them. This lack of political will has been reflected in a growing unwillingness of member states to commit troops to situations which may involve casualties. This is not surprising: it remains difficult for any government (though particularly so it would appear for Western governments) to explain why its own nationals should risk their lives in conflicts where the warring factions themselves appear far from anxious to end the fighting and where no obvious „national interest“ appears to be at stake.

The diminishing political commitment to UN peacekeeping has been most striking in the United States. For military, financial and psychological reasons this development is also certain to have the most far-reaching consequences for the future of international peacekeeping.⁴⁰ It is worth recalling, for example, that the US decision in October 1993 to pull out all of its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994 was quickly followed by similar announcements by Belgium, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and Sweden.

Before assuming office, President Clinton had openly committed himself to reversing the UN policies of preceding Republican administrations. Indeed, in April 1992 he even called for a „rapid deployment force“ at the UN to conduct operations such as „standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and combatting terrorism“.⁴¹ This initial idealism, however, was gradually reversed under the impact of events in Bosnia, Haiti and, above all, Somalia. As a result, the contents of a Presidential Policy Review, ordered in February 1993 with a view to strengthen US-UN ties, has undergone a drastic change in the course of 1993 and the first half of 1994. At present, US conditions for participation in UN operations are arguably more restrictive than they were under President Bush.⁴² The basic elements of US policy which have emerged from the process of enforced in-

tropection have now finally codified in „Presidential Decision Directive 25“ and can be summarised as follows:

- the objectives of an operation must be clearly defined, in „America's own national interest“ and assured of „continuing public and Congressional support“;
- the commitment of US troops cannot be „open-ended“ and consequently an „exit strategy“ must be in place before troops are deployed;
- operations involving US forces must have „satisfactory command and control arrangements“.

Even a cursory survey of the conflicts in which the UN has become involved illustrates the inherent difficulties of applying these criteria. A narrow definition of national interest, rigid adherence to the principle of „no open-ended commitments“ and continuing public support are certain to limit the scope for involvement in a world where communal and ethnically motivated hatreds are major sources of violence. It is ironic that the successful deployment of US troops in Macedonia would not have been possible if the criteria for participation in peacekeeping enshrined in current US policy had been applied. As for „satisfactory command and control arrangements“, the Somalia experience, where all US combat troops remained under the direct control of US commanders, is hardly satisfactory from a UN point of view.

Conclusion

There has been a strong tendency to attribute the failures of the UN peacekeeping since 1992 to the UN itself and, in particular, its perceived inability to articulate a coherent doctrine and equip itself for operations „beyond“ classical peacekeeping. This, however, is to simplify a much more complex reality. While the UN's record of reform after the Cold War leaves much to be desired, recent setbacks ultimately reflect the nature of an international system which – whilst no longer paralysed by East-West rivalry – remains profoundly divided by conflicts of *interest* and *value*. Moreover, as Coner Cruise O'Brien perceptively notes and as events over the past two years confirm, „taking the blame

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ I have discussed the present state of US-UN relations in greater detail in, „Fateful Encounter: the US and UN Peacekeeping“, *Survival* Spring 1994.

⁴¹ Quoted in Elaine Scionlino, „US Narrows Terms for its Peacekeepers“, *New York Times*, 23 September 1993.

⁴² „The Peacekeeping Front: Clinton is Pulling Back“, *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 1994.

for the mistakes of national leaders (especially the US) is one of the things the UN is *about*, and is a large part of its utility to national governments ..."⁴³ Although the UN is, and will probably remain, more central to questions of international security than it was during the Cold War, states still think in terms of interests and no consensus has emerged (nor is it likely to emerge) among „major powers about the basis for international security“.⁴⁴ For this reason alone, to assume that peacekeeping can ever „become the linchpin in developing an overall strategy for re-

ducing the role of military power in international relations“, is to misunderstand both the actual and potential role of peacekeeping and to disregard important elements of continuity in international politics after the Cold War.⁴⁵

⁴³ Conor Cruise O'Brien, „Faithful Scapegoat to the World“, *The Independent*, 1 October 1993.

⁴⁴ Adam Roberts, „The United Nations and International Security“, *Survival*, vol. 35, no. 2 (Summer 1993), p. 3.

⁴⁵ Robert C. Johansen, „UN peacekeeping: the changing utility of military force“, *Third World Quarterly*, April 1990, p. 53.

Eindscriptie: Budgettering bij het schoolbataljon 11 luchtmobiele brigade

Resultaatverantwoordelijkheid en doelmatigheid zijn gevleugelde woorden in het hedendaagse functioneren van de militair. Hoe dit mogelijk in de praktijk toegepast zou kunnen worden, is beschreven in de eindscriptie „Budgettering bij het schoolbataljon 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade“ door de cadetvaandrig Michel Verhoeven. Met deze eindscriptie won hij de Krijgswetenschapsprijs 1994, uitgelooft door de Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap. Het hierna volgende artikel is een bewerking van deze scriptie.

Inleiding

Het vallen van de Berlijnse muur symboliseerde het uiteenvallen van het Warschau-Pact aan het begin van de jaren '90. Wellicht had men niet kunnen vermoeden wat voor impact dit zou hebben op de NAVO en daarmee de Nederlandse krijgsmacht. De krijgsmacht kon tot op dat moment uitgaan van een stabiele omgeving met een duidelijk vijandbeeld en een groei van 3% per jaar op de Rijksbegroting.

De KL moest inspelen op de nieuwe situatie en wijzigde haar taakstelling. Daarnaast kwam de vraag hoeveel de belastingbetaler daar voorover zou hebben. Dat bleek een stuk minder te zijn. Sinds de publikatie van de Defensienota-1991 is het defensiebudget op jaarbasis met bijna f 1.100 miljoen verlaagd. Een van de financieel-economische gevolgen is, dat de vermindering van het defensiebudget de noodzaak tot doelmatigheid versterkt. Een instrument om de doelmatigheid te bewerkstelligen, is budgettering.

Eind 1991 komt het BVBKL uit. Hierin worden randvoorwaarden geschetst hoe de nieuwe bedrijfsvoering geïmplementeerd zal moeten worden. Aspecten als resultaatgericht opereren, wederzijds vertrouwen, zelfstandig handelen, doelmatig aanwenden van middelen en resultaatverantwoordelijkheid nemen, vormen hierbij de hoofdpunten.

Een ander aspect wat in de nieuwe KL aan de orde is, is de wijziging van een kaderniliteleger naar een beroepsleger. Voor de opleiding van BBT-ers zijn de zogenaamde schoolbataljons opgericht. Deze schoolbataljons leiden BBT-ers op voor functies die zij gaan vervullen in parate eenheden van een brigade (of divisie). Het schoolbataljon dat het langst functioneert, is het schoolbataljon 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade.


Deze ingrediënten vormden de basis voor de eindscriptie die handelt over „Budgettering bij het schoolbataljon 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade“. De probleemstelling van de eindstudie was: „Is het mogelijk om het schoolbataljon 11 Luchtmobiele Brigade te budgetteren, zo ja, wat is de meest passende budgetteringstechniek en aan welke randvoorwaarden dient de uitvoering te voldoen?“

Budget en budgettering

Een budget wordt veelal beschreven als een formele kwantificering van de omvang aan productiefactoren, die nodig is om bepaalde taken uit te voeren. Deze kwantificering geschiedt meestal in geld, maar kan ook in hoeveelheden plaats vinden.

Budgettering is het proces dat zich afspeelt rond zo'n budget; variërend van vaststelling, uitvoering, verantwoording en evaluatie. Men geeft dus de eenheid een aantal taken dat binnen een bepaalde periode uitgevoerd dient te worden, met een beperkte hoeveelheid (financiële)middelen. Met deze middelen (input) worden processen in gang gezet om het uiteindelijke resultaat (output) te halen (afb. 1).

De processen en output zijn niet duidelijk voor elke eenheid. De output van een tankeskadron,



Afb. 1

„gevechtkracht” is moeilijk te identificeren. Dit in tegenstelling tot een hersteleenheid die, bijvoorbeeld, een output levert van 10 gerepareerde YPR's. Het (productie)proces wat zich binnen deze eenheden afspeelt, is niet direct met elkaar vergelijkbaar. De input is bekend, maar de productie en de output zijn niet altijd even duidelijk en te identificeren.

Dit kan vastgesteld worden aan de hand van de volgende twee vragen:

– *Is de productie homogeen?*

Bij een homogene productie kunnen de functies in het productieproces in gelijksoortige (groepen van) activiteiten worden uiteengelegd. Omdat voor elk van die activiteiten even veel middelen nodig zijn, kunnen die activiteiten eenduidig aan de input worden gerelateerd, zodat ervoor standaardkosten kunnen worden gecalculleerd. Voorbeeld: de productie aan een lopende band.

– *Is de output te identificeren?*

Identificeerbaar wil zeggen dat naast de waargenomen output, de kwaliteit en eisen van de output vastgesteld kunnen worden. Voorbeeld: bij een hersteleenheid zijn 10 YPR's gerepareerd. De output is 10 YPR's. Daarnaast dient vastgesteld te worden of de YPR's ook kwalitatief goed zijn gerepareerd en of ze voldoen aan de eisen van het operationeel gebruik.

Dit is belangrijk om te weten omdat aan de antwoorden op bovenstaande vragen, budgetteringstechnieken gekoppeld kunnen worden. Dat betekent dus dat elke eenheid met zijn eigen specifieke kenmerken op een passende manier gebudgetteerd kan worden. Antwoord op de beide vragen is weergegeven in een schema (afb. 2).

		Is de output te identificeren?	
		Ja	Nee
Is de productie homogeen?	Ja	Outputbudget	Procesbudget
	Nee	Projectbudget	Inputbudget

Afb. 2

Een korte toelichting op de diverse budgetteringstechnieken

Inputbudgettering

Deze techniek van budgetteren houdt in dat men middelen ter beschikking stelt, zonder dat daar een taakstelling voor de te leveren productie aan verbonden wordt. Kortom men stelt de maxima voor de uitgaven van de produktiemiddelen vast, maar niet de minima van de prestaties die daarvoor geleverd moeten worden.

Projectbudgettering

Het bijzondere van projectbudgettering is dat de beschikbaar gestelde middelen slechts voor één plan of project beschikbaar worden gesteld. De taakstelling is wel in outputeenheden gegeven.

Procesbudgettering

Er is bij projectbudgettering nog een binding met de output doordat de taakstelling in outputeenheden is. In de sector van de dienstverlening is echter het probleem dat de output niet zo duidelijk is te formuleren. Dat houdt tevens in dat de relatie tussen kosten en prestatie niet duidelijk is. Men zal dus procesindicatoren moeten zoeken die de taakstelling koppelt aan de te verrichten werkzaamheden. Deze taakstelling wordt niet geformuleerd in prestaties, maar in daarvoor noodzakelijk geachte activiteiten. Deze activiteiten zijn geschikt voor een kosten-calcuatie.

Outputbudgettering

Deze wijze van budgettering past in een ideaal bedrijfseconomisch plaatje. Ideaal wil zeggen, dat aan elk produkt de kosten toegerekend kunnen worden, die op dat produkt betrekking hebben. Het budget wordt gevormd door het aantal te produceren produkten te vermenigvuldigen met de voorgerecalculeerde kostprijs.

Kerntakenbudgettering

Kerntakenbudgettering staat niet in het schema, maar is een geval apart. Kerntakenbudgettering is bij uitstek een doelmatigheidsinstrument. Dat wil zeggen, dat men een middel heeft om de doelmatigheid van een organisatie te bekijken. De (organisatie)doelstellingen en prestaties dienen tegen zo laag mogelijke kosten te worden gerealiseerd. Kenmerkend voor deze budgetteringstechniek is dat relaties gelegd worden tussen outputfactoren (geleverde prestaties) en inputfactoren (personele en materiële middelen),

Tabel 1

	Input-budgettering	Project-budgettering	Proces-budgettering	Output-budgettering	Kerntaken-budgettering
Doelstelling	Het stellen van een uitgaven-maximum.	Het stellen van een uitgavenmaximum, na het geven van een taak.	Kostenbeheersing door proces-beheersing.	Kostenbeheersing door produktie-beheersing.	Kostenbeheersing door activiteiten-beheersing.
Gericht op	Verdeling van financiële middelen.	Toedeling van beschikbare financiële middelen.	Toedeling van beschikbare financiële middelen.	Onderbouwing en rechtvaardiging van de budgetten.	Interne financieel-economische beheersing van activiteiten.
Aangrijpingspunt	Verdeling volgens een verdeelsleutel of overleg.	Een globaal kosten-overzicht voor een eenmalige gebeurtenis.	Kostenindeling op basis van proces-indicatoren.	Integrale kosten-calculatie.	Relatie prestaties en benodigde middelen per kerntaak.
Beheersings-oriëntatie	Top down.	Top down.	Top down.	Bottum-up	Bottum-up. Top down afstemming
Sterke punten	Eenvoudig.	Eenvoudig.	Relatie met produktie.	Bedrijfseconomisch ideaal-plaatje, relaties tussen input, proces en output.	Motiveert het management op alle niveaus. Geeft inzicht in de relatie output-input op kerntakenniveau.
Zwakke punten	Geen relaties tussen input, proces en output.	(Financiële) Controlemogelijkheden gedurende project beperkt.	Werkt alleen met juiste en valide procesindicatoren.	Criteria voor de „normale” produktie.	Niet gericht op de beoordeling van de effectiviteit van de activiteiten.

met als doel het beheersen van de kosten van de noodzakelijke geachte activiteiten van de kerntaken. Een kerntaak is gedefinieerd als een werkzaamheid of een samenstel van werkzaamheden waarvan de uitvoering in het bijzonder aan een bepaalde resultaatverantwoordelijke eenheid is opgedragen en die in voldoende mate voorkomt om als basis voor normontwikkeling te kunnen dienen. De kosten die gebudgetteerd worden, zijn beïnvloedbare kosten (tabel 1).

Om een „op maat gesneden” budgetteringstechniek toe te passen, is bestudering van de eenheid nodig. Het schoolbataljon bestaat uit drie instructiecompagnieën en staf-staf verzorgingscompagnie. Zo'n instructiecompagnie bestaat op haar beurt weer uit vier instructiepelotons. De belangrijkste taken van het schoolbataljon zijn:

- het opleiden van BBT-ers. De opleiding van BBT-ers behandelt een algemeen militair vormend gedeelte van drie maanden en een specifiek luchtmobiel gedeelte van twee maanden. Hierna volgt de BBT-er nog één maand specifieke functie-opleiding (bijv. infanterie-pionier op het Genie Opleidings Centrum, of Dragonschutter bij een paraat luchtmobiel bataljon);
- het opleiden van Beroeps Onbepaalde Tijd

(BOT-ers). De opleiding van BOT-ers voor de rode baret. Dit is een opleiding voor kaderleden van de luchtmobiele brigade en behandelt het luchtmobiele optreden en crisisbeheersing;

- het opleiden van externe cursisten. Dit zijn aanvullende cursussen voor specialisten. Bijv. het vastmaken van een voertuig onder een helikopter, of het inrichten van helikopterlandingspunten. Deze opleiding is voor militairen die al werkzaam zijn bij de luchtmobiele brigade. Daarnaast zijn er cursisten van de Koninklijke Luchtmacht en Korps Commando Troepen.

Budgetteringstraject

Om de passende budgetteringstechniek bij de eenheid te vinden, waren twee vragen van belang: is de produktie homogeen en is de output te identificeren? Wat het schoolbataljon betreft kunnen de beide vragen met *ja* beantwoordt worden.

Homogene produktie

De „produktie” van BBT-ers en BOT-ers is homogeen omdat het leerproces in gelijksoortige groepen van activiteiten worden uiteengelegd (bijvoorbeeld: AMO, VAGOL, ACB etc.). Omdat

voor elk van die activiteiten even veel middelen per leerling nodig zijn, kunnen die activiteiten eenduidig aan de input worden gerelateerd, zodat daarvoor standaardkosten kunnen worden gecalculleerd.


Identificatie van de output

De output van het schoolbataljon is te identificeren, omdat naast de direct meetbare output (bijvoorbeeld: 150 BBT-ers en 35 BOT-ers) ook de kwaliteit en de eisen van het operationeel gebruik bepaald kunnen worden. Dit gebeurt door testen tijdens de opleiding, maar ook door terugkoppeling van het functioneren van de BBT-er of BOT-er met de commandant, na de opleiding.


Gezien het antwoord op de beide vragen zou in de toekomst *outputbudgettering* mogelijk kunnen zijn. Dit is echter niet rechtstreeks realiseerbaar. Outputbudgettering houdt tevens in dat alle kosten bekend zijn en dat er een kostencalculatie gemaakt kan worden. Dit is zeker nu nog niet het geval. Daarom zal een traject opgesteld moeten worden wat uiteindelijk leidt tot outputbudgettering.

Het traject zal moeten beginnen met delegatie van budgetten die betrekking hebben op beïnvloedbare kosten, om commandanten kennis te laten maken met de veranderende bedrijfsvoering. Ik kies voor beïnvloedbare kosten, omdat een commandant direct het nut en effect ziet van zijn handelen met een budget. Hiermee krijgt een commandant meer invloed op het proces en heeft hij de mogelijkheid keuzes te maken. Daarbij zullen bevoegdheden gedelegeerd moeten worden. Tevens ziet de commandant direct de consequenties van zijn handelen en zal daar op afgerekend worden. Hierbij is *kerntakenbudgettering* toepasbaar. Dit betekent dat een relatie gelegd kan worden tussen input- en outputfactoren, met als doel het beheersen van de kosten van de noodzakelijk geachte activiteiten (afb. 3).


Kerntakenbudgettering gaat niet uit van een identificeerbare output. Omdat kerntakenbudgettering alleen beïnvloedbare kosten in het budget opneemt, kan men geen antwoord geven op de integrale kostprijs van activiteiten. Voor outputbudgettering is dit noodzakelijk. Als het gehele beeld van activiteiten – met kosten – compleet is, dan is *procesbudgettering* mogelijk. Men zal dan procesindicatoren moeten zoeken die de taakstelling koppelt aan de te verrichten activiteiten. Hierbij is het mogelijk om te sturen op deelprocessen zoals de AMO, VAG-OL, Heli-opleiding etc. De activiteiten kunnen onderworpen worden aan een kostencalculatie omdat ze normeerbaar zijn (afb. 4).



Afb. 3



Afb. 4



Afb. 5

		Is de output te identificeren?	
		Ja	Nee
Is de productie homogeen?	Ja	Outputbudget	Procesbudget
	Nee	Projectbudget	Inputbudget

Note: In the original image, a black arrow points from 'Procesbudget' to 'Outputbudget', and a black box labeled 'Kerntakenbudget' is placed over the 'Inputbudget' cell.

Afb. 6

Outputbudgettering is mogelijk wanneer aan elk produkt of prestatie de kosten toe te rekenen zijn, die daarop betrekking hebben. Dit vereist een kwantificeerbare en kwalificeerbare relatie tussen input, processen, output en doelstelling (afb. 5).

Het hele budgetteringstraject is in afb. 6 weergegeven.

Kerntakenbudgettering

Een tweetal aspecten spelen hierbij de hoofdrol, namelijk de kerntaken en de beïnvloedbare kosten. Als kerntaken voor het schoolbataljon wil ik onderscheiden:

- kerntaak 1, uitvoeren BBT-opleiding;
- kerntaak 2, uitvoeren BOT-opleiding;

Tabel 2 Met betrekking tot materiële kosten

Kosten*	Stuurbaar	Niet-stuurbaar
Planbaar	Munitie BOS Vervoer Automatisering Onderwijs- leermiddelen Oefenterreinen	Onderhoud inventaris en gebouwen
Niet planbaar	Telefoon Gas Water Licht Kopieermateriaal Post	Medisch materiaal

* Niet volledig

– kerntaak 3, uitvoeren opleiding externe cursisten voor de heli-cursus.

Als prestatie-eenheid van de kerntaak kunnen de aantallen opgeleide militairen dienen. Om vast te stellen wat beïnvloedbare kosten zijn, kunnen we een indeling maken naar stuurbare en/of planbare kosten (tabel 2).

De in de tabel genoemde combinaties zijn niet 'zwart-wit', de gebieden zijn niet opgesteld als zijnde 100% planbaar, 100% niet stuurbaar, etc., maar zijn opgesteld in de zin van 'het merendeel van de genoemde zaken is planbaar en niet stuurbaar'.

Consequenties voor kerntakenbudgettering

Gezien de matrixen in tabel 2 kan een budget gegeven worden met de kwalificatie van stuurbaar/planbaar. Een commandant kun je aanspreken op deze budgetten omdat hij die in ruime mate kan beïnvloeden. De budgetten met de kwalificatie stuurbaar/niet planbaar kunnen gegeven worden, maar met een ander kader waarbinnen de commandant moet blijven, omdat de beïnvloedbaarheid minder groot is dan bij stuurbaar/planbaar. De budgetten met de kwalificatie niet stuurbaar/planbaar en niet stuurbaar/niet planbaar zijn bij kerntakenbudgettering niet toepasbaar.

Procesbudgettering

Om te komen tot een systeem waarbij het budget vastgesteld is op basis van een integrale kostprijs is het nodig om alle kosten te weten en

een goed inzicht te hebben in de processen die leiden tot het uiteindelijke produkt. De hoofdprocessen die we kunnen onderscheiden, zijn:

1. Besturen;
2. Opleiden en vormen;
3. Ondersteuning.

Hierbij worden alle kosten in ogenschouw genomen. De gehele voorgaande matrix wordt dus zichtbaar gemaakt. Dit is ook mogelijk, omdat ervaring en informatie opgebouwd is met kerntakenbudgettering.

Men zal dus ook verder moeten gaan met het beïnvloedbaar maken van kosten. Tevens zal een goede procesbeschrijving gemaakt moeten zijn om inzicht te kunnen verschaffen in de diverse processen en de kosten die de afzonderlijke processen met zich mee brengen. Procesbudgettering heeft als randvoorwaarde dat valide en juiste procesindicatoren aanwezig zijn om het proces te kunnen beoordelen.

Outputbudgettering

Gedurende het budgetteringstraject is de informatie over kosten toegenomen. Men is door procesbudgettering in staat om kosten te koppelen aan activiteiten. Door de kosten te koppelen aan aantallen militairen die de activiteiten doorlopen hebben, kan men een patroon onderscheiden waarbij constante en variabele kosten te onderscheiden zijn. Men heeft dan een kwalificeerbare en kwantificeerbare relatie tussen input, proces en output.

Uiteindelijk zijn dus alle kosten toe te rekenen aan de output; de juiste aantallen opgeleide militairen die voldoen aan de operationele kwaliteitseisen van de commandant 11 LumbI Brig. De output bestaat uit:

$$xx \text{ militairen} / yy \text{ kwaliteit} = zz \text{ functioneren.}$$

xx is het aantal militairen; yy is de kwaliteit van de militairen, af te lezen uit de testen gedurende de opleiding; zz is het functioneren van de militairen, af te lezen aan de beoordelingen van de militairen of in een enquête met de commandant.

Randvoorwaarden

Om budgettering een doelmatig middel te laten zijn, zijn echter een drietal randvoorwaarden van belang. Ten eerste de omgeving van het schoolbataljon. De omgeving zal bevoegdheden moeten loslaten om zelfstandiger functioneren mogelijk te maken. Niet alleen het budget moet ontvangen worden, maar ook de bevoegdheid die bij het budget past. Ten tweede dient vol-

doende kosteninformatie beschikbaar te zijn. Zonder kosteninformatie zal budgettering weinig zin hebben, want men weet niet hoe en wanneer een bepaald budget uitgeput zal worden. Als laatste randvoorwaarde wil ik de cultuur noemen. Naast personeel en materieel dienen de financiën een vanzelfsprekend aspect te worden, bij het functioneren van een eenheid.

Aanbevelingen

Om dit geheel mogelijk te maken zijn een aantal aanbevelingen opgesteld:

1. Het vullen van de Sectie Controller 11 Lumbl-Brig en wijziging van de functie-inhoud van de administratiegroep van het schoolbataljon.
2. Deze Sectie en de administratiegroep zullen moeten beginnen met het opzetten van een kosteninformatiesysteem, definiëren van de kerntaken en activiteiten. Bij het opzetten van het kosteninformatiesysteem moet rekening gehouden worden met de voorbereiding op procesbudgettering, later outputbudgettering.
3. Tevens dient bij andere schoolbataljons een dergelijk budgetteringstraject gestart te worden. Indien men de activiteiten(kosten) weet, kan men aan de hand van verschillen in activiteiten, verschillen in de „kostprijs” per cursist analyseren. Dit is belangrijk voor de normontwikkeling van de kostprijs. Overigens, de eerste drie maanden van de opleiding, bij elk van de schoolbataljons, is gelijk.
4. Het opstellen van een Managementcontract waarbij de commandant van het schoolbataljon

afspraken maakt met de commandant 11 Lumbl-Brig over de aantallen militairen die geleverd moeten worden van een bepaalde kwaliteit. Het traject van opleiden is de verantwoordelijkheid van het schoolbataljon zelf.

5. De omgeving zal bevoegdheden moeten loslaten om zelfstandiger functioneren van het schoolbataljon mogelijk te maken.

De probleemstelling beantwoordend, kan gesteld worden dat het schoolbataljon gebudgetteerd kan worden. Dat zou dan kunnen gebeuren in het hiervoor beschreven budgetteringstraject. Er zijn echter wel een aantal randvoorwaarden die ingevuld dienen te worden. Daarbij dient het middel budgettering geïntegreerd te worden in de bedrijfsvoering, op weg naar een doelmatiger KL.

Verklaring van de gebruikte afkortingen

ACB	Algemene CrisisBeheersingstaken
AMO	Algemene Militaire Opleiding
BBT	Beroeps Bepaalde Tijd
BOS	Brandstof Olie Smeermiddelen
BOT	Beroeps Onbepaalde Tijd
BVBKL	Beleidskader Verbetering Bedrijfsvoering Koninklijke Landmacht
KL	Koninklijke Landmacht
NAVO	Noord-Atlantische Verdrags Organisatie
VAGOL	Voortgezette Algemene GrondOpleiding Luchtmobiel

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Aankondiging

De Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap houdt op *donderdag 18 mei a.s.*, ter gelegenheid van haar 130-jarig bestaan, een symposium in de Nieuwe Kerk aan het Spui in Den Haag met de titel:

De toekomstige relatie tussen Duitsland en Nederland

Tijdens dit symposium komen de volgende aspecten aan de orde:

- *een politieke beschouwing,
met nadruk op de samenwerking op het gebied van veiligheid;*
- *een visie vanuit de economische realiteit;*
- *de ontwikkelingen in de relatie tussen de Duitse en
Nederlandse krijgsmacht.*

De Vereniging wil met dit symposium een bijdrage leveren aan de actuele discussie in de Nederlandse samenleving, 50 jaar na de bevrijding, over de versteviging van de relatie tussen de twee buurlanden.

Opgave voor deelname is mogelijk vóór 1 mei door storting van f 40,- voor niet-leden of f 25,- voor leden van de Koninklijke Vereniging en studenten, op postbankrekening 2940159 t.n.v. Koninklijke Vereniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap, o.v.v. Themadag Den Haag.